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UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

23 April 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND (NAVCENT)

SUBJECT: SECOND ENDORSEMENT of Command Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (HSTCSG) Friendly Fire Incident and Class A Aviation Flight Mishap on 22 December 2024

1. I have reviewed the above subject investigation and concur with the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in the Command Investigation into HSTCSG Friendly Fire Incident from Rear Admiral Kavon Hakimzadeh, Investigating Officer, 14 February 2025, as modified by the First Endorsement of Vice Admiral George Wikoff, NAVCENT Commander, 17 March 2025.

2. The U.S. Central Command Area of Operations (AOR) is a highly dynamic and kinetic theater. It is essential that all Navy assets are fully mission-capable before deploying into the CENTCOM AOR.

3. Moving forward, I expect the NAVCENT Commander to provide to me a readiness and risk assessment for all Navy assets prior to those assets deploying into the CENTCOM AOR.

4. Given the kinetic nature of operations in the CENTCOM AOR, I recommend that the Navy review existing standards of deployment certifications to ensure those standards meet the current (and projected) threat environment. I will direct a similar review for all Service force providers.

(b) (5)

6. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b) (6) USCENTCOM who can be reached by telephone at (b) (6) or by electronic mail at (b) (6)

MICHAEL E. KURILLA
General, U.S. Army

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
PSC 901 BOX 10000
FPO AE 09805-0101

5830
N00/029
17 Mar 25

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on RDML Kavon Hakimzadeh ltr 5830 of 14 Feb 25

From: Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Central Command
Via: Commander, U.S. Central Command
To: Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7G, CH-2

Encl: (283) Command Investigation into HSTCSG Friendly Fire Incident, Commander U.S. NAVCENT Endorsement of Opinions
(284) COMUSNAVCENT ltr 5000 Ser N00 of 30 Dec 24
(285) COMCARSTKGRU FOUR ltr 3000 Ser N00/A01 of 7 Jan 25
(286) COMUSFLTFORCOM ltr 3000 Ser N00/S069 of 30 Dec 24
(287) COMUSFLTFORCOM ltr 3000 Ser N00/S070 of 8 Jan 25
(288) IFF Engineering and Technical Description of IFF Related Issues, 4 Mar 25

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

1. (CUI) I carefully reviewed the subject investigation. For readability, a copy of the opinions with my recommended modifications is included as Enclosure (283).

2. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1), (b)(5)



3. (CUI) I concur with findings of fact and opinions of the investigation officer, with the following recommended modifications:

a. (CUI) Modify FF 82 to read, "HSTCSG Group Sail event was specifically designed to foster integration amongst the Warfare Commanders. However, due to operational constraints, including a Military Sealift Command (MSC) oiler shortage on the East Coast and scheduled

Fleet Week, the HSTCSG integration training opportunities were reduced to two days, specifically limiting HSTCSG warfare commander integration for CVW (*PAPA*) and AMDC (*WHISKEY*). HSTCSG Group Sail (27 April 2024 – 4 May 2024) occurred prior to the unit level training of SWATT (3 -21 June 2024). Integrated Strike was not scheduled or executed during Group Sail."

b. (CUI) Modify FF 91 by adding, "GET was aggregated during fly days 23% of their first 3 months of deployment."

c. ~~(S)~~ Modify FF 173 by adding, [redacted]

d. ~~(S)~~ Modify FF 212 to read, [redacted]

e. (CUI) Delete FF 612-615 and 648-651 as not being relevant to the evidence provided, Modify to read, "Intentionally left blank."

f. (CUI) Modify FF 616 to read, "The 19 December 2024 modification to the Condition III Underway Watchbill signed 14 December 2024 for the four tactical watches, GET TAO, GET AAWC, XW FTAO, and FAAWC, shifted the watch hours of all personnel on those watches, in most cases, to times they were previously not standing watch. Four of the personnel assigned to those four watches were "dual hatted;" standing two different watches. One person stood a consecutive watch between two entities: three hours as GET AAWC and three hours as FAAWC, however, he was not the only person on the watch bill to stand a six-hour watch, and cumulatively, he stood the least number of hours on watch per day (nine). None of the personnel stood watch more than 12 hours per day. Of the four dual-hatted watchstanders, three of them were on watch during the mishap engagement: XW FTAO, GET TAO, and FAAWC. [Encls. 101, 111]"

h. (CUI) Modify FF 619 to read, "GET TAO, one of the people whose watch hours changed with the 19 December modification to the Condition III Watchbill, reported that in the 24-hour period prior to the mishap engagement, he slept his typical 4.5-5 hours, and also took a 2-hour nap immediately preceding his watch."

i. (CUI) Modify FF 652 to read, "All GET watchstanders interviewed indicated they had felt physically and mentally ready to assume the watch on 21 December 2024. The majority of the other watchstanders on the watch floor at the time of the engagements indicated they had slept or had the opportunity to sleep at least 7.5 hours, and believed they were ready to stand their watch at the time, including GET Tactical Interface Coordinator (TIC), GET EWS, GET TSS, GET IDS, EW Operator [Encl. 15, 16, 19, 21-25, 27, 69-71, 73-74]"

j. ~~(S)~~ Modify opinion 1 to read, [redacted] [FF 2-15, 17-18, 20-27, 260-269, 286-287, 314-316, 347-358, 361]"

k. ~~(C)~~ Modify opinion 2 to read, [redacted] [FF 36-37, 39-40, 96-139, 302, 310, 312-313, 317-325, 336-337, 342, 456, 461, 499-506, 508-510, 515, 541, 551-553, 559-582, 607-639, 641, 643, 645-653, 655-665]"

l. ~~(S)~~ Modify opinion 3 to read, [redacted] [FF 13-19, 21-26, 28-38, 42-44, 45-47, 51-53, 55-72, 74-79, 81-82, 88-89, 107-108, 117-118, 135, 138, 147-152, 153-161-162, 165-178, 180-210, 212-213, 223, 231-235, 237-249, 252-254, 257, 260-271, 274, 276, 279-284, 286-288, 290, 298-313, 351, 355-356, 481-482, 498, 500-501, 510-516, 518-523, 530, 532-533, 557-563, 562-563, 569, 576-577, 586-588, 590-604, 616, 640]"

m. (CUI) Modify opinion 4 to read, "The loss of Aircraft 107 and near loss of Aircraft 112 were preventable. Watchstanders across the CSG possessed sufficient information and the time required to prevent the incident, but failed to apply formal forceful backup, as expected, trained on, and certified. Lack of cohesion across warfare commanders and the CSG staff, compounded by a lack of integrated training, contributed to ineffective communication and informality. [FF 19, 38-41, 101, 110-114, 117-119, 124-126, 175, 192, 199-210, 218-222, 244, 267-269, 285-287, 289, 295, 297, 301-303, 306-307, 309, 317, 319, 321-322, 327, 330, 334, 341-343, 350-354, 360-364-369, 371, 374-384, 390-410, 492, 498, 500, 506, 510-511, 514, 526-534, 552-556, 562-563, 565-567, 570-574]"

n. ~~(S)~~ Modify opinion 5 to read, [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(1) [redacted] [FF 19-22, 28-29, 32-33, 35-36, 52-56, 59-60, 76-78, 80, 90-91, 96-97, 99-100, 106, 108, 122, 124-127, 134-146, 162-163, 180-181, 187, 194, 207-210, 212-213, 223, 236-237, 248, 259-260, 275-276, 278, 291-294, 298-303, 308, 312, 314, 316, 321-322, 326, 328, 331, 333, 338, 344, 347-349, 352-353, 354, 356, 357, 359-365, 370, 438-443, 445-454, 457-460, 462, 464-647, 472-474, 483-484, 499-514, 540-544, 552, 566, 565, 567, 572, 573, 579-585, 601, 603]"

o. (CUI) Modify opinion 2b to read, "Although in compliance with the TYCOM training and readiness requirements, shipboard training and qualification program for CIC watchstanders was ineffective and GET CO's oversight was insufficient. [FF 96-127]"

p. (CUI) Modify opinion 2c to read, "Unauthorized modifications to the signed Condition III Watchbill demonstrate a lack of formality and procedural compliance within GET. [FF 128-139, 616, 621]"

q. (CUI) Modify opinion 2d, to read, "Physiological and psychological factors may have degraded GET CIC watchteam and affected the watchteam's situational awareness. [FF 607-614, 617-618, 621, 620-639, 641, 643, 645-651, 655-665]"

r. (CUI) Modify opinion 2d(1) to read, "Increased level of fatigue caused by insufficient sleep, circadian rhythm desynchrony, and sustained cognitive loading may have contributed to reduced performance by key watchstanders and may have influenced the engagement decision. [FF 390, 607-614, 617-622, 625-639, 641, 643, 645-646, 648-653]"

s. (CUI) Modify opinion 2d(1)(a) to read, "GET's modification to its watchbill in an attempt to alleviate recognized TAO watchstander fatigue did not have sufficient time to take effect, and the altered rotation may have contributed degraded performance and situational awareness among key watchstations at the time of the incident. [FF 607-615, 623-624, 627, 630, 632-635, 639, 641, 643, 645-646, 650]"

t. (CUI) Modify opinion 2d(1)(b) to read, "A circadian watchbill, like the one used onboard GET, can protect against, but not completely eliminate, the reduced performance that occurs during the circadian trough (period between 0300-0500). [FF 610, 612, 614-615]"

u. ~~(C)~~ Modify opinion 3a to read, (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) [redacted] [FF 28-38, 42-44, 45-47, 52-53, 55-58, 60-71, 76-79]"

v. (CUI) Modify opinion 3c(7) to read, "Reduced integrated training opportunities during the ORFP and GET's limited aggregated operations with the HSTCSG (GET was integrated with HSTCSG 13 of 60 days preceding the incident) adversely impacted the interoperability between GET and CVW-1 in planning and executing integrated operations. [FF 81-82, 88-89, 153-162]"

w. ~~(S)~~ Modify opinion 3e(5) to read, (b)(1) (b)(1) [FF 176, 532-533]"

x. ~~(C)~~ Modify opinion 3g to read, (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) [FF 299, 301-313, 514]"

y. ~~(S)~~ Modify opinion 4a(1) to read, (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) [FF 301-303, 510]"

z. ~~(S)~~ Modify opinion 4c(2) to read, (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) [FF 125, 322, 570-571]"

aa. ~~(S)~~ Modify opinion 4d to read, (b)(1) (b)(1) [FF 572-574]

ab. ~~(S)~~ Modify opinion 4f(1) to read, (b)(1) (b)(1) [Encl. 199-210]"

ac. ~~(S)~~ Modify opinion 4f(5) to read, (b)(1) (b)(1) [FF 219-222, 554-555]"

ad. ~~(S)~~ Modify opinion 5b to read, (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) [FF 278, 291-294, 298-299, 301-303, 308, 312, 333, 356, 500, 510-513, 552, 567]"

ae. (CUI) Modify opinion 5p to read, "While not causal to the incident, the aircrew of Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112 failed to comply with the check-in procedures required by the CSG FADIZ SOP and CVW-1 Tactical SOP. Additionally, while not contributing to the incident, the Aircraft

107 pilot and the Aircraft 112 pilot violated Navy policy by making an unauthorized disclosure of non-public information. [FF 423-435, 496-497, 526-529, 532-534]"

af. (CUI) Add opinion 3a(4)(a): "GET's inability to conduct combat identification did not support her serving as the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Commander (IAMDC), Redcrown, or as an air defense unit within a CSG environment. If the GET CO, or the CSG Commander, or their teams had recognized this and taken appropriate action, GET would likely not have been in a situation which resulted in this incident. [28-50, 50-72, 74-79, 579-584, 590, 592-593]"

ag. ~~(S)~~ Add NAVCENT summary opinion, (b)(1)

(b)(1)

3. (CUI) I non-concur with the opinions 2d(1)(c), 4g and 4g(1), but concur with the following modifications:

a. (CUI) Delete opinion 2d(1)(c). The conclusion is not supported by the facts.

b. ~~(S)~~ Modify opinion 4g to read, (b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(1) [FF 330, 334, 327, 352, 351, 354, 371, 374-383, 390- 393, 405-410]"

c. (CUI) Modify opinion 4g(1) to read, "XB did not exercise command by negation in the 29 seconds between the first report of engagement and a report of 'birds away' targeting GB121 (Aircraft 107). CCSG-8 and BWC failed to recognize the developing friendly fire incident in the 92 seconds from initial report of GB 121 through the second 'birds away' at GB 123. [FF 330, 334, 327, 371, 374, 376-384]"

4. (CUI) I concur with the recommendations with the following modifications and recommend they be forwarded to the following parties for appropriate action:

a. (CUI) Recommendation 1 should be forwarded to all Fleet Commanders for attention and action.

b. (CUI) Recommendations 2, 4-5, 8-10, 12-14, 16-17, and 20 be forwarded to Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet for attention and action

c. (CUI) Recommendations 3, 7, 15, 18-19, 29, 32, and 39 be forwarded to Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command for attention and action.

d. (CUI) Recommendation 40 be forwarded to Commander, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery for attention and action.

e. (CUI) Recommendations 6, and 21 be forwarded to Commander, Naval Education and Training Command for attention and action.

f. (CUI) Recommendations 27-28, 30-31, 37-38, and 41 be forwarded to Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command for attention and action.

g. (CUI) Recommendations 35-36 be forwarded to Commander, Naval Air Systems Command for attention and action.

h. (CUI) Recommendations 22-26 be forwarded to both Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet for their attention and action.

i. (CUI) Recommendations 11 and 42 are under my cognizance and are being actioned. Recommend 42 be modified to read, "Recommend appropriate administrative and/or disciplinary action across the CSG."

5. (CUI) In response to the subject incident, but prior to the subject investigation's completion, additional stakeholders took immediate action to assess problems and identify solutions. The following actions related to the recommendations are already in progress:

a. (CUI) Immediately following the incident I requested an assessment by CSG-4 of GET's ability to defend herself, safely conduct combat operations in the CSG environment, and resume duties as IAMD, enclosure (284). The assessment team found the GET to be effective and proficient for these duties, enclosure (285). Additionally, USFF separately directed CSG-4 to, in parallel, evaluate GET's readiness to resume duties as HST CSG AMDC, assess the effectiveness of corrective actions taken since the incident, and determine additional support was required for GET to resume AMDC duties, enclosure (286). USFF reported to the VCNO that the assessment and validation by CSG-4 did not provide the information required for USFF to determine appropriate risk mitigations, and recommended additional personnel be assigned to GET to support the GET CO and GET watchstanders, enclosure (287).

b. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

c. (CUI) Intermediate solutions have been implemented to resolve GET's two IFF issues, which included mode 5 instability and loss of digital mode 5 to C&D, see Enclosure (285).

6. (CUI) This incident provides our Navy an introspective opportunity to improve our combat effectiveness across the enterprise. As the Fleet Commander, I failed to effectively assess the total risk accumulated within the HSTCSG when considering material readiness and strike group

proficiency in this combat environment. An accurate assessment would have inspired a questioning attitude and more effective backup in support of their operations.

7. (U) Per §0209 of reference (a), a copy of this investigation will be retained by the (b) (6) (b) (6) My point of contact for this matter is the (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) The office can be contacted at DSN: (b) (6) COMM: (b) (6) or (b) (6)

G. M. WIKOFF

~~SECRET~~

5830
14 Feb 25

From: RDML Kavon Hakimzadeh, USN, 1320
To: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

Preliminary Statement – Administrative Matters

1. (U) Per enclosure (1) through (3), this Command Investigation (CI) was convened by order of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and conducted in accordance with reference (a). NAVCENT convened the investigation to determine the facts and circumstances that caused or contributed to the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (HSTCSG) Friendly Fire Incident and Class A Aviation Flight Mishap on 22 December 2024 that resulted in the loss of F/A-18F Side 107 Bureau Number (BUNO) 166671 (Aircraft 107) and near miss of F/A-18F Side 112 BUNO 168493 (Aircraft 112). The flight mishap Aircraft 107 and the second Aircraft 112 were assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron ELEVEN (VFA-11) and Carrier Air Wing ONE (CVW-1).

a. (U) The units of the HSTCSG are: Carrier Strike Group EIGHT (CSG-8), USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN-75) (HST), Carrier Air Wing ONE (CVW-1), USS GETTYSBURG (CG 64) (GET), Destroyer Squadron TWENTY-EIGHT (CDS 28), USS STOUT (DDG 55) (STT), USS THE SULLIVANS (DDG 68) (SUL), and USS JASON DUNHAM (DDG 109) (JDM).

b. (U) The first friendly fire engagement occurred at 2325Z on 21 December 2024 / 0225L on 22 December 2024. The second friendly fire engagement occurred at 2326Z on 21 December 2024 / 0226L on 22 December 2024. Throughout the investigation some evidence, to include witness statements and chat logs, reference the incident time in Zulu (Z) time and others reference it in local (L) time.

2. (U) An extension to submit this report was requested and granted by the Convening Authority establishing a new report deadline of 14 February 2025.

3. (U) Throughout this investigation the Investigating Officer (IO) and investigation team consulted with [redacted], who served as the [redacted], and [redacted], who served as the [redacted]. The investigation team was led by [redacted] and consisted of: [redacted].

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

4. (U) All reasonably available evidence pertinent to this CI was collected. Interviews were conducted by the investigation team either in person or via secure telephone while embarked aboard HST and GET.

a. (U) Due to the delay in the investigation team's arrival to the deployed units of the HSTCSG, select individuals (personnel on watch and other key personnel) were asked to complete pre-interview questionnaires to assist with the memorialization of details. Additionally, immediately following the friendly fire incident, the watchteam onboard GET was properly relieved and provided an opportunity to write a statement memorializing the incident, these statements were collected, sealed, and stored in a safe onboard GET. These statements were provided to the investigation team upon arrival onboard GET. Not all individuals who were interviewed by the investigation team completed a pre-interview questionnaire.

b. (U) All of the individuals and witnesses involved with this CI were cooperative, accessible, and forthcoming. All individuals believed to have pertinent information were interviewed. Their statements were contemporaneously transcribed during the interview – an audio recording device was not used. All personnel interviewed were given the opportunity to review the transcribed statement and to request modifications or edits they deemed necessary to ensure the accuracy of their statement. Witnesses signed their statements with a wet or digital signature. All written statements and pre-interview questionnaires are included in this investigation report as an enclosure even if not referenced. On a case-by-case basis, as determined by the IO in consultation with the legal advisor, individuals were read their rights under Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

c. (U) Technical support for the investigation was provided primarily by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWC DD), and coordinated through Program Executive Officer Integrated Weapons Systems (PEO IWS) to other supporting agencies for specific weapon system data analysis. To provide needed technical background information, NSWC DD conducted a quick look of the data prior to the investigation team's travel into theater. Additional root cause analysis and RFI support continued throughout the investigation. The following organizations provided technical support to the investigation team, as described below:

(1) (U) NSWC DD conducted Aegis Weapon System (AWS) analysis of the event, integrating data from both USS GETTYSBURG and USS STOUT.

(2) (U) NSWC Corona provided additional weapon system analysis, to include reconstruction into a Simulation Display (SIMDIS) replay, and analysis of USS HARRY S. TRUMAN's Ship's Self Defense System (SSDS) data.

(2) PMA-213C provided coordination on the investigative team's Requests for Information (RFI) specific to the IFF systems onboard GET and the aircraft involved.

(3) Program Executive Office Integrated Weapons Systems (PEO IWS) provided coordination and responses to RFIs.

(4) Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC), Surface Warfare Technical Division (SWTD), provided additional quick look and tactical/technical analysis.

d. (U) All included documentary evidence is original or a copy that is a true and accurate representation of the original document. All personally identifiable information in this report was obtained from sources other than the individual and therefore Privacy Act statements were not required. All evidence gathered is retained at NAVCENT in accordance with reference (a), the responsible custodian is the (b) (6) (b) (6) .

5. (U) The following appendices were created to assist with comprehension and promote efficient readability:

Appendix (A) is this CI's table of contents
Appendix (B) is a timeline of the incident with each event supported by witness statements, deck logs, chat logs, net recordings, and system data. This timeline depicts events critical to understanding the facts and circumstances surrounding the friendly fire incident and is not intended to be a complete account of all events. This timeline will be in Zulu Time (Z)
Appendix (C) is a list of all individuals who are referenced in this report. The purpose of this list is to associate full names with the generalized individual role identifier used throughout this report
Appendix (D) is a full list of Acronyms and Abbreviations used throughout this report
Appendix (E) are additional facts required for an aviation mishap investigation that were not included in the main body of this report
Appendix (F) is a list of all References and Enclosures
Appendix (G) is a list of all Figures used throughout this report
Appendix (H) is a "Warfighter Primer" intended to provide a basic level of knowledge of Warfare Systems and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) needed to comprehend this report

Scope of Investigation

6. (U) NAVCENT convened this CI to determine the facts and circumstances that caused or contributed to the GET firing on two friendly F/A-18 aircraft on or about 22 December 2024. This investigation focused on the critical combat systems involved and the actions of key watchstanders and decision makers, both aboard the GET as well as others within the HSTCSG that contributed to the decision to engage two friendly aircraft. The scope of this investigation

focused on the time period immediately before and after the friendly fire incident, specifically 18 – 22 December 2024.

Executive Summary

7. (U) On 22 December 2024, the Commanding Officer (CO) of USS GETTYSBURG CG-64 (GET) and his Combat Information Center (CIC) team engaged and fired one Standard Missile (SM-2) each at two friendly F/A-18Fs. The GET CIC team believed them to be enemy Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). The friendly F/A-18Fs will be referred to as Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112. GET also engaged (i.e., targeted), but did not fire upon on a third friendly, Aircraft 211.

8. (U) The decisions to shoot were wrong when measured across the totality of information available to GET CO. Constrained by a series of previous actions/decisions (both in and beyond his control), the CO had low situational awareness, and his CIC team was unable to help him regain it.

Summarized Chronology

9. (U) HSTCSG entered the Red Sea on 14 December 2024. This incident occurred 7 days later, immediately following HSTCSG's first defensive strike against Houthi positions. The strike was successful and adversary reaction followed. HSTCSG air and surface units spent several hours defending the force against Houthi launched Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) and One-Way Attack (OWA) drones.

10. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted]

11. (U) At 0140L, the air threat picture was clean, and GET CO reported to HSTCSG commander that he held no tracks that met Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) profiles.

12. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted].

13. (U) In the 40 minutes that followed, GET and HST gave conflicting guidance to the remaining section of Defensive Counter Air (DCA) aircraft (and tanker) that remained airborne. On orders from the Strike Warfare Commander watch (XP), the DCA began their return to base, and while this was communicated in various ways, it was not understood across the force.

14. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted]

15. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

16. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

17. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

18. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted].

19. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]'s [redacted].

20. (U) This process repeated itself nearly verbatim and GET CO ordered the launch of a second SM-2 at GB123 (Aircraft 112), 5 miles aft of Aircraft 107, which had begun a left turn in response to the first missile launch.

21. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

22. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

Summarized Conclusions

23. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

24. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

25. ~~(S~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

26. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

27. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

28. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

29. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted].

30. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted]

31. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted].

32. (U) The issues inherent to GET and caused by casualty conditions could have been mitigated through effective planning and timely execution prior to the 21 December operations. Neither of these occurred. Specific failures in the planning process exacerbated an already challenging integration scenario for the strike group.

33. (U) Although the GET CO's decision to engage was in self-defense of his ship, the Composite Warfare Commander construct relies heavily on decentralized execution and command by negation. In this event, both XW and CSG-8 were not provided the time to effectively control engagements by negation and prevent the friendly fire.

34. (U) The totality of the circumstances, including the deficient condition of GET (IFF, CEC, and LINK 16 PPLI issue), deficient unit and force watchstander proficiency, and possessing the ability to have understood and mitigated both, conclude that the GET CO's decision to engage was neither reasonable nor prudent, and could have been prevented by action at multiple levels.

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

Findings of Fact

GET Materiel Readiness

Degradation of GET's Combat Systems

1. (U) Degradations to GET's combat systems fit into two categories. The first category includes documented discrepancies within the AWS Baseline (BL), peripheral systems, and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber and Information (C5I) systems specific to strike group interoperability. The second category is materiel condition or casualty configuration specific to GET systems at the specific point in time prior to the incident. The impact of each of these categories can be further related to watchteam readiness by measuring if the issue is observable to the watchstander in the normal conduct of the watch, the watchteam's recognition of the discrepancy where indications of the issue are observable, and the tactical impact rendered by the aggregate of multiple system issues active concurrently. [Encl. 4-5; Ref. b]

GET AWS Baseline and C5I Deficiencies

2. (CUI) GET AWS BL 9 A2.1.2.3BG was certified for deployment via a Combat Systems Certification Panel on 22 June 2022. Known system limitations were provided to the ship in the Computer Program Description Document (CPDD) and Crew Brief. [Encl. 6-8]

3. (U) The AWS BL specific to GET is shown in Figure 1. [Encl. 7]



Figure 1: (U) GET Certified ACS Configuration

4. (CUI) The certification and modifications to the baseline were reviewed in July 2024 via the Warfare System Certification Decision (WSCD), as reported in the WSCD Report, dated 11 November 2024, last modified (in the online repository) 21 August 2024. This report highlights an aggregate technical risk of MODERATE. Specific to interoperability, the report indicates: [Encl. 9]

a. (CUI) "Significant degradation in 5 of 5 Core Interoperability Functions (CIFs). The network management, surveillance and track reporting, identification, mutual tracking, mission management and weapons coordination core interoperability functions are significantly degraded."

b. (CUI) The WSCD report references the Interoperability Criteria Assessment Group (ICAG) Report of 5 November 2020. [Encl. 9]

5. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted], (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 4]



Figure 2: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

6. (U) Specific deficiencies noted in the interoperability report include [Encl. 4]:

a. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1)

b. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1)

c. (U) "Mission Capability Significantly Degraded means single or cumulative impact of issues are likely to prevent mission accomplishment or cause operationally meaningful limitations to mission capability and/or increased probability of fratricide."

7. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 6, 9-11]

8. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

9. ~~(S)~~ ((b)(1) ((b)(1)

10. (U) The CPDD addresses capabilities and limitations of the BL 9.A2 AWS computer program, and it is issued with each major baseline version and updated when computer programs are changed or new information needs to be communicated to the Fleet. Additional restrictions or limitations may be placed on operational employment of the Combat System. If applicable, operational restrictions are provided by separate correspondence (SEPCOR) from the cognizant program office. The CPDD lists each of the deficiencies with a title and brief description, with

[1] ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

little information regarding the frequency of the event or mitigations to prevent occurrence. [Encl. 6]

11. (U) In addition to the CPDD, NSWC PHD publishes an Interoperability Capabilities and Limitations (IOP C&L) web-based document for every platform configuration in the fleet inventory, including surface ship, aviation, joint, and allied platforms. The IOP C&L collects and integrates each deploying CSG or ARG into a collective C&L web-based document, consolidating an overall description of system capabilities across the force, while highlighting specific deficiencies across the system of systems. [Encl. 12]

12. (U) Some of the SWCRs listed in either the CPDD and the IOP C&L include mitigations, recommended temporary standing orders, or modified standing operating procedures that should be implemented to account for the deficiency and mitigate its impact. Many of the mitigations are not tactically feasible in a combat environment. [Encl. 6, 12]

13. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 13-14]

a. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 13]

(CUI) (SWCR 102845 / PR051388). NonC2 IUs 301 and 302 Missing from System (C&D, 2C). This issue documents the failure to convert tracks from the temporary LINK Interface Function (LIF) Local Stores Database (LSDB) to the permanent LIF LSDB. A review for this issue was submitted in 2021, stating the issue was being frequently seen during IDCT and recommending an upgrade from 2C to 2B. The failure to establish PPLIs and Interface Units (IU) when receiving valid data over the LINK was also reported by CG 62 in 2023 and was documented against 9A.2.1 in CPCR VB2459, Dropped IU Never Returns. A mitigation for these issues was sourced in 9.2.2 and CP22-1. [Encl. 14]

b. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 13]

c. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 13]

d. (CUI) SWCR 102845 is not listed in the CPDD onboard GET on 21 December 2024. GET CPDD is NSWCDD CID NO. 3081816, dated 15 July 2022. It was not listed as a safety or operational concern in the Crew Brief. It is included in the SHIP REPORTS document dated 28 October 2024. [Encl. 6, 7, 10]

e. (CUI) SWCR 102845 is annotated in the GET Interoperability C&L web document as a high-risk discrepancy, with the following text: [Encl. 12]

> (U) "When C&D Track Managers Are Out of Sync, Ownship May Experience Loss of Non-C2JUs. There can be occasions where C&D may not respond to an SGS/AC[2] correlation recommendation and/or Track Number correction involving non-C2JU[3]s. When this occurs, the PPLI data for these track will be lost and if the aircraft launch again during a later cycle, the PPLI will still not show up. If operators notice the loss of non-C2JU data and the same non-C2JU are expected during another cycle from the CVN, a C&D Cold Load should be completed to correct this issue. Operational Impact: Lost non-C2JU until a C&D Cold Load is complete." [Encl. 12]

f. ~~(C)~~ ~~(b)(1)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 13]

g. (CUI) GET was scheduled to receive an AWS baseline upgrade to correct SWCR 102845 in May 2025, after deployment. However, no recommended intermediate mitigations were passed to affected ships in order to limit the severity or minimize the occurrence of the issue. [Encl. 14]

14. (U) Of the 50 members of GET crew who were interviewed, less than 10 percent indicated they had familiarity with the NSWC PHD Interoperability C&L website. Only 3 members indicated they had read the 2024 HSTCSG page that provides a focused section on GET discrepancies. No one indicated they had knowledge of SWCR 102845. [Encl. 15-28]

15. (U) Interviews indicate there is no process in place for GET personnel to take notable system deficiencies (SWCRs) and apply mitigations into battle orders or temporary standing orders. [Encl. 16, 18, 20, 22]

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[2] Ship Gridlock System / Auto-Correlation.
[3] Non-Command and Control JTIDS Unit, for example, Fighter or Helicopter Aircraft.

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

16. (U) GET CO attended BL 9 specific training prior to reporting aboard GET; however, GET STO and GET ADO did not attend BL 9 specific training prior to reporting aboard GET. [Encl. 18, 21-22]

17. (U) NSWC DD publishes the CPDD and SHIP REPORTS document to the Fleet Support Operations Center (FSOC) website. The ship's Systems Test Officer (STO) and Combat Systems Maintenance Manager (CSMM) have access to the FSOC website, and routinely pull the updated documents for reference. Upon delivery of the CPDD, the ship is provided a crew brief including the safety and operational limitations of the baseline. [Encl. 6, 7]

18. (U) Critical updates or deficiencies are published by the In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA) in Fleet Advisory Messages (FAM), which detail specific technical findings and provide mitigations or resolutions. No FAM was published on discovery of SWCR 102845. [Encl. 12]

GET Materiel Condition

19. (U) Watchstanders execution of TTPs associated with the assigned mission area, in this case AW, are based on an assumption the weapon system and associated peripherals are operating in accordance with design specification. Any degradation from this specification should be noted, and if sufficiently impactful, documented in a Casualty Report. [Ref. c, d]

20. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

21. (U) In the weeks and hours prior to the friendly fire engagement, LINK 16 performance on GET was noticeably degraded. [Encl. 21, 33-34]

22. (U) GET suffered numerous losses of LINK 16 during the days/hours before the friendly fire engagement. [Encl. 21, 33-34]

23. (U) The previous watch GET TIC1 stated that PPLI's were not transmitting reliably during his watch. [Encl. 26]

24. (U) GET CSOOW1 stated that there were "lots of LINK 16 issues" on his watch on 22 December 2024. [Encl. 34]

25. (U) GET CE LCPO reported that there were issues with LINK 16 falling out of fine sync, but the duration of those casualties was short, often resolving before technician had time to respond. He did not recall how long this issue had persisted. [Encl. 33]

26. (U) GET CO, GET XO, and GET Electronics Materials Officer (EMO, and acting Combat Systems Officer (CSO)) incorrectly believed the LINK 16 (CO, EMO)/CEC (XO) casualties were CSG-wide rather than specific to GET. [Encl. 16, 22, 35-36]

27. (U) Post event analysis and troubleshooting onboard GET identified a degraded cable connection to the JTIDS antenna, which has been attributed to the intermittent coarse sync/fine sync issues leading up to 21 December 2024. [Encl. 31]

28. (U) IFF casualties were more prevalent and more widely observed than observed LINK 16 casualties. During the week between 15 – 21 December 2024, there was an average of 11.8 IFF casualties per day logged in the Combat Systems Officer of the Watch (CSOOW) log onboard GET. When performing to specification, there should be zero casualties per day and only reset in accordance with routine preventative maintenance schedules. [Encl. 32]

29. (U) Multiple watchstanders stated that GET had frequent IFF casualties. The GET IFF system was suffering from several types of intermittent failure manifesting as stale IFF video, IFF not displaying M5 video, IFF not correlating with CEC, and IFF spiral tracks (defined below). The severity of these issues varied from stale video reportedly affecting a single console at a time to more complex issues (i.e. processor failures) which would require a UPX-24 reset. [Encl. 21, 25, 34, 37-40]

30. (U) GET watchstanders were aware of recurrent stale IFF video on the TIC, IDS, AAWC AIC1, and AIC2 consoles. Stale IFF video means indications of IFF video (M5) which remain on the scope of the operator despite not having an associated track. Stale IFF video had occurred for at least one month prior to the friendly fire engagement. When observed by a watchstander, the stale IFF video was then reported to Combat System Coordinator (CSC) and then the Aegis Computer Network Technical (ACNT) watchstander would respond to correct the casualty. [Encl. 32, 34, 37, 39-42]

31. (U) GET watchstanders were aware of IFF intermittently not properly displaying M5 video. IFF video irregularities were most often associated with M5 "Ring around," where spurious M5 returns would be presented in a dense ring around ownship's position on the watchstander's scope, typically around 20 nautical miles (NM) in range. [Encl. 20-23, 33, 38, 41, 43-45]

32. (U) At least one week prior to the friendly fire engagement, watchstanders observed that IFF was not properly displaying M5 video. [Encl. 16, 23, 33, 38, 44]

33. (U) Several months prior to the friendly fire engagement, watchstanders observed that IFF had not been properly correlating with CEC. [Encl. 15, 17, 27, 33]

34. ~~(S)~~ b)(1) [Encl. 15-20, 22, 27, 34, 38, 41, 43]

35. (U) GET watchstanders and GET CO were aware of IFF spiral tracks appearing around the ship and being transmitted over CEC to other cooperating units, without the ability to filter. Watchstanders reported IFF spiral tracks occurred since at least the middle of December 2024. [Encl. 15-16, 19, 21-22, 38, 43, 46-47]

36. (U) Despite known issues with the IFF system, GET watchstanders had high confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the IFF system and continued to rely on it, even when observing the issues. [Encl. 16-17, 23, 25, 42]

37. (U) Combat Systems Maintenance Manager (CSMM) / XW Force Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (FAAWC) stated confidence in IFF was high, despite awareness of casualties, because "you still saw IFF on all our air contacts." [Encl. 25]

38. (U) During the six hours prior to the friendly fire engagement of Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112, GET reported internally to their CSOOW organization, five IFF casualties, including one system reset, but never reported these casualties externally to XW or in turn XB. [Encl. 19, 32]

39. (U) IDS reported the loss of ability to challenge IFF M5 [IFF Master Operating Panel (MOP) Overload] to GET CSC approximately 15 minutes prior to the friendly fire engagement. [Encl. 15, 27]

40. ~~(C)~~ b)(1) [Encl. 48]

41. ~~(S)~~ b)(1) [Encl. 13]

42. (U) Ship's force reported conducting the IFF Interrogator Side Lobe Suppression (ISLS) alignment procedure while in port Souda Bay, Greece, on 10 December 2024, IAW the technical bulletin released in fall of 2024. Upon arrival on 26 December 2024, PMA-213 technical

representative onboard GET discovered that the ship had conducted the ISLS alignment procedure, but failed to save the alignment settings. [Encl. 49-50]

43. (CUI) The OE-120 antenna system[4] was assessed as degraded based on onboard tech assist (OBTA) observations / recorded data from 29 December 2024 taper test, with approximately 12 of 64 antenna feed horns confirmed bad with an additional 24 of 64 antenna feed horns potentially degraded. [Encl. 51]

44. (CUI) Data analysis by PMA-213C (Combat Identification) indicated the lack of updated ISLS settings resulted in excessive clutter on IFF video resulting in reduced use as a combat ID / battle management tool. The technical assessment is that this was contributory but not causal to the engagement. [Encl. 51]

Casualty Reporting Requirements

45. (U) Casualty reporting is governed by several guiding documents at various echelons of both the operational and administrative chains of command. [Encl. 52; Ref. b]

46. (U) Surface casualty reports (CASREPs) are governed by the Fleet commanders, as defined in NTRP 1-03.1, Operational Reports. [Ref. b]

47. (U) NTRP 1-03.1 states: "A casualty is defined as an equipment or software malfunction or deficiency that within the first 24 hours of discovery cannot be corrected within 48 hours and which: [Ref. b]

a. (U) Reduces the unit's ability to perform a primary mission or results in loss of redundancy to essential systems for navigation, propulsion, or steering. [Ref. b]

b. (U) Reduces the unit's ability to perform a secondary mission. Casualties affecting secondary mission areas are limited to casualty category (CAT) 2." [Ref. b]

48. (U) Figure 3, from NTRP 1-03.1, provides the criteria and level of severity required for casualty reporting. [Ref. b]

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[4] Antenna for the IFF System

Casualty Category	Equipment Casualty Criteria
2*	A deficiency exists in mission-essential material/equipment that causes a minor degradation or affects redundancy or reliability in any primary mission or that causes a major degradation or total loss of a secondary mission, and the associated OPNAV 4790/2K form meets the following conditions: 1. For organizational maintenance management system (OMMS) ships: equipment status code must be equal to 2 (inoperative) or 3 (reduced capability). 2. For automated workforce notification (AWN) ships: equipment operating capability must be equal to or less than 0.5 (reduced capability). See Figure 1-5 for the AWN equipment operational capability chart. **A minor degradation is defined as an equipment casualty that does not directly reduce performance of the affected mission area, but affects redundancy or reliability.** Primary and secondary mission areas for each fleet unit class are defined in the ROC/POE OPNAVINST 3501.2 series of publications, located at: https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/rocpoe.aspx.
Casualty Category	**Equipment Casualty Criteria**
3	A deficiency exists in mission-essential material/equipment that causes a major degradation, but not the loss of a primary mission, to include: 1. Navigation, propulsion, or steering control systems. 2. Loss of TYCOM's or NFC's designated minimum equipment. 3. Consideration of the severity of impact to primary or secondary missions associated with systems or equipment that are left with minimal or no redundancy. And the associated OPNAV 4790/2K form meets the following conditions: 1. For OMMS ships: equipment status code must be equal to 2 (inoperative). 2. For AWN ships: equipment operating capability must be equal to or less than 0.4 (restricted operation). **A major degradation is defined as an equipment casualty that significantly reduces the unit's ability to perform a primary mission area to the designed capability and/or capacity of the affected systems.**
4	A deficiency exists in mission-essential material/equipment that causes a loss of at least one primary mission.
*Casualties affecting a secondary mission shall always have a casualty category of 2.	

Figure 3: Casualty Reporting Criteria

49. (U) Supplemental guidance relating to minimum equipment required for underway operations are dictated by the Type Commander (TYCOM), under Commander Navy Surface Forces, Pacific (CNSP)/ Commander, Navy Surface Forces, Atlantic (CNSL) 3504.1E, REDLINES instructions. [Ref. e]

50. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 52]

51. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5) [Encl. 52]

52. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 53]

53. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 53]

54. (U) CSG-8 adds supplemental guidance for CASREP and assessment through three means: Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), CSG-8 Standing Orders, and the CSG-8 Battle Orders. [Encl. 5, 54-55]

55. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 56]

56. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 5]

57. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 54]

58. (U) CSG-8 Standing orders direct the TFCC watch to "Maintain situational awareness on the status of Mode 5 IFF on units in and around the Strike Group's operation area. I expect all U.S. units to have fully operable IFF systems." [Encl. 54]

59. (U) CSG-8 Battle Orders direct that "all units shall maximize redundancy in system capability, capacity, and crew qualifications and proficiency. Continually self-assess and evaluate the impacts of system casualties, personnel shortfalls, and degraded proficiency in order to properly balance risk with mission requirements." [Encl. 55]

Reporting of GET Casualty Conditions

60. (U) There were casualty conditions in place onboard GET that were not reported to the appropriate echelon as dictated by instruction, including but not limited to, watchstanders not reporting observed casualty conditions to supervisory watchstanders, divisional and departmental leadership not reporting consistent and repeated casualties to shipboard leadership, and shipboard leadership not reporting known casualty conditions off-ship to CSG-8 or the operational or administrative chains of command. [Encl. 5, 32, 34, 37, 39-42, 54-55]

61. (U) Watchstanders and technicians were aware of GET's frequent IFF casualties but did not consider the degradation sufficient to warrant casualty reporting although established procedures, both Navy-wide and CSG-8 specific, direct reporting of casualty conditions, including the specific casualty conditions experienced on GET. [Encl. 5, 32, 34, 37, 39-42, 54-55]

62. (U) Stale IFF video was reported to CSC watchstanders. [Encl. 32, 34, 37, 39-42]

63. (U) GET CE LPO stated that, "IFF was the big one [troubleshooting problem] that we've been dealing with since I've been onboard." GET CE LPO checked onboard one week prior to deployment. [Encl. 17]

64. (U) GET technicians were in contact with distance support for IFF troubleshooting, but these degradations were not reported to CSG-8. [Encl. 17, 22, 33]

65. (U) GET TAO2 stated that his turnover included, "consistent things that had been going on" including intermittent IFF and spiral tracks. [Encl. 21]

66. (U) GET CSMM / XW FAAWC stated, "We knew we were having issues with [IFF and CEC], but we weren't seeing any issues which were outside of the norm. We were seeing IFF wraparound for M5 – which was happening since before I was onboard. We also attributed the CEC casualty to the timing issue, so we were keeping it down as well." [Encl. 25]

67. (U) GET OI LCPO stated, "We were experiencing sporadic interoperability issues, but I didn't recognize a trend." [Encl. 42]

68. (U) GET CSOOW2 stated that IFF casualties were a common issue. [Encl. 37]

69. (U) GET TAO2 stated, "We were having some IFF issues, but I wasn't aware that we had some at that instance." [Encl. 21]

70. (U) The Combat Systems submission of 8 O'clock Reports from 19 December 2024 did not mention IFF or LINK 16 casualties of any type, or reported with any tactical significance. The Combat Systems Night Orders for 19-21 December 2024 each listed IFF M5 degradation as a result of timing issue and that COMPID was not correlating tracks and CEC was listed as "UP" This was not accurate as GET CEC had been secured. [Encl. 57-58]

71. (U) Key personnel in the combat systems maintenance organization – EMO, STO, CE LCPO – were unable to describe the method in which casualties and system status should be reported to CSG-8. [Encl. 16, 18, 33]

72. (U) Combat systems equipment status and reporting was challenging after the CSG-8 N4A broke his leg in Oslo and was flown home from deployment. CSG-8 N4A was a combat systems LDO. [Encl. 20, 25, 59]

73. (U) GET CSMM was acting as the CSG-8 N4A for combat systems, while also covering for the gapped CDS 28 CSMM which limited his ability to focus on internal GET combat system materiel defects due to the additional workload. [Encl. 20, 25]

74. (U) As one of the primary AMDC planners, GET OPS would consolidate combat systems related CASREPs for the entire strike group that related to the AMDC mission for inclusion in the Commander's Update Brief (CUB) slide and briefing at the GET Operations and Intelligence (OPS/Intel) brief. [Encl. 59]

75. (U) GET STO stated that GET OPS was the primary conduit for informing CSG-8 of GET combat system equipment status. [Encl. 18]

76. (U) CSG-8 had no knowledge of the extent of the IFF issues onboard GET. [Encl. 60-62]

77. (U) GET CO believed the IFF system was working to specification, and only released a CASREP following the incident because the engagement demonstrated to him that the system was not functioning. [Encl. 22, 63]

78. (U) The CSG-8 AMDC CUB slide, prepared daily by GET AMDC Syndicate[5], included an assessment of capability for specific air defense missions, as assess by GET CO. The primary driver of capability assessment was this equipment status. The CUB for 21 December 2024 shows GET as degraded capability (yellow) but still assigned duties (asterisk) for HVU defense,

[5] The primary air defense planning organization for GET is the "AMDC Syndicate."

REDCROWN, SADC, and Air Control Unit. In contrast, STT is assessed fully capable (green), but is not assigned any duties, shown in Figure 4. [Encl. 64]



Figure 4: AMDC Core Competencies Assessment from 21 December CUB

79. (U) Individual ship combat systems statuses were reported on the ship "READINESS" slides in the CSG-8 CUB, with statuses as generated by CSG-8 N4 organization with support from the combat systems maintenance organization onboard GET. The READINESS slides did not include IFF or CEC status for any surface unit. [Encl. 64-65]

HSTCSG Deployment Certification and Training Cycle

80. (U) The CSG-8 Battle Orders state, "every ship, aircraft, and support unit must at all times be fully trained, qualified, and proficient to expertly handle the full range of combat operations." [Encl. 55]

81. (U) Prior to deploying, the HSTCSG completed the training and certification process of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP), a process designed to ensure units and forces are certified in defined, progressive levels of employable and deployable capability, with special attention given to the Red Sea, an area of known active hostilities. The major milestones associated with an OFRP training and certification cycle include: [Ref. f]

a. (U) Basic Phase – certified at completion of the basic phase with particular focus on AW mission area and completion of a final unit-level battle problem. [Ref. f]

b. (U) Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training (SWATT) – A five day inport and 16-day underway advanced training event where ships are trained in advance TTPs through the Plan, Brief, Execute, and Debrief (PBED) process through increasingly complex scenarios designed to prepare ships for the Integrated Phase. [Ref. f]

c. (U) Group Sail – A 10-day underway assessed event integrating the Cruiser and Destroyers (CRUDES), the aircraft carrier, and all Warfare Commanders into a multi-ship, multi-platform, multi-warfare environment prior to a final Composite Training Unit Exercise (C2X). [Ref. f]

d. (U) C2X – Certified at completion to deploy for major combat operations as a CSG. [Ref. f]

82. (CUI) [redacted] [Encl. 22, 60-61]

a. (U) When interviewed, CSG-8 COS stated that "we never really got a chance to learn from the integration … I would have liked to have [] a group sail longer than two days. We never got the chance to say "that does not work…let's try something else" We just had to be like that's done, that's done, and move down the list. We then had to move on to the next thing." [Encl. 61]

83. (U) On 26 August 2024, HSTCSG was recommended for certification to deploy by CSG-4, after having completed integrated phase training, consisting of Warfare Commanders Conference, Fleet Synthetic Training (FST)-Group Commander event, Force Protection Exercise (FPEX), Navy Undersea Warfare Training and Assessment Course (NUWTAC), FST-Joint, Integrated Air Defense Course (IADC), Group Sail, and C2X. [Encl. 66]

84. ~~(C)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 66]

85. ~~(C)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 67]

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86. (U) A review of FLTMPS report dates and event dates, indicates that of GET critical watchstanders[6] the following were attached to GET during the Basic Phase, Group Sail, SWATT, and C2X. Basic Phase 13/14, Group Sail 12/14, SWATT 13/14, C2X 13/14. However, during interviews, the number of personnel who indicated attendance of the training events were: Basic Phase 7/14, Group Sail 7/14, SWATT 7/14, C2X 7/14. [Encl. 15, 19, 21-25, 27, 68-74]

87. (U) Of GET critical watchstanders, 11/14 were onboard for IADC and 6/14 indicated they attended during their interview. [Encl. 15, 19, 21-25, 27, 68-74]

HSTCSG 2024 – 2025 Deployment

88. (U) The HSTCSG deployed from Norfolk, Virginia on 23 September 2024. The units of the HSTCSG include CSG-8, HST, CVW-1, GET, and the ships of CDS 28, which includes STT, SUL, and JDM. [Encl. 75]

89. (U) On 14 December 2024, the HSTCSG entered CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) with the exception of GET. GET was delayed after having to conduct a port call in Souda Bay for maintenance repairs from 8 - 14 December 2024. GET transited the Suez Canal on 17 December 2024 and rejoined the HSTCSG in the Red Sea on 18 December 2024. [Encl. 76-77]

90. (U) During the first three months of the deployment (23 September – 21 December 2024), GET operated aggregated with the HSTCSG approximately 43% of the time (38 of 89 days). GET was disaggregated from the HSTCSG approximately 57% of the time (51 of 89 days), with 31% of that time (28 of 89 days) on detached operations and 26% of that time (23 of 89 days) in port. However, it is important to note, that over the immediate 45 days prior to the incident, GET only operated with the HSTCSG 15% of the time (7 of 45 days). [Encl. 76]

91. (U) Although GET CO remained the AMDC, WHISKEY, GET watchteams only stood the WHISKEY watch when operating with the Strike Group, otherwise the alternative AMDC, CHARLIE, was activated. Figure 5 is a pie chart graphic displaying the % of time GET spent aggregated with or disaggregated from the HSTCSG. [Encl. 22, 76]

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[6] (U) AMDC and GET Critical watches are defined as CO, FTAO, FAAWC, TAO, CSC, AAWC, RSC, REDCROWN, IDS, TIC, MSS, EW Supervisor, and EW Operator who were on watch at the time of the friendly fire incident.

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

Figure 5: (U) GET First 3 Months of Deployment Breakdown

GET Manning

92. (CUI) GET Muster Report for Officers generated on 6 January 2025 indicates: Present at Quarters is 44; Authorized Absences (TEMADD Duty) is 3; Total Navy personnel (PERS) Assigned (Ship's Company) is 40; Attached TEMADD Duty is 7; Total Assigned is 47. [Encl. 78]

93. (CUI) GET Muster Report for Enlisted generated on 6 January 2025 indicates Present at Quarters is 303; Authorized Absences (Leave, TEMADD Duty) is 16; Total PERS Assigned (Ship's Company) is 283; Attached TEMADD Duty is 36; Total Assigned is 319. [Encl. 79]

94. (CUI) GET Muster Report for Enlisted/Officer generated on 21 December 2024 indicates Present at Quarters is 348; Authorized Absences (Leave, TEMADD Duty) is 20; Total PERS Assigned (Ship's Company) is 326; Attached TEMADD Duty is 42; Total Assigned is 368. [Encl. 80]

95. (CUI) Current as of 27 December 2024, GET billet authorization for Combat Systems Technical rates – Electronics Technician (ET), Interior Communications Electrician (IC), Fire Controlman Aegis (FCA), and Operations Specialist (OS) – are 17, 5, 26, and 32, respectively. GET Fit / Fill data for these rates, including TEMADD Sailors, are 94 / 94 (ET), 100 / 100 (IC), 92 / 92 (FCA), and 91 / 91 (OS). GET Fit/Fill for these specific rates was in accordance with (IAW) HSTCSG deployment certification. [Encl. 67, 81]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

GET Watchteam Readiness - Qualifications

96. (U) GET TAOs are qualified based on the GET CO's trust in their ability to stand the watch. No TAO boards were held during GET CO's tenure, which is contrary to line item 301.7.1 in the CRUDES TAO PQS which states "pass an oral examination board." Instead, the GET CO stated that he requires the TAO candidates to stand a "significant number of U/Is, and [he] observe[s] their performance in a CSTT scenario." [Encl. 22, 35, 82-83]

97. (U) There are six TAOs qualified onboard GET. However, the TAO watchbill was operating under a modified port/starboard structure (i.e. two alternating shifts) at the time of the incident, with the modification to enable GET ADO to cover some of the TAO watches and reduce potential fatigue of GET Weapons Officer (WEPS) and GET Chief Engineer (CHENG). [Encl. 22, 35, 47]

98. (U) GET XO stated the GET CO will not qualify GET Planning and Tactics Officer (PTO) as TAO because, "he doesn't trust him." A TAO board was not held for GET PTO. [Encl. 35]

99. (U) GET CO's policy was only IADC attendees could be assigned to stand XW FTAO. In his interview, GET CO stated "they have to have a significant amount of expertise – so senior DHs or LDO/Warrants in order to stand that watch. Again there is no board for that." [Encl. 22, 35]

100. (U) GET CO's policy was only previously qualified AAWCs (qualified on another ship) could be assigned to stand XW FAAWC. [Encl. 22, 35]

101. (U) FTAO, TAO, FAAWC, AAWC, CSC, MSS, RSC, TIC, IDS, REDCROWN, EWS, and EW Operator watchstations are associated to the correct NAVEDTRA in Relational Administrative Data Management (RADM). [Encl. 84-94]

102. (U) Designation letters for TAO correctly reference NAVEDTRA 43304-F. [Encl. 95-100]

103. (U) Designation letters for AAWC and CSC correctly reference NAVEDTRA 43398-26B. [Encl. 85-94, 102]

104. (U) All personnel other than GET AWO assigned as FTAO, TAO, FAAWC, AAWC, and CSC on the signed Condition III Watchbill have a signed designation letter on file. [Encl. 85-93, 95-102]

105. (U) GET AWO does not have a designation letter as AAWC or TAO. [Encl. 103]

106. (U) The XW FTAO on watch was not qualified TAO in RADM. [Encl. 104]

107. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 56]

108. (U) GET RC1 stood the REDCROWN watch from 1800 to 2300Z on 21 December 2024, but did not meet the requirements to stand REDCROWN, as he is not qualified IDS in RADM. When GET RC1 was first assigned to stand REDCROWN during C2X, he told his LPO that he did not meet the requirements, and had never seen the REDCROWN PQS. GET RADM lists IDS as a pre-requisite for REDCROWN qualification. According to the Condition III Watchbill, GET RC1 was assigned to the CIC Watch SUP position and was not listed as a watchstander for REDCROWN. As of 3 January 2025, GET RC1 was "still waiting for IDS qualification" as a pre-requisite to stand REDCROWN. [Encl. 41, 56, 83-84, 101, 105]

GET Individual Competency / Tactical Watch Proficiency

109. IAW CNSP/CNSL-3502.7 Surface Force Training and Readiness Manual (SFTRM), Warfare Area certification includes certifying the ship to sustain training through completion of Repetitive Exercises (REs) following the ATG's assessment. Ships are required to periodically conduct RE's following certification to maintain proficiency in each mission area. The ship's CO is responsible for ensuring the ship maintains, as a minimum, currency on REs. Ships will use their training teams to maintain proficiency in all mission's areas through the accomplishment of REs while in sustainment phase and on deployment. [Ref. f]

110. (U) GET does not track CIC watchstander proficiency and currency. [Encl. 35, 47]

111. (U) Although not required by an instruction, there was no indication that GET was tracking individual participation in CSTT training scenarios to ensure balanced training across the watchbill. Instead, watchstanders reported that the CSTT training scenarios were typically scheduled at the same time and therefore the same watchteam conducted the training. [Ref. f]

112. (U) GET RSC1 indicated he last sat for a CSTT scenario during basic phase and has had more junior Sailors sit CSTT scenarios since then. He assessed the CSTT training scenarios are pretty unrealistic since the scenarios cannot display clutter. [Encl. 70]

113. (U) GET RSC2 indicated their last CSTT training was in August 2024 and it did not accurately represent the Red Sea because there is a lot more clutter in the Red Sea, and CSTT had no clutter. [Encl. 71]

114. (U) GET RSC3 indicated last CSTT training scenario was in December 2024 in the Red Sea and the scenario was "pretty similar to actual combat experience." [Encl. 106]

115. (U) GET RSC4 indicated their last CSTT training scenario occurred at the start of deployment or during C2X and assessed the CSTT scenarios as more complex for RSC than real world operations. [Encl. 107]

116. (U) GET Anti-Surface Warfare Coordinator (ASUWC) indicated he sat through several CSTT scenarios during deployment, and the most recent CSTT scenario was in the middle of November 2024 slightly after GET was in Germany. [Encl. 108]

117. (U) GET ASUWC described the CSTT scenario as "a lot easier than the real world. Scenarios are less active we don't have the ability to do as much or make it as complex as the real world. A lot less contact management." [Encl. 108]

118. (U) When asked if the scenario complexity reflected real-world ops, GET SWO said, "No, the biggest issue with the scenarios is there are 3 of them," and "there isn't a CID challenge. […] It's easy to identify and it's not challenging." GET SWO further clarified that the CSTT scenarios are only a single ship starting from picture clean, and then they are engaged. He mentioned the scenarios are more focused on operator task saturation because they "end up being less of an ID and CID challenge," with a straightforward drone formation. [Encl. 47]

119. (U) In C5F-specific scenarios, the watchstanders are trained to expect threats to present as unknown, unidentified, or pop-up contacts inbound to the ship. Recognized Air Picture development is less of a primary focus. [Encl. 47, 70-71, 106-108]

120. (U) In accordance with COMNAVSURFORINST 1211.2A, "All air controllers must use Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Air Warfare Directorate (N98) Form 3560/9 Surface Air Controller's (SAC) Logbook to log flights and missions. OPNAV Form 3560/9 will be the primary means of tracking air controller proficiency and training. It will contain a complete, accurate and current record of all air control accomplished. The air controller designation date and all changes in qualification level and grades will be accurately annotated in the logbook. Type of mission column must include type of mission per enclosures (2) and (4). Controller logbooks must be signed monthly by the Commanding Officer. This duty must not be delegated." [Ref. g]

121. (U) The ship must report the currency of its air traffic controllers to the Immediate Superior in Command via a monthly training report (TRAREP) message. The TRAREP message must be submitted within the first five days of each month. [Ref. g]

122. (U) GET could not produce a record of TRAREP messages submitted for November or December 2024 indicating that those messages were not submitted. A review of the TYCOM quarterly training report indicates that GET did not submit a monthly training report for October, November, or December 2024. [Encl. 109]

123. (U) Six of seven GET Air Controller logbooks are not maintained in accordance with COMNAVSURFOR INST 1211.2A. [Encl. 110; Ref. g]

124. (U) When interviewed, GET CIC watchstanders made factually incorrect statements about Combat ID and Air Defense processes and procedures. [Encl. 69, 73-74]

125. (U) GET AAWC, EWS, and TSS made factually incorrect statements about the threat order of battle. [Encl. 69, 73-74]

126. (U) GET IDS and REDCROWN were unable to describe appropriate console operations for their displays. [Encl. 15, 23]

127. (U) GET IDS and REDCROWN were unable to describe the responsibilities for their watchstations. [Encl. 15, 23]

GET Condition III Watchbill

128. (U) On 14 December 2024, GET CO signed the Condition III Watchbill. [Encl. 101]

129. (U) The GET Condition III Watchbill lists GET WEPS and GET CHENG as TAO. GET ADO is not listed as TAO on the signed Condition III Watchbill. [Encl. 101]

130. (U) The GET Condition III Watchbill lists GET OPS and GET ADO as XW FTAO. [Encl. 101]

131. (U) The GET Condition III Watchbill lists GET EMO as XW Force AAWC (FAAWC). [Encl. 101]

132. (U) On 19 December 2024, GET implemented modification to Condition III Underway Watchbill for TAO watchstanders in an effort to permit more sleep opportunity to address fatigue concerns. [Encl. 20, 111]

133. (U) Modification to Condition III Underway Watchbill rotated TAO qualified watchstanders between the GET TAO and XW FTAO positions. [Encl. 111]

Unauthorized Watchbill Modifications

134. (U) The watch rotation for TAO was not in accordance with the signed Condition III Watchbill. The watchbill had only two TAOs listed, but three were standing the watch. However, the plan to modify the TAO rotation was verbally approved by GET CO. [Encl. 19-20, 35, 42, 47, 111]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

135. (U) The watch rotation for RSC was not in accordance with the signed Condition III Watchbill. The watch rotation was written so that watchstanders would have a 3-hour watch and a 5-hour watch per day, this was changes to two 4-hour watches. [Encl. 70-71]

136. (U) The watch rotation for RSC was modified by GET CSMM. [Encl. 70-71].

137. (U) The watch rotation for REDCROWN was not in accordance with the signed Condition III Watchbill. A non-qualified watchstander was standing a watch. [Encl. 41]

138. (U) The watch rotation for REDCROWN was modified by OI LCPO. [Encl. 41]

139. (U) GET CHENG held the collateral duty of Senior Watch Officer (SWO), responsible for watchbill production. GET SWO was not aware of any changes to the Condition III Watchbill other than the TAO modification verbally approved by GET CO. GET SWO stated that he was not aware of the modified RSC watch rotation or the modified REDCROWN watch rotation. GET CO also indicated that he was not aware of any other modifications to the Condition III Watchbill. [Encl. 22, 47]

Red Sea Combat Operations

140. (U) Since 19 October 2023, U.S. Navy surface units, aircraft carriers, and carrier air wings have been operating continuously in defense of coalition assets and commercial shipping. Houthi forces have conducted more than 200 engagements in that time, rapidly introducing new weapon systems or altering their employment TTPs in order to bring weapons to bear on shipping in the Red Sea. [Encl. 112]

141. (U) Figure 6 is an unclassified Congressional Research Service figure showing the Maritime Incidents and Responses as of 6 September 2024. [Encl. 113]



Figure 6: (U) CRS Maritime Incidents and Response as of 6 September 2024

142. ~~(S/REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] – [redacted] [Encl. 114]

Figure 7: ~~(S/REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

143. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 112]

144. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 115]

Battlespace Threat Intel/Weapon Kinematics

145. ~~(S/REL FVEY)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 116]

146. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 116]

Atmospheric influence on radar performance in the Red Sea:

147. (U) The Red Sea atmospheric environment presents a complex scenario for target fidelity due to small scale phenomena (diurnal effects, land/surface interface, mountainous terrain, high humidity, coastal cloud development, etc.) influencing radar performance and decision space for target identification, specifically against targets with small radar cross-sections and low altitude flight profiles. [Encl. 117; Ref. g]

148. (U) High humidity levels increase the amount of water vapor in the air, enhancing signal scattering and attenuation, further complicated by dust and other aerosols in the region. The increased moisture can result in signal distortion and multi-path propagation where signals bounce off different surfaces and return to the radar at multiple angles, complicating the interpretation of that data. [Encl. 117; Ref. g]

149. (U) The ducting patterns in the region can result in radar signals propagating over long distances, along the boundary layer, often beyond the radar's intended detection area. These ducts can reach objects or surfaces that would not normally be detected in standard atmospheric conditions, leading to enhanced clutter and multiple echoes from distant unexpected sources. [Encl. 117; Ref. g]

150. (U) The Red Sea atmospheric conditions influence the radars ability to accurately distinguish between real and spurious targets, resulting in doctrine adaptations to mitigate the impact of environment factors against known Houthi targets. [Encl. 117-118; Ref. h]

151. (U) These specific parameters, even more critical for the Red Sea, require system tuning to ensure clutter mapping and system configurations are accurate to the exact location to account for the sand and moisture in the warm atmospheric which are big players in the clutter return. [Encl. 117; Ref. g]

152. (U) The HST METOC team provided training to CRUDES watchstanders before entering theater to prepare the battle space. METOC related training was provided on 7 December 2024 to

GET. SMWDC also provided Tactical Action Messages (TAM), specifically for Red Sea operations, to influence doctrine set up for AEGIS systems, and lessons learned from IKECSG deployment. [Encl. 119-121]

Event Planning

General Facts about Event Planning Process

153. (U) Although a routine CSG Battle Rhythm for planning and decision processes existed within the HSTCSG and all Warfare Commanders participated, during the investigation indications of information stove-piping, integration concerns, and a lack of dissemination of the final planning products were raised. [Encl. 22, 60-61, 122-123, 134]

a. (U) When interviewed, CCSG-8 characterized the inclusion of Assistant Chiefs of Staff[7] (ACOS) into his decision process as "there is a good transparency in their field of work (area of responsibility) but whether they fully understand the full picture I can't speak to." [Encl. 60]

b. (U) When interviewed, CSG-8 COS described the commander's decision process as "[not] very formal – I've been trying to fix that. [So that] when we slap the table, everyone is in the room. But we (staff) have not been good at distributing the final product." [Encl. 61]

c. (U) When interviewed, CSG-8 JAG stated that "there are a significant number of meetings that are kept to the O6-and-above level. [] N2, N3, PAO and myself [] do not participate in a lot of those meetings." When discussing warfare commander integration, CSG-8 JAG stated that "sometimes, it seems like the first time issues are presented to the Warfare Commanders is during the Warfare Commander Board…I do not feel that the detailed tactical planning is happening across the Warfare Commander staffs…there is not a standard CSG-wide process to facilitate that planning, so it ends up being done ad hoc with different Warfare Commanders as the supported commander." [Encl. 134]

d. The routine CSG-8 Battle Rhythm for planning and decision processes, shown in Figure 8 [Encl. 22, 60-61, 122-123]

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[7] HSTCSG ACOS include N2/N6/N9/N3/N4/JAG



Figure 8: (U) CSG-8 Daily Battle Rhythm

154. (U) The CUB slides for 20 December 2024 and 21 December 2024 indicate: [Encl. 64-65]

a. (U) a range of 2-13 days (or 5.5 days average) between Initial Planning Conference/Operational Planning Team and Main Planning Group.

b. (U) a range of 1-2 days (or 1.6 days average) between Main Planning Group and briefing at the Warfare Commander's Brief.

c. (U) a range of 1-7 days (or 2.6 days average) between briefing at the Warfare Commander's Brief and briefing to Commander, CSG-8 (CCSG-8).

d. (U) a range of 0-2 days (or 1 day average) between briefing to CCSG-8 and CONOPS submission to NAVCENT.

e. (U) a range of 4-7 days (or 5.3 days average) between CONOPS submission to NAVCENT and execution.

Strike Planning for Deliberate Strike of 21 December 2024

155. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 124-125]

156. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 126, 127]

157. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 128-129]

158. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 128, 130-131]

159. (U) On 19 December 2024 at 1430Z, XB approved the proposed course of action for the potential strike during the Warfare Commander's Board (WCB)/ Commander's Decision Brief (CDB). GET CO was present for the WCB/CDB via Secure Video Teleconference (SVTC). [Encl. 22, 132]

160. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 133-135]

161. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 133, 135-139]

162. (U) On 21 December 2024 at 1200Z, a second rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill was executed the day of the strike with all CVW strike and DCA assets. CVW-1 personnel could not recall if any AMDC representation was present. AMDC LNO stated that he did not participate. [Encl. 134, 140-141]

163. (U) On 20 December 2024 at 1500Z, CVW-1 conducted a strike brief. The strike brief included CVW launch, employment, and recovery procedures. DCA assets were present for this rehearsal meeting, however CVW-1 personnel could not recall any AMDC representation. [Encl. 124, 140-144]

164. (U) In planning, tailored meteorological and oceanographic information were provided to HSC-11 in the form of a combat search and recovery (CSAR) kneeboard. [Encl. 145]

Meteorological Forecast for Deliberate Strike of 21 December 2024

165. (U) The released forecast for HSTCSG indicated no meteorological phenomenon that would meet no-go criteria for the deliberate strike plan. Observations validated the released forecast. [Encl. 119, 145-146]

166. (U) Environmental impacts to Houthi forces advised that there would be marginal, becoming minimal, impacts to Houthi UAV One-Way Attack (OWA) missions, with marginal to significant impact to Houthi small boats and USV operations. [Encl. 146]

167. (U) The forecast for the deliberate strike indicated that the moist onshore flow would interact with the terrain increasing cloud cover along the (western side) mountain range with the greatest cloud cover along the northwestern coast of Yemen. [Encl. 128]

168. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 128]

169. (U) Blue force sensor range predictions against known threats in the current environment are modeled using Builder with parameter and scenario-specific manipulations. Although the modeled scenario was not for the specific time, location, and bearing of the OWA profiles on 21 and 22 December 2024, it was representative of the atmospheric environment at the time. [Encl. 146-147]

170. (U) The reported SPY detected ranges were the same order or magnitude as forecasted. [Encl. 148]

171. (U) Surface-to-air ducting on the evening of 21 December 2024 and the morning of 22 December 2024 was slightly extended from average conditions due to an increased evaporative duct height associated with the influence of a frontal boundary, increasing probability of multipath interference for X band radar. [Encl. 146]

Deliberate Strike Mass Brief

172. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(1)
[Encl. 129, 141, 150]

173. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)
[Encl. 141, 151]

174. (U) On-deck indications of operable LINK 16 and IFF M5 were briefed as systems required by aircraft to proceed on mission. [Encl. 141]

175. (U) The standard communications game plan for launch was for aircraft to check out with STRIKE, then REDCROWN, then transition to the briefed mission frequency. When aircraft later returned to HST, standard comm flow was to check-in with REDCROWN, then STRIKE, then Marshal, and finally be directed to an Approach controller frequency. [Encl. 151]

176. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)
[Encl. 123, 129, 141]

177. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)
[Encl. 123, 129, 141]

178. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
. [Encl. 129, 141]

179. (U) The CG Class tactical publication specifically highlights that doctrine management process allows target criteria for automatic engagements to be defined precisely. This is of particular importance when coordinating missile engagements with the movement of friendly aircraft. NWP 3- 01.01 states that RTF radials should be established for DCA/SAM coordination. Exercise results have shown that friendly aircraft are normally not endangered by the proximity of an engaged hostile, but by being directly engaged themselves after being mistakenly identified as hostile. Aegis CGs can engage targets satisfying ROE, even if they are in RTF radials, by relying on SPY track accuracy, SPY continuity of track and track ID, M5 IFF, and speed and

altitude criteria in Weapons Selection DSs to discriminate those tracks from friendly aircraft. [Ref. d]

Air Defense Planning

180. (U) As the XW, GET CO was responsible for the planning and execution of the AMDC plan in support of the strike mission. [Ref. i]

181. (U) XW is the only warfare commander not co-located onboard the HST. As such, the XW relied on his AMDC Liaison Naval Officer (LNO) to be his direct representative for all AMDC planning onboard HST when he was otherwise not available. [Encl. 22; Ref. i]

182. (U) On 21 December 2024, GET Combat Systems Officer (CSO) was assigned as the AMDC LNO aboard HST. He had been assigned as the AMDC LNO since October 2024. [Encl. 152]

183. When interviewed, AMDC LNO stated that he "never did any organic WHISKEY planning here, just acted as a liaison." According to AMDC LNO, watchstanders in the XW FTAO and GET TAO roles do not cross over between roles. AMDC LNO stated this as an explanation for why he was not familiar with the role of the AMDC watchteam. [Encl. 152]

184. (U) The AMDC LNO was generally not involved in the air defense planning process but rather was perceived as a communications conduit and not a planner. Additionally, he was not present for all meetings associated with the planning for the strike mission and the associated overall CSG air defense plan. [Encl. 19, 141-142, 152-153]

185. (U) The AMDC LNO did routinely attend HSTCSG battle rhythm events, collect notes and RFIs, and pass information back to the GET planning team. Information flow consisted primarily of email, supplemented with phone call communication between LNO-OPS, LNO-AWO, and LNO-CO. When interviewed, the AMDC LNO stated that he would speak to GET CO maybe once a week. [Encl. 22, 152]

186. (U) The AMDC planning process on GET consists of routine planning meetings, AO level participation in the battle rhythm, collection and dissemination of CSG maintenance requirements, coordination with other warfare commander staffs, and CO participation in the senior leader battle rhythm events. [Encl. 18-20, 22, 25, 35, 59, 152]

187. (U) The primary air defense planning organization for GET is the "AMDC Syndicate," which meets at least twice per week, and included all force watch standers (ADO, EMO, AWO, OPS), CO, XO, and some junior officers. The AMDC LNO did not participate in these meetings. [Encl. 18-21, 35, 59]

188. (U) The lead planners for AMDC-related events were GET OPS and GET AWO. OPS was responsible for coordinating ship schedules and scheme of maneuver, and AWO was principally focused on Air Defense planning and integration with CVW-1. GET WEPS, the only IAMD WTI onboard GET, and the AMDC LNO did not participate in the AMDC planning process. [Encl. 18-21, 59]

189. (U) Routine planning products, such as the AMDC CUB slides, DIMS, and WIMS were produced by the morning watch XW FTAO, routed to GET OPS, then GET CO for approval before submission. [Encl. 19, 21, 59]

190. (U) Planning products for specific missions were initially drafted by AWO, reviewed by the AMDC Syndicate, then either shared with the AMDC LNO or passed directly to CVW-1 planners (by AWO) for cross-warfare commander coordination. [Encl. 19, 21, 59]

191. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 153]

WHISKEY Planning and Integration for deliberate strike of 21 December 2024

192. (U) The air defense planning for HSTCSG's integration to the provided CONOPS for the deliberate strike of 21 December 2024 did not use the deliberate planning process with input and buy-in across all warfare commanders, nor was it submitted to WCB for approval. The air defense plan was not generated through the AMDC planning cell, but was instead generated as a small part of the CVW's strike planning. [Encl. 19-20, 129, 151, 154]

193. (U) Initial tasking for the strike planning was passed to CVW-1, placing GET in a supporting role for an air defense plan that would supplement CVW-1's overall plan. [Encl. 19]

194. (U) AMDC had no representation at the AO level planning for the deliberate strike of 21 December 2024. The AO level meeting was held in Aircraft Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC) at the TS/SCI level. Although, the AMDC LNO has a TS/SCI clearance, he did not attend the planning session, as he did not take the appropriate steps to gain access to the space. The meeting was not hosted on SVTC. When interviewed and asked about his situational awareness of the air defense plan for 21 December 2024, the AMDC LNO stated "my understanding was not terribly high, I wasn't in most of those meetings." [Encl. 19-20, 151]

195. (U) AMDC planning team was not included in the initial planning and therefore required additional effort to catch up to the overall planning effort, specifically due to the AMDC LNO's failure to participate in the planning meetings onboard HST. [Encl. 19, 141]

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196. (U) The primary effort of the AMDC planning team was to determine DCA and Alert requirements. In addition to number of aircraft and stationing, there was a significant discussion of which Air Control Unit (ACU) would control aircraft. [Encl. 154-155]

197. (U) The primary ACU for the strike would be the E-2D, followed by HST, then STT. GET AWO recommended having an ADU (STT or GET) as secondary, but the CVW-1 AIC Supervisor pushed for HST to be secondary due to expected delays in "manning up" AIC stations on CRUDES ships. [Encl. 155]

198. ~~(S)~~ ~~b)(1)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 129, 154, 156]



Figure 9: ~~(S)~~ ~~b)(1)~~ [redacted]

199. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) [redacted]. [Encl. 25]

200. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) [redacted]. [Encl. 128, 157]

201. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 128]

202. (U) The air defense plan, as briefed within the CVW mass brief, included elements that were not approved by the AMDC nor published to all ADUs and supervisory watch stations. [Encl. 128, 157-158]

203. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 157]

a. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]" [Encl. 157]

b. ~~(S)~~ "(b)(1) [redacted]" [Encl. 157]

[8] "BULLSEYE" is an Air Land Sea Space Applications (ALSSA) brevity term indicating use of an established reference point from which the position of an object can be referenced by bearing (magnetic) and range (nautical miles) from this point. [Ref. j]

[9] Here RTF is being used interchangeably with RTB.

204. (U) The procedures outlined above, establishing PFID in the absence of PPLI, were provided via email from GET AWO to AMDC LNO. However, the AMDC LNO failed to pass this information to appropriate planning personnel in CVW-1. Therefore, this information was not integrated into any formal air defense plan or briefing products associate with the deliberate strike of 21 December 2024: Additionally, there is also no email record of this information being passed to the other ADUs. [Encl. 157, 159-160]

205. ~~(S)~~ b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 161]

206. (U) No members of GET AMDC planning team indicated they had received the CVW-1 mass brief. In interviews, no member of GET was able to confirm that a 15NM handover range[10] was in effect. [Encl. 16, 19, 25, 59]

207. (U) Promulgation of the deliberate strike plan to GET and other air defense units was provided in the form of a single strike scheme of maneuver slide (OV-1). This was not the DCA slide generated in the mass brief, but rather the Strike Scheme of Maneuver slide. GET OPS stated that she "used that slide and some other slides [she] has based on what [she] knew, and the air plan … [and] built a Frankenstein version of the brief." The brief built by GET OPS contained no information on the air defense plan. It also did not include a fires coordination plan, providing a delineation of either a MEZ/FEZ/JEZ construct, or a specific range for DCA aircraft to hand off engagement responsibility to ADUs as a means of preventing fratricide. [Encl. 21, 59]

208. (U) On 21 December 2024 following the Ops/Intel brief, a deliberate strike event brief was provided to GET's TAO, AAWC, CSC, and FAAWC by GET OPS. This briefing did not include all watchstanders who would be on watch in CIC during the event. Notably the TIC and REDCROWN controllers did not attend. The brief, while insufficient in detail regarding CID and RTF procedures, would have provided overall situational awareness to the missing watchstanders. [Encl. 19, 21, 25, 41-42, 47, 59, 129, 158, 162]

209. (U) When asked if there was a brief prior to the strike, GET RC1 stated, "There was a brief during the day, but REDCROWN was not a required party to be at the brief." GET RC1 referenced the ATO and HST Air plan on his computer to maintain SA to airborne aircraft. [Encl. 41]

210. (U) The plan for both the strike and the associated air defense plan was not well understood

[10] ~~(S)~~ b)(1) [redacted]

on GET. Across various members of the CIC watchteam, they did not understand the timing of the event, the departure and return to force plan, or the potential threat response. [Encl. 23, 25, 42, 163]

Event Execution

Network Status at Start of Event Execution

211. (U) All surface units (GET, HST, JTT, JDM, SUL) were in an active LINK 16 at the start of Air Plan Event 4. Event 4 was the launch of the DCA preceding the launch of the strike package in Event 5. [Encl. 164-165]

212. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5) [redacted]

213. (U) No units were established in a CEC network at the start of Air Plan Event 4. The other CEC capable units, excluding GET, were operating beyond line of sight before an airborne node is established and GET was operating out of compliance with the requirements of ID Policy ALPHA and had CEC secured. [Encl. 165-166]

214. (U) GET STO, GET CSMM, GET CSC, XW FTAO, and GET CO stated that GET was directed to bring down CEC prior to 21 December 2024, but could not recall who had given that direction. GET CO accepted the vague turnover that "Strike Group" told us to secure CEC. [Encl. 18-19, 22, 24-25]

215. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 19, 22, 25, 47]

216. (U) CCSG-8 was not informed that GET was out of the CEC network by CSG-8 JICO or GET CO. [Encl. 22, 60, 62]

217. (U) CSG-8 JICO stated that he was not aware that GET was not up in CEC. When asked how he would have been able to tell if GET was not up CEC, he stated that the SSDS console in TFCC displays who is participating. CSG-8 JICO admitted that he should have known that GET was not up in CEC and that he would have expected to be aware of an order for GET to not participate in CEC. [Encl. 62]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

218. (CUI) AWS is capable of receiving downlinked tracks from non-C2 JTIDS Units (non-C2JUs), through a process known as TACAIR Integration, in the AWS. Although Two-Way Data Exchange (positive electronic control of an aircraft) is not authorized, AWS is still authorized for TACAIR integration. GET was receiving non-C2JU "fighter backlink tracks" consistently throughout the event. Functions of TACAIR integration can be seen in Figure 10. [Encl. 12, 167-169]


(b)(1)

Figure 10: (U) Tactical Air Integration with Non-C2Jus Downlink Track Initiation Table

219. (U) Watchstanders did not have knowledge of active receipt of fighter backlink tracks or how they were displayed on the AWS. [Encl. 16, 19, 27]

220. (U) There is no published TTP on use, little mention of the capability in the Aegis C&L document, and TACAIR integration is not currently trained to watchstanders. [Encl. 170]

221. (U) TACAIR integration functionality and displays are described in the IOP C&L and in the Aegis Combat Systems Console Operators (CSCO) Introduction. [Encl. 48, 50]

222. (U) TACAIR integration is visible to the operator by white block lettering superscript on the track, as shown in Figure 11. Additional modifiers on the superscript are described in Table 11-29 of the CSCO Introduction, Figure 12. [Encl. 48, 168]

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

Figure 11: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

Table 11-29. (U) Superscripts

Letter	Significance
F	Track is being downlinked by way of Link-4A or Link-16
L	Track is being uplinked and/or downlinked by way of Link-4A or Link-16
K	Track is being downlinked by way of Link-4A or Link-16 and has been correlated with another C&D track
U	Track is being downlinked and uplinked by way of Link-4A or Link-16 and has been correlated with another C&D track
A	Track is designated as ID Ambiguous.
u	UAV candidate
UNCLASSIFIED	

Figure 12: (U) ADS Track Superscripts

Notable Events during Deliberate Strike of 21 December 2024

223. (U) Prior to the HST Event 4 launch, CSG-8 Maritime Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Officer (MISR) reported Indications and Warnings (I&W) of KAS-04 OWA drone and P-351 ASCM launch preparations in progress in the vicinity of Sana'a. These launch

preparations occurred earlier than CVW-1 anticipated based on the briefed expected threat reaction. [Encl. 129, 171]

224. (U) When launched, all Event 4 CVW assets were in an active LINK 16 network. The E-2D Side 600 (Aircraft 600) utilized track block BT000-BT777 for NPG 7 surveillance track reporting. [Encl. 172]

225. (U) At 1649Z, the Event 4 DCA, Corsair flight (113, 203, 207, 300) and at 1711Z, Aircraft 600 launched and proceed to station. [Encl. 152, 165, 173-174]

226. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1)

227. (U) Aircraft 600 coordinated the initiation of a CEC network once at altitude and within line of sight to HST and JDM. [Encl. 165, 177]

228. (U) At 1815Z, GET initiated LINK 16 troubleshooting due to not receiving tracks from HST or STT, and reported "loss of LINK 16" to XW. XW did not transfer duties to XC. [Encl. 164]

229. (U) From 1818Z to 1837Z, the Event 5 strike package is launched in accordance with the SIGCON guidance. All strike aircraft had operable LINK 16, this has been verified through post flight analysis. [Encl. 165]

230. (U) At 1821Z, CSG-8 MISR generated TACREP "X-M02" indicating a P-351 ASCM launch and periodically provided positional updates to the threat. This information is posted in ADC C&R and CMD Chat windows. Aircraft 600 correlated an unknown RADAR track to an X-M02 update and reported to XW that the track was 278NM from HST. [Encl. 152, 177]

231. (U) Simultaneously, Aircraft 600 detected and reported three tracks that were 235NM from HST and evaluated them as KAS-04 OWA. Aircraft 600 recommended targeting all threats with Corsair flights 1-4. Three minutes later, XB BWC asked XB FTAO what the track number was for the "LACM," and CSG-8 FTAO reported they did not have a track on the "LACM". [Encl. 165, 177]

232. (U) Aircraft 600 committed each Corsair flight to target the P-351 ASCM and KAS-04s. After the initial targeting of P-351 ASCM and KAS-04 had concluded, Aircraft 600 tracked and reported a stream raid comprised 7 KAS-04 tracking toward the CSG, as close as 175NM to HST. While Corsair flight targeted the P-351 ASCM and KAS-04s, the strike package proceeded to the "decision point" and relayed "Hammer/Axe attack" with "Min Go" requirements satisfied. [Encl. 165, 178]

233. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) responsible for controlling the DCA. [Encl. 141, 173, 175-176]

234. (U) At 2003Z, after all ordnance was expended, the strike package passed "MILLER TIME[11]," and Aircraft 600 relayed the status of the strike through multiple C2 channels. The strike package proceeded to the egress flow point and executed an RTB to HST. Aircraft 603 actively tracked and reported an additional eight KAS-04 airborne at the time the strike package reported "ft [feet] wet." [Encl. 165, 178]

235. (U) Almost immediately after the strike package launched, there was an earlier than anticipated Houthi response, which led to extensive targeting of available DCA to airborne threats. Since DCA were committed and were unsuccessful in prosecuting OWA and ASCM threats, an assessment was made in TFCC that additional DCA were required. [Encl. 60, 130]

236. (U) At 2014Z, GET reported its LINK 16 is still down and estimates it will return at 2100Z. XW did not transfer duties to XC. At 2104Z, GET reported its LINK 16 is restored. [Encl. 166]

237. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1)

Flex Deck Op



Figure 13: ~~(C)~~ (b)(1)

[11] (U) "MILLER TIME" is an ALSSA brevity term indicating completion of air-to-surface ordinance delivery. [Ref. j]

238. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

239. (U) The HST flight logs managed by Carrier Air Traffic Control Center (CATCC) lists seven tanker sorties total. In accordance with Aviation Mishap procedures, Aircraft 107 tanker sorties that were flown by the Aircraft 107 pilot and the Aircraft 107 WSO were removed by CATCC. In total, ten tanker sorties were executed. [Encl. 173, 179-181]

240. (U) Aircraft 411 recovered onboard HST at 2305Z, and was the final fixed-wing aircraft recovery prior to the friendly fire engagements of Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112. They were directed to refuel and hold position. In total, at the time of the friendly fire engagements, there were six fully-fueled tankers online and awaiting orders to launch. [Encl. 173, 182]

241. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

242. (U) In total, throughout the flight schedule there were seven additional fixed-wing sorties flown. Additionally, in total, at the time of the friendly fire engagements, there were six fully-fueled tankers online and awaiting orders to launch. [Encl. 139, 173, 179-180, 182]

243. (U) The normal process of an Alert tanking plan and specific "line up" side numbers being passed from ROMEO to WHISKEY did not occur effectively in the "pick-up game" as the HSTCSG shifted to flex-deck operations. [Encl. 22, 123, 130, 183]

244. (U) Carrier Air Traffic Control Center (CATCC) includes multiple controllers for managing the safe departure and arrival of aircraft inside the Carrier Control Area, defined as 50NM. Marshal Control is a position in CATCC responsible for providing control and arrival information to inbound aircraft until handed off to another controlling agency, usually the Approach controllers who are responsible for providing positive control of aircraft during Case II and Case III recoveries. Jet/turboprop aircraft executing a radar approach (radar vectors) shall be vectored to intercept final bearing, and transition to a landing configuration as directed. An enroute radar approach may be used to place the flight in in the proper approach sequence. [Encl. 184; Ref. k]

[12] (U) "Flex Deck" refers to a mode of flight deck operations that allows aircraft to land and launch at any time, not just during a cycle.

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

Strike Package Return / Re-Role as DCA

245. (U) XB ordered the targeting of all "possible OWAUAS" through the XP watchstander. XP and the E-2s coordinated ad-hoc alert tanker and DCA aircraft, and lassoed strike aircraft to assume a DCA role via J-Voice A which was not IAW the OPTASK AMD lasso procedure. [Encl. 171, 178, 185]

246. (U) To accommodate the assessed need for DCA, multiple strike package aircraft were lassoed into a DCA role throughout the HST flex deck operations. Using the CWC construct, this lasso should have been requested by XW to fill a need for the air defense picture, however it was directed from TFCC via XP to the airborne E-2D. [Encl. 171, 178, 185; Ref. I]

247. (U) Four strikers in total were lassoed into a DCA role. Tanker-configured Aircraft 107 assisted in the DCA role on two of their sorties. Aircraft 112 recovered from Event 4 and was instructed to set an Alert 5 posture instead of the planned Alert 15, and launched shortly thereafter with Aircraft 211. In total, 14 different DCA sorties occurred over the course of 4 hours, involving a total of 11 individual aircraft, in comparison to the original 6 scheduled DCA sorties. [Encl. 139, 150, 166]

248. (U) The extensive flex deck operations and increase in number of assets used for DCA caused confusion for the ADUs as to the overall air picture, as ADUs were not expecting to see such a robust CVW-1 DCA response via lassoed Striker assets. When interviewed, GET CO in his XW capacity stated that the re-role of the strikers as DCA was not expected and he was "surprised." Instead, he stated that "I expected [] the DCA would stay up and others would RTB…from our vantage point, it looked like they were re-roleing everyone." Once he realized what was happening, he "called the Admiral to talk about it." [Encl. 22]

Strike Package Recovers and DCA Remains Airborne

249. (U) At 2057Z, the strike package began recovery onboard HST. At 2151Z, the strike package recovery was completed. [Encl. 173, 176]

250. (U) From 2109Z to 2118Z, SUL and JDM, positioned 155NM South of the CSG, each engaged a single KAS-04 with SM-2. XW negated a request from SUL to re-engage an assessed leaker and directed JDM to "cease engagement on all tracks." XW stated the remaining tracks were believed to be clutter. However, Aircraft 600 was actively tracking two KAS-04 after this engagement sequence. [Encl. 166, 186]

251. (U) Aircraft 603 committed the section of DCA (Aircraft 112 and Aircraft 211) to target the remaining KAS-04 to the North and outbound of JDM and SUL. [Encl. 165-166]

252. (U) At 2147Z, XW FTAO informs Papa and Closeout on CLOSEOUT_SHOWOUT chat that "XW Actual" directs "all DCA recover, followed by tankers and other aircraft – E-2s last, all fixed-wing RTB." [Encl. 171]

253. (U) At 2149Z, XW directs via chat that all remaining airborne fixed-wing aircraft to return to HST and recover, citing the inability to "get a read on poss OWAs with mode swaps with friendlies, k." The GET CO stated he directed this because he had misunderstood the direction from XB to bring some aircraft home to make it easier to manage the air picture. [Encl. 22, 25, 166]

254. (U) XB negated XW's direction to recover all aircraft, and, following a VOSIP call between CCSG-8 and the GET CO, XP directed via J Voice and CLOSEOUT_SHOWOUT chat that two sections of DCA (later reduced to one) and an E-2 would remain airborne. [Encl. 22, 25, 60, 171]

255. (U) At 2153Z, XW FTAO informed XP and Closeout on CLOSEOUT_SHOWOUT chat that "XB actual" directed that two sections of DCA, one E-2, and required tankers were to remain airborne. [Encl. 171]

256. (U) At 2209Z, XB told XW via ADC chat that "we will maintain 2x DCA and 1x E-2 airborne." This was acknowledged by XW, who asked for confirmation of whether it is 2 sections or 2 aircraft. XB confirms that it is 2x aircraft. [Encl. 166, 171]

257. (U) At 2213Z, XB tells XW via CTF50 CMD Chat that "we are in the process of recovering all aircraft." This is acknowledged by XW. [Encl. 178]

258. (U) At 2227Z, Aircraft 603 reported committing CR 6/7 against two contacts held by HST and JDM. At 2231Z this is reported to XB by XW. [Encl. 166]

259. (U) At 2231Z, Aircraft 107, Aircraft 112, and Aircraft 211 are visible on GET AAWC's scope with quick tags applied matching their squadron callsigns, shown in Figure 14. [Encl. 168]

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

Figure 14: ~~(S)~~ ~~(b)~~(1)

260. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)

261. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

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

Figure 15: (~~S~~) b)(1)

262. (~~S~~) b)(1)
b)(1)
(b)(1) [Encl. 187]

263. (U) At 2244Z, Aircraft 603 communicated that it does not hold a track, noting possible degradation to its RAP. Following this engagement, Aircraft 603 requested ROCK (BULLSEYE) because they did not hold that track. Aircraft 603 continued to ask for the track data to be passed with a BULLSEYE cut. [Encl. 166, 177]

264. (U) At 2252Z, Aircraft 603 stated on ADC_Chat that they are troubleshooting radar and requests HST to come up control. This was not acknowledged by XW but is acknowledged by HST AIC at 2253Z. [Encl. 166]

265. (U) At 2253Z, Aircraft 603 reported "midnight[13]" to XP on the CLOSEOUT_SHOWOUT chat. [Encl. 171]

[13] (U) "MIDNIGHT" is an ALSSA brevity term, indicating C2 sensors are unavailable due to degradation. [Ref. j]

266. (U) Approximately 4 minutes after the engagement call from STT, XW responded to Aircraft 603 that it "was IVO STT, first detect was ROCK 326/415." [Encl. 166]

267. (~~S~~) [redacted] [Encl. 188]

268. (~~S~~) [redacted] [Encl. 188].



Figure 16: (~~S~~) [redacted]

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[14] (~~S~~) [redacted] [Encl. WU, 170]

269. (~~S~~) (b) (1) (A) [Encl. 188]

270. (U) Shortly after this event, XB directed XW to change BULLSEYE from ROCK to SWITCH. [Encl. 134, 141, 166, 178]

271. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 166, 171, 177]

272. (U) At 2254Z, on GET AAWC scope the watchstander attempted to log onto the remote desktop for chat but is unable to do so. The server remained down until sometime after the engagement. Anyone who was logged in remains logged in, but new users are unable to log in to chat. [Encl. 24, 69]

273. (U) At approximately 2300Z, GET ADO relieved GET TAO1 as GET TAO2. As GET TAO2, he was also unable to log on to chat. [Encl. 21]

274. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 166]

275. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 166]

276. (U) At 2305Z, Aircraft 411 was recovered onboard HST. This is the last fixed-wing recovery that occurred prior to the friendly fire engagement of Aircraft 107. [Encl. 173]

277. (U) At 2306Z, XW reported to XB via CTF-50 CMD chat that they were setting CR to VL 16C. [Encl. 178]

278. (U) At 2310Z, BIG CHIEF 706 (Helo 706), GET's embarked MH-60R, was standing by to the Southeast of GET for recovery. Helo 706 had approximately 25 minutes of fuel remaining, and was scheduled to recover for a "hot pump." GET initiated the setting of flight quarters and XZ reported to XB via CTF50 CMD Chat, that GET was setting flight quarters for refueling and crew swap of Helo 706. [Encl. 108, 178, 189]

279. (U) At 2310Z, XP asked Aircraft 603 for a status update on their Radar. [Encl. 171]

[15] (~~S~~) (b)(1)

280. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 166]

281. (U) Also at 2311Z via J Voice A, XP passed to all for "everyone to start making your way back to mom for recovery." This order was acknowledged by CR 6, Texaco, and H. When interviewed, CCSG-8 stated that he called XW via VOSIP and informed XW that "I intend to recover all fixed-wing aircraft since the E-2 radar did not come up following tanking." The specific time of this phone call cannot be confirmed. [Encl. 60, 182]

282. (U) Also at 2311Z, XW and XB exchanged several chats regarding engagement kinematics for storyboard development. [Encl. 166, 178]

283. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 141, 166]

284. (U) At 2314Z, on J Voice A CR 6 reported to H that they were advised by XP to "retrograde" to mom. [Encl. 182]

285. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 166]

286. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 178, 188]

287. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 166]

288. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 168]

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

Figure 17: (S) b)(1)

289. (U) At 2316Z, HST communicated the RTB of Aircraft 112 and Aircraft 211 to XW via ADC Chat. At 2317Z, H again passes via ADC Chat to XW that "CR 6/7 RTB, still under H control, standing by for follow-on plan from XW/XP." Neither of these transmissions are acknowledged by XW. As the aircraft RTB, the approximate heading for recovery is 340 magnetic. [Encl. 166]

Engagement Decision – Shot on Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112

Force Laydown at Engagement

290. (U) The force laydown, including the Southern SAG at 2324Z, is provided in Figure 18. The force laydown focusing on the vicinity of HST during recovery process at 2324Z is provided in Figure 19. These are latitude and longitude values extracted from THRESHER ES and PPLI data with graphical depictions of surface vessels and aircraft with respective headings extracted from ADS replays in order to enhance reader situational awareness. [Encl. 29, 45, 190]



Figure 18: (~~S~~) (b)(1)



Figure 19: (~~S~~) (b)(1)

291. (U) For the duration of the event, GET was assigned a sector station of 075-255 at 5-10NM with HST as the guide. [Encl. 191]

292. (U) GET maintained a northerly course, between 330 and 040 from 1752Z throughout the friendly fire incident. [Encl. 192]

293. (U) The deliberate strike weather brief listed winds from the North-Northwest at 15-20kts from launch through planned recovery. [Encl. 193]

294. (U) In his interview, the GET ASUWC stated that the HST was on a steady Northwest course and speed for most of the watch. [Encl. 108]

Engagement Critical Timeline

295. (U) For ease of understanding this critical timeline, the investigation team developed a graphic of the Engagement Critical Timeline of the Friendly Fire Incident, shown in Figure 20. In addition, during post-event analysis, NSWC Corona developed a Simulation Display (SIMDIS) Replay from GET C&D Data and relevant network audio files. [Encl. 13, 29, 45, 177, 182, 194-196, 168, 194-195, 197-198, 273]

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

Figure 20: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

296. (U) At 2318Z, the GET AAWC primary hooked a track correlating to Aircraft 107, located south of GET at approximately 60NM. The track hooked is an unknown track, flying in close proximity to a friendly track. The two tracks together correlate to Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112 together, shown in Figure 21. [Encl. 168]



Figure 21: b(1)

297. (U) At 2318Z, Aircraft 107 checked in with the Marshal controller and was passed radar vectors, as well as approach instructions. [Encl. 184]

298. (U) At 2318Z, Helo 706 requested combat systems green deck from the GET tower, which was relayed to the GET bridge, the GET TAO2 in CIC, and eventually to the GET CO in CIC. The GET CO gave permission for green deck. [Encl. 21, 189]

299. (U) The bridge, having obtained permission for combat systems green deck, then requested setting of combat systems green deck. The practice of setting combat systems green deck included setting SPY to low-power aft at a "non-specified range as the helo came in close" then inhibiting radiation across a 180-degree sector aft. This procedure was practiced to "minimize" the time spent with radar secured. In addition to inhibiting SPY, aft Fire Control System (FCS) illuminators. Aft 5" gun, and aft VLS were to be secured. [Encl. 21, 24, 69]

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300. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 199]

301. (U) At 2320Z, combat systems green deck is set and GET Spy Radar is sectored aft. Prior to setting combat systems green deck to recover Helo 706, GET TAO2 did not verbally solicit for tactically significant tracks from AAWC, ASUWC, and CSC prior to securing SPY aft as required to do by the GET Battle Orders. Instead, after local assessment of the picture by GET CSC and GET TAO2, SPY-1 was sectored AFT approximately 4 minutes before GET's friendly fire engagement of Aircraft 107. [Encl. 21-22, 24, 69-71].

302. (U) A review of the GET AAWC scope indicated that the hooked track and additional friendly track fade when the SPY-1 radar was secured at 2320Z. The GET AAWC did not recall this occurring. The GET AAWC did not make a "track FADED[16]" report, either internally to the GET TAO2 or externally to XW, shown in Figure 22. [Encl. 21, 69, 168]



Figure 22: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

[16] (U) "FADED" is an ALSSA communication brevity term, indicating that sensor data is lost on a group or contact. Requires information of last known position to include number of contacts and track direction. [ref. j]

303. (U) At 2321Z, the lost track indications dropped from GET AAWC's scope, and there was a complete loss of situational awareness inside GET CIC of aircraft inbound for recovery from the South. [Encl. 15, 19, 21-23, 29, 45, 168, 190]

304. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 166]

305. (U) At 2321Z, Aircraft 112 checked in with the Marshal controller and was passed radar vectors, as well as approach instructions. Aircraft 112 stated that they will manage their spacing relative to Aircraft 107. [Encl. 184]

306. (U) At 2322Z, Aircraft 211 checked in with REDCROWN and received "Sweet / Sweet, clear to switch." Aircraft 211 then switched to Marshal controller and received radar vectors. [Encl. 184, 195]

307. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 13]

a. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 13, 200]

b. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 201]

c. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 172]

d. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 12]

e. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] [Encl. 13, 200, 202]

f. (S) (b)(1) [redacted]. [Encl. 15, 21, 69]

308. (S) (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 13]



Figure 23: (S) (b)(1) [redacted]

309. (S) (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 168]

310. (S) (b)(1) [redacted]

311. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 13, 149]

312. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 13]

313. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) [Encl. 13, 197, 203]

314. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 165, 204]

315. (U) Post-event data analysis by NSWDC DD generated Figure 24 which depicts PPLIs and Spy track data. This figure shows that PPLIs existed in the LINK stores database for a significant period of time without being reported to C&D. [Encl. 13]



Figure 24: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

316. ~~(S)~~ Per AWS system specification, PPLI correlation to an engaged track is prohibited. Any [redacted] (b) (1) (A) [Encl. 13-14]

317. ~~(S)~~ (b) (1) (A) [redacted] [Encl. 13-14]

318. (CUI) From initial detection at 2323:42Z and the GET TAO2's rolling of FIS Green at 2324:50Z, a total of 68 seconds elapses. The following events in the timeline occur within that 68 seconds. [Encl. 13]

319. ~~(S)~~ (b) (1) (A) [redacted] [Encl. 15, 69-71, 73-74, 205]

320. (U) GET RSC1 reported strength 1, as was reported via A-scope and their TACSIT. [Encl. 70].

321. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 13, 15, 29, 205]

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

Figure 25: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

322. ~~(S)~~ [Encl. 13, 73-74, 206]

323. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)
(b)(1)
[Encl. 13, 15, 25, 69, 203]

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[17] (U) Tactical Signals Supervisor replaced the legacy nomenclature "Electronic Warfare Console Operator" for this AWS baseline. [TB]
[18] (U) APG-79 Radar System is associated with the F/A-18

324. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 21, 69]

325. (U) During his interview, it was notable that the GET AAWC stated "… I was kind of skeptical, like understanding what exactly we were shooting at. It's different when we were in it for real, vice sitting a scenario. You can shoot track after track in the scenario no issue." [Encl. 69]

326. (U) The GET TAO2 received the GET AAWCs report and recommended engaging the track to the GET CO. This conversation occurred shoulder-to-shoulder at the front table, not over Net 15. [Encl. 21-22]

327. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 166]

328. (U) Following discussion with the GET TAO2, the GET CO hooked the track and evaluated it. [Encl. 22]

329. (U) The GET ASUWC, having heard the air engagement in progress, placed "guns in trail," by generating a 5" gun engagement on the track, and then released 5" batteries by Variable Action Button (VAB) action. [Encl. 13, 108]

330. (U) At 2324:42Z, the external voice report over ADC C&R to XW made by the GET AAWC is immediately followed by an engagement report, "XW this is G, engaging track GB121 with birds, over." This report was immediately acknowledged. [Encl. 177]

331. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 13, 21-22]

332. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 72]

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

Figure 26: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

333. (CUI) At 2324:57Z, due to the engagement in progress, the GET CSC took actions to secure from combat systems green deck, by reauthorizing FCS illuminators and aft VLS, and removing the SPY1 radiation inhibit region aft. [Encl. 13, 24]

334. (U) At 2324:58Z, BIRDS away is reported by the GET AAWC on ADC C&R. [Encl. 177]

335. (U) The Gun Weapon Supervisor (GWS) received a gun engagement and batteries release from the ASUWC, released MT52 from normal stow, slewed the weapon, and slaved the electro optical sight system to the targeted track. [Encl. 13, 108, 196]

336. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 118, 197]

337. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 13, 19, 21-22, 24-25, 69, 118, 203]

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338. (U) Within GET, another CHECKPRINT was conducted on GB123, with identical responses from RSC, IDS, and EW, and an identical recommendation was made from the GET AAWC to the GET TAO2 to evaluate as P-351. [Encl. 15, 21, 69-74]

339. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 13, 149]

340. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) . [Encl. 19, 21, 70, 196]

341. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 13, 196]

342. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 13, 72, 197]



Figure 27: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

343. (U) GET IDS recalled hearing XW FAAWC saying, "they're turning left," out loud in CIC prior to the friendly fire engagement of Aircraft 112. [Encl. 15]

344. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 187]

345. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 166]

346. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) [Encl. 13]

Decision to Engage

347. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 13, 203]

348. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 13, 203]

349. (U) The three primary watchstanders with authority for pre-planned response (PPR) execution are the AAWC, TAO, and the CO. [Ref. d]

350. (U) GET AAWC made an assessment and verbal recommendation (to the TAO) to engage track GB121 based on the following: [Encl. 29, 69, 166, 203]

(1) (U) I&W of P-351 ASCM employment by Houthi forces earlier in the day;

(2) (U) Engagements completed or in progress against both OWA UAVs and P-351 ASCMs across the force over 40 minutes earlier;

(3) (U) Belief that no friendly aircraft were in vicinity or inbound;

(4) (U) SPY track initiation of a new pending track;

(5) (U) Track doctrine qualification and "auto engagement ordered" alert at console:

(6) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) ;

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(7) ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

(8) ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1) [redacted]

(9) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

(10) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(1) [redacted]

(11) (U) Manual SIF interrogation with no change in IFF status.

351. (U) GET TAO2 made an assessment and recommendation to GET CO to engage track GB121 based on the following: [Encl. 100]

(1) (U) I&W of P-351 ASCM employment by Houthi forces earlier in the day;

(2) (U) Engagements completed or in progress against both OWA UAVs and P-351 ASCMs across the force over 40 minutes earlier;

(3) (U) Belief that no friendly aircraft were in vicinity or inbound;

(4) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

(5) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted];

(6) (U) Assessment of track vector between GET and HST;

(7) (U) Track doctrine qualification and "auto engagement ordered" alert at console;

(8) (CUI) Close control CRO indicating a pending track, no IFF codes, and M5 "NO RESPONSE" from IFF;

(9) (U) Recommendation to engage by GET AAWC.

352. (U) GET CO made an assessment and authorization to engage track GB121 acting in unit self-defense of GET based on the following: [Encl. 22]

(1) (U) I&W of P-351 ASCM employment by Houthi forces earlier in the day;

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(2) (U) Engagements completed or in progress against both OWA UAVs and P-351 ASCMs across the force over 40 minutes earlier;

(3) (U) Misplaced confidence in IFF M5 and LINK 16 PPLI to generate a friendly ID;

(4) (U) Belief that friendly fighter A/C should never have been eligible for engagement based on AWS/IFF/LINK 16 system specification;

(5) (U) Confidence in IFF M5 Lethal Interrogation to generate a FRIEND response and break the engagement;

(6) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(7) (U) STT doctrine trip and engagement on ST347, 40 minutes prior;

(8) (U) AAWC evaluation of P-351 ASCM;

(9) ~~(S)~~ [redacted];

(10) (U) GET TAO2 recommendation to engage GB121;

(11) ~~(S)~~ [redacted];

(12) (U) Assessment that GB121 was demonstrating hostile intent/hostile act.

353. (U) The factors relating to the decision to engage GB123 (Aircraft 112), are the same as listed above, across all three watches, with the notable addition of having just executed an engagement against track GB121 with a near identical profile. [Encl. 22, 29, 69, 100, 166, 203]

354. (U) The decision to engage made by the XW AMDC watch was made through the doctrinal practice of command by negation. As GET reported their engagement in progress, the XW watch, consisting of the FAAWC, FTAO, and again, GET CO in his capacity as XW, reviewed, acknowledged, and communicated up – to both XB and SADO – the engagement. By acknowledging, the force watchstanders authorized the engagement through command by negation. [Encl. 207; Ref. i]

355. (U) XW FAAWC made an assessment and acknowledgement of the engagement on track GB121 on ADC C&R based on the following: [Encl. 25, 166, 190, 197]

(1) (U) Confidence in IFF to effectively interrogate and correlate to C&D tracks;

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(2) (U) Engagements completed or in progress against both OWA UAVs and P-351 ASCMs across the force by both surface ADUs and fighter aircraft over 40 minutes earlier;

(3) (U) STT doctrine trip and engagement on ST347, 40 minutes prior;

(4) (U) Expectation of GET IDS to effectively identify IFF presence on GB121/GB123;

(5) ~~(S)~~ [redacted];

(6) (U) Assessment of track vector between GET and HST;

(7) (U) Track doctrine qualification and "auto engagement ordered" alert at console;

(8) (U) SADO upgrade of Warning/Weapons status to Red/Tight/One for Air Warfare;

(9) (U) Lack of awareness of IFF MOP Overload and SIF Gate issues;

(10) (U) Distraction by force watch administrative requirements.

356. (U) XW FTAO made an assessment and up echelon report (to XB) and did not negate the order for the engagement on track GB121 based on the following: [Encl. 29, 69, 166, 197]

(1) (U) I&W of P-351 ASCM employment by Houthi forces earlier in the day;

(2) (U) Engagements completed or in progress against both OWA UAVs and P-351 ASCMs across the force over 40 minutes earlier;

(3) ~~(S)~~ [redacted];

(4) ~~(S)~~ [redacted];

(5) (U) Concern of undetected threats due to not receiving E-2D LINK picture;

(6) (U) STT doctrine trip and engagement on ST347, 40 minutes prior;

(7) ~~(S)~~ [redacted].

(8) (U) Assessment of track vector between GET and HST;

(9) (U) Distraction by force watch administrative requirements

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(10) (U) Confusion generated between STT and JDM engagement reporting during storyboard data call from XB;

(11) (U) Track doctrine qualification and "auto engagement ordered" alert at console;

(12) (~~C~~) [redacted]

(13) (U) Audible receipt of GET TAO2's conversation and internal CIC CHECKPRINT;

(14) (U) Overhearing of GET CO's order to GET TAO2 to engage track GB121;

(15) (U) Lack of awareness to an ongoing aircraft recovery on HST;

(16) (U) Belief that DCA and E-2D were still operating well south of the force;

(17) (U) Reliance on cooperative ID systems (IFF, LINK 16 PPLI) to identify force aircraft;

(18) (U) Expectation and false belief that IFF and LINK 16 was operating correctly for friendly aircraft recovering.

357. (U) GET CO assessment and authorization to engage track GB121 were made in his role as GET CO, acting in unit self-defense, as indicated above. No additional considerations from an AMDC perspective were noted, as his decision had been made before the engagement reached the force watch for command by negation. [Encl. 22]

358. (U) The factors relating to the decision to engage GB123 (Aircraft112), are the same as listed above, across all three watches, with two exceptions: [Encl. 19, 25]

(1) (U) XW FTAO's surprise at a second engagement, as he was focused on XW to XB communications.

(2) (U) Ongoing engagement against a GB121 with a near identical profile.

Attempted Intervention of Engagement

359. (U) Multiple individuals across the force attempted to intervene and prevent engagement on GB121 (Aircraft 107), and subsequently GB123 (Aircraft 112). Attempts at intervention were noted in GET CIC, HST CDC, and across several CVW-1 aircraft, which eventually resulted in

the breaking of engagements on GB121 (post-intercept) and GB123 (coincident with intercept). [Encl. 22, 25, 177, 182, 184, 199, 208-210]

HST Intervention

360. (U) HST ADWC 1 completed a turnover of the HST ADWC watch to HST ADWC 2 after having assessed that there were no remaining air threats and the DCA had been directed by XP to RTB. After turning over the watch, HST ADWC 1 remained in HST CDC to observe the fixed-wing recovery. [Encl. 208-209, 211-212]

361. (U) HST ADWC 1 heard an engagement order from GET over the CSG CMD net. The order did not include any CHECKPRINT, and based on her perception of no threats in the area, HST ADWC 1 manually searched the track number, correlated it to a PPLI for aircraft 107, and observed three red paring lines to the recovering aircraft (107, 112, 211). HST ADWC 1 immediately told HST AIC to direct the recovering aircraft to SCRAM[19] over J-Voice A. [Encl. 208, 211]

362. (U) HST ADWC 1 made several radio calls to GET to "disengage" and "hold fire" on the ADC C&R net. GET acknowledged the radio calls and confirmed all remaining engagements were terminated, however no transmissions from GET were heard in HST CDC on the ADC C&R net. [Encl. 177, 204, 208, 211]

363. (U) Following the engagement report of BIRDS AWAY," HST ADWC 2 called "121 has Friendly PPLI" on ADC C&R. This report is not acknowledged by FAAWC or GET AAWC. [Encl. 177]

364. (U) An unidentified station on CSG CMD net reported to XB and XW that the engaged track was held as friendly. XW responded that GET was "hold firing all tracks." [Encl. 199]

Intervention from onboard GET

365. (U) GET TIC2 observed GB123 make an evasive maneuver executing an approximately 90 degree turn to the left, he also observed the IFF M5 video in vicinity of the track move with it. [Encl. 13, 27]

366. (~~S~~) (b)(10

(b)(10 [Encl. 13, 27]

[19] "SCRAM" is a Brevity term used to direct aircraft to take immediate evasive action.

367. (CUI) GET AAWC received an "auto engagement ordered" alert on GB122 (Aircraft 211). Upon review, the engagement was not authorized due to the friendly PPLI on a nearby dual track. [Encl. 13, 69]

368. (CUI) GET TAO upon hearing the "cease fire" call from XW FTAO, issued a Hold Fire order on GB123. GET MSS, issued an MSS Hold Fire order on the same track. The resulting command destruction of the missile occurred at the same approximate time as the calculated intercept of Aircraft 112. [Encl. 13, 21, 72]

369. (U) GET ASUWC received a voice directive from XZ over SCC C&R to "stop shooting, stop shooting." This communication was acknowledged, but GET ASUWC did not relay the order inside CIC as the XW FTAO had already directed the cease fire. [Encl. 108, 213]

WHISKEY Intervention

370. (CUI) XW FTAO observed the evasive maneuver from GB123, and received the transmission from HST ADWC 1 to "stop shooting / disengage." XW FTAO stood up in CIC and yelled to cease fire. After ordering to cease fire, he observed friendly symbology in the area of the engaged tracks. [Encl. 19, 21-22, 25]

TFCC Intervention

371. (U) At 2324Z, XW FTAO reported on EHF CMD NET "XB this is XW, new track GB121, suspected Project 351 over" [Encl. 199]

372. (U) MRICO reported that LMMT held both friendly PPLI and AIR UNKNOWN PENDING tracks in the area of GB121. [Encl. 174]

373. (U) XB BWC, received the communication HSTCSG Command Net and subsequently observed pending tracks near friendly tracks on LMMT. [Encl. 199, 207]

374. (U) CCSG-8 reported that at 2324Z, he heard a call from GET of contacts inbound but could not correlate them to tracks on LMMT until the pending track filter was disabled and "recognized the unknown or pending tracks coincided with PPLI from the recovering aircraft." It was not clear to CCSG-8 what GET was shooting at until this point, but he assessed they could not get "bittersweet[20]" calls out fast enough to terminate the engagements. [Encl. 60]

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[20] "Bittersweet" is a brevity term used to indicate a possible friendly fire situation.

375. (~~S~~) (b)(1) (b)(1) [Encl. 199]

376. (CUI) At 2325Z, CSG-8 JAG observed blue tracks in the vicinity of GB121 after XW assessed it as a P-351 ASCM. CSG-8 JAG expected a SCRAM call but instead heard a call that XW assessed GB123 as a P-351 ASCM. The first indications the CSG-8 JAG had that a friendly fire incident occurred was when a call of "stop shooting at us" call was heard over a voice circuit. [Encl. 134, 214]

377. (U) At 2325Z, XB BWC informed C5F of GET engagement on GB121, P-351 ASCM and one minute later informed C5F of GET engagement on GB123, P351 LACM via C5F command chat. [Encl. 178]

378. (U) At 2326:03Z, five seconds after GET FIS green for second engagement, XW reported via EHF command net "splash track" for the first engagement, and the follow on engagement in progress on Aircraft 112. [Encl. 199]

379. (U) At 2326:27Z, 23 seconds after the second missile launched, XB acknowledges the second engagement on EHF CMD Net, "This is XB, roger out." [Encl. 199]

380. (U) At 2326:37Z, a report is made on EHF CMD NET, "HB hold track GB127 as a friendly, side 107, break XW, over." [Encl. 199]

381. (U) At 2326:47Z, XW reported GET was, "hold firing all tracks." [Encl. 199]

382. (U) At 2329Z, XB BWC informed C5F via chat of a possible blue-on-blue engagement on Aircraft 107. [Encl. 207, 215]

383. (U) At 2329Z, XB BWC directs XW to hold fire via HSTCSG Command voice net. [Encl. 199, 207]

384. (U) From the initial report of engagement at time 2325Z, XB does not negate an engagement, direct XW to break engage, hold fire, or cease fire for almost 5 minutes. [Encl. 199]

385. (U) COMCARSTRKGRUEIGHTSTAFFINST 1500.2L of 12 September 2018 establishes qualification requirements for TFCC watches. [Encl. 216]

[21] Under the Command by Negation construct, the tactical commander retains the power to negate or modify any particular action, but will do so actively, there is an expectation that silence is consent. Here, the act of acknowledging GET intention to engage with a "roger, out" was XB providing its consent on the engagement. [Ref. i]

386. (U) The Chief of Staff formally designates BWCs and FTAOs by letter after they have been recommended for qualification by the Operations Officer. [Encl. 216]

387. (U) The Operations Officer is directed to serve as the senior member during BWC qualification boards in the absence of the Chief of Staff. [Encl. 216]

388. (U) Prior to being designated as a BWC, individuals must complete all line items of the "Battle Watch Captain Qualification Requirements" enclosure and then complete and oral board. [Encl. 216]

389. (U) XB BWC was formally designated as a BWC on 26 April 2024, although he had previously qualified on CSG-8's previous deployment in August 2022. [Encl. 207, 217]

390. (U) XB BWC reported he had been on watch for nine hours prior to the friendly fire incident, starting at 1730L. His relief showed up on time but he determined there was not an appropriate opportunity to conduct a turnover. This extended period on watch resulted in XB BWC reporting "I felt myself going weak in the knees" before he turned over the watch and going to the library to recover. [Encl. 207]

Evaluating Aircraft 107's Decision to Eject

391. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) [redacted]. [Encl. 143, 218]

392. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 219]

393. (U) At the time of the first friendly fire engagement, Aircraft 107 was at approximately 300kts, descending through approximately 2,000 ft MSL on approach to HST, and in communication with the Approach A controller. In accordance with the Defensive Electronic Countermeasures In-Flight Guide, Aircraft 107 did not have their Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), or ALQ-214 powered on because they were on approach. [Encl. 149,150, 184, 220]

394. (U) The Aircraft 107 pilot and the Aircraft 107 WSO were visually looking at GET at the time of the friendly fire engagement, and noted the missile launch from GET. They initially thought GET was targeting the OWA they were unable to find. The Aircraft 107 pilot and the Aircraft 107 WSO discussed concerns that the missile could be targeting their aircraft. They saw the missile reach apogee and update its flight profile to an intercept course towards Aircraft 107. This adjustment provided the first confirmation to the Aircraft 107 pilot and the Aircraft 107 WSO that they were being targeted by the missile. [Encl. 149-150]

395. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 13]

396. (U) F/A-18 Surface-To-Air Counter-Tactics (SACT) are a series of maneuvers aircrew utilize as a decision matrix in order to defeat missile engagements. SACT requires aircrew to execute tasks in a specified order, and includes visual assessments of the missile, use of countermeasures, and specific maneuvers. [Encl. 221]

397. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 221]

398. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 143, 149, 222]

399. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) [Encl. 143, 149, 221-222]

400. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 143, 149, 222]

401. (U) When the Aircraft 107 pilot confirms the missile is targeting Aircraft 107, he had maintained sight of the missile and had not looked back inside to see his airspeed and altitude. The Aircraft 107 pilot asked the Aircraft 107 WSO, "are you seeing this?" The Aircraft 107 WSO responded, "Yeah. I'm watching it." The Aircraft 107 pilot then asked WSO if "he wants to get out." In the interview with Aircraft 107 pilot he stated, "I will basically have my life flash before my eyes and assess we had no options," and "I will just pull the handle not saying eject over the ICS or anything." [Encl. 149]

402. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

(b)(1) [Encl. 13, 196-197]

403. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) . [Encl. 13, 196-197]

404. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) – [Encl. 196]



Figure 28: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

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

Figure 29: ~~(S)~~ ~~(b)(1)~~ [redacted]



Figure 30: ~~(S)~~ ~~(b)(1)~~ [redacted]



Figure 31: ~~(S)~~ b)(1)



Figure 32: ~~(S)~~ b)(1)

Figure 33: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

Evaluating Aircraft 112's Decision Not to Eject

405. (U) Aircraft 112 was descending through 5,000ft and in communication with the Approach B controller, 5NM in trail of Aircraft 107 at the time of the friendly-fire engagement of Aircraft 107. The Aircraft 112 pilot and WSO saw the missile explosion. Shortly after the Aircraft 112 WSO made a second "mayday" communication, the Aircraft 112 pilot and WSO see a second missile launched from GET, immediately assessing that it was targeting Aircraft 112. [Encl. 182, 223-224]

406. (U) Upon seeing the second missile launch from GET, the Aircraft 112 pilot was at 4,000ft MSL and maneuvers the aircraft to assess missile guidance while selecting afterburner to increase aircraft airspeed. In accordance with the Defensive Electronic Countermeasures In-Flight Guide, Aircraft 112 did not have their RWR, Countermeasures Dispensing System (CMDS), or ALQ-214 powered because they were on approach. The aircraft 112 pilot assessed he did not have the time to power on the CMDS. [Encl. 220-221, 223-224]

407. (U) The Aircraft 112 pilot saw the missile continue to make course corrections toward their aircraft, and told the Aircraft 112 WSO that he thought they needed to eject, "he was like give it one more second, I have my hand on the handle." In the interview with the Aircraft 112 pilot, he stated, "I don't know why I didn't pull the handle." When the rocket motor burned out, the Aircraft 112 pilot lost visual of the missile, "I was like, are we okay?" He noted that the missile

employed on Aircraft 107's rocket motor remained burning the entire intercept, "that's why when I saw the motor burn out, I paused." [Encl. 223-224]

408. (U) The Aircraft 112 WSO noted the missile's rocket motor burn out about five seconds before it passed by the aircraft. The Aircraft 112 WSO maintained visual of the missile and saw it pass "one to two plane-lengths" behind the aircraft. Both the Aircraft 112 pilot and WSO note the aircraft shake as the missile passed the aircraft, and see the missile explode in the water. [Encl. 13, 223-224]

409. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [Encl. 223-224]

410. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1)
[Encl. 13, 197]

Additional Aircraft Safety Concerns from Engagement

411. (U) At the time of the friendly fire engagement of Aircraft 107, GET CSC indicated remembering GET's helicopter, Helo 706 "…was close, but I don't think we were tracking it." [Encl. 24]

412. (U) At the time of the friendly fire engagement of Aircraft, Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC), who was at controls of Helo 706, assessed that the helicopter was positioned over GET's aft missile deck at approximately 50ft altitude. [Encl. 189]

413. (U) 706 HAC was unaware GET was in the process of engaging Aircraft 107 at the time it occurred; he believed that Helo 706 was making a routine nighttime recovery. [Encl. 189]

414. (U) 706 HAC was looking through Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) while flying approach to GET and was communicating with on deck personnel to troubleshoot NVG non-compatible lighting when the first SM-2 missile was launched from the forward of the ship. The light emitted from the missile launch saturated the NVGs, forcing HAC to transition to an under the goggles scan. [Encl. 189]

415. (U) Immediately following GET launch of first SM-2, 706 HAC called a wave off and waved off to the port side of the ship, proceeding outbound to the southwest and climbing to approximately 150 ft. [Encl. 189, 194]

416. (CUI) Helo 706 did not have any warning prior to first engagement. There was no SCRAM call issued by GET prior to launching missiles. [Encl. 189, 194]

417. (U) IAW GET Battle Orders, the aft 5-Inch Gun (Mount 52) and aft VLS must be secured while the helicopter is within one half nautical mile of the ship and any decision to accept greater risk to the helicopter in conducting flight operations requires CO/TAO authority. Additionally, while conducting flight operations, TAO direction is required for CSC to restore the normal combat systems configuration. [Encl. 225]

418. (U) GET ASUWC placed Mount 52 in trail, pointing the gun at the target for engagement while at Combat Systems Green Deck with helo over deck, risking Helo 706 being in the line of fire. [Encl. 108, 189]

419. (U) GET ASTAC informed Helo 706 that a second SM-2 would be launched before GET engaged Aircraft 112. [Encl. 189, 194]

420. (U) 706 HAC recalled the second SM-2 as "we physically saw the missile overhead and saw it flash and pop and wasn't exactly sure of its position in time and space. It was directly in front of our aircraft, I believe southwest." [Encl. 189]

421. (U) GET CSC authorized aft magazine after second engagement. If this action had been done prior to the first engagement, a missile could have left the aft launcher and impacted Helo 706. [Encl. 24]

422. (U) GET CSC stated that, despite having just set Combat Systems Green Deck, she was not aware of the helicopter's location during GET's engagements. [Encl. 24]

Leaking of Controlled Information Associated with Military Operations

423. (U) Detailed first-hand accounts of the friendly fire incident were leaked to open sources. The method and responsible party or parties by which the original content was leaked to the public within days of the friendly fire incident remains unknown. From interviews with the Aircraft107 and 112 pilots, both a177itted to providing detailed accounts of the incident in group text messages with previous squadron mates, but did not know who in those groups first "posted" their messages in open sources. [Encl. 226-228]

424. (U) Figure 34 is the content of the two social media post that were released on 25 December 2024. [Encl. 226-228]

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Launched on a DCA for a strike. One ways all over the place. Lead shoots one down. We RTB for fuel because they were far and didnt wanna get SAMbushed. Land on the ship and launch again. End up flying for a few hours. I shot one of them. Yay! 0230 now and we are the last ones to be called back from CAP to the ship. It's us, 143 wingman and Fig in the tanker. We sequence ourselves in 5 mile spacing and check in on 16. Fig in front, then me, then 143 wingman. Vectors for recovery. At 20 miles from Mom I see the Gettysburg (who is 10 miles aft of final bearing) shoot an SM-2. Holy shit, they're shooting at drones. After a few seconds I'm like holy fuck. It's pulling lead on FIG. I hear ELTs going off. 3 seconds later I see an explosion 5 miles off my nose. I scream over ICS that they just shot down fig. We scream a mayday call over voice alpha. 5 seconds later I see another SM-2 launch from the Gettysburg. I am now freaking out. We dive for the deck, accelerate, and try to beam the missile. I'm now trying to figure out how to defend to an SM-2. Try to put out flares. No flares, I fenced out. Great. Missile is lighting up the sky like it's daytime. It starts to apex. I start screaming over ICS dude it's time for us to fucking go. We gotta pull. The missile apexes and the rocket motor burns out. In my mind I'm like wtf happened are we ok now??? I hesitate and 3 seconds later it passes within 100 feet of our jet and shakes the jet. It explodes off our left on the surface of the water. CAG paddles called up to the captain of HST who got on the red phone and told all destroyers to abort their missiles.

Figure 34: (U) Open Source Social Media Posts

425. (U) The aircrew of Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112 were given an opportunity to talk to their families following the incident. [Encl. 149-150, 223]

426. (U) There were group text messages, of current and previous squadron-mates, inquiring about the health and well-being of the aircrew of Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112. [Encl. 149-150, 223-224]

427. (U) The Aircraft 107 pilot sent a synopsis of the incident to his friends in a VFA-32 text group, his old squadron. [Encl. 149]

428. (U) The Aircraft 107 WSO lost his phone during the ejection and therefore did not send out any messages. [Encl.150]

429. (U) The Aircraft 112 pilot departed the ship the day after the event, 23 December 2024. While sitting at the airport in Bahrain, the Aircraft 112 pilot sent a summary to his old squadron shipmates. [Encl. 223]

430. (CUI) Restricted River City conditions (no WiFi) were immediately implemented for almost 48 hours following the friendly fire incident. [Encl. 122, 149-150, 224]

431. (CUI) Before coming out of River City conditions, HST CO made an announcement over the 1MC directing everyone to not speak about this incident off ship and reminding everyone of the importance of OPSEC. [Encl. 122, 149-150]

432. (CUI) After coming out of restricted River City conditions, it became clear that the story was already known by the public. [Encl. 122, 150, 223]

433. (U) CAG directed all Squadron COs to put out additional guidance/reminder that all communications about this incident must not be discussed off ship. [Encl. 122, 224]

434. (U) The aircrew was upset that no action was being taken to correct the incident from occurring again, and that there seemed to be a lack of accountability. [Encl. 122]

435. (U) Public Affairs guidance promulgated in SECNAVINST 5720.44C, establishes that certain categories of official DoD information must be submitted, reviewed, and cleared for release. Included in those categories are information that "is or has the potential to become an item of national or international interest, military operations, significant exercises, and OPSEC." This guidance also defines non-public information as "information generally not available to the public, obtained in the course of one's official DoD duties or position, which has not yet been cleared and authorized for release to the public or would normally not be released. [Ref. m]

Fact Relating to Accountability & Analysis

436. (U) GET CO is no longer in command due to a pre-scheduled change of command unrelated to this incident. [Encl. 229]

Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)

437. (U) At the time of the Friendly Fire Incident, the HSTCSG was operating in international waters. [Encl. 203]

438. (U) At all times, U.S. forces are subject to U.S. law and policy regarding the use of deadly force to include the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). [Ref. n]

Inherent Right of Self-Defense

439. (U) The rules of engagement (ROE) are inherently permissive: U.S. units are authorized to use force when it complies with mission specific ROE or falls within the self-defense paradigm in the Standing ROE (SROE). [Ref. n]

440. (U) Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. [Encl. 53, 55, 230-233; Ref. n]

441. (U) Both unit and individual self-defense includes defense of other U.S. Military forces in the vicinity. [Ref. n]

Hostile Act / Demonstrated Hostile Intent

442. (U) "Hostile Act" is defined as "an attack or other use of force against the United States, US forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property." [Ref. n]

443. (U) "Hostile Intent" is defined as "the threat of imminent use of force against US forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces . . . ." [Ref. n]

444. (U) "Imminent Use of Force" is defined as "the determination of whether the use of force against US forces is imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances known to US forces at the time and may be made at any level. Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous." [Ref. n]

445. (U) "Hostile Intent Indicators" is defined as "Commanders will use their best judgement and available information including intelligence, political-military factors, and technological capabilities to determine hostile intent. No list of actions will, in all cases, define hostile intent…." [Ref. n]

446. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) [Ref. n]

447. (U) Additionally, the SROE specifically lists factors to be consider before using force in self-defense against airborne objects. One that is relevant in this case is: Identification difficulties, both visual and electronic. [Ref. n]

Theater Guidance in Red Sea

448. (U) On 4 December 2024, Commander FIFTH Fleet (C5F) sent a "personal for" message to Commanders/Commanding Officers outlining "Fifth Fleet Fighting Instructions." These instructions were provided to HSTCSG Warfare Commanders via email from CSG-8 Chief of Staff ahead of arrival in C5F AOR on 8 December 2024. [Encl. 234]

449. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) [Encl. 53]

450. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 53]

451. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 53]

Carrier Strike Group Battle Orders

452. (U) Commander, Carrier Strike Group EIGHT (CCSG-8) promulgated Battle Orders on 29 April 24, which provide a framework for Unit and Warfare Commanders to understand Commander's intentions and expectations during battle or action. [Encl. 55]

453. (U) CCSG-8 Battle Orders state that unit commanders at all times may use all necessary means available to respond decisively to hostile acts or demonstrated hostile intent against HSTCSG units or U.S. forces in the vicinity. The Battle Orders go on to emphasize that nothing in "any doctrine or any ROE, mandates that HSTCSG ships or aircraft absorb the first hit" and that "in instances of self-defense, weapons release authority is delegate to the unit commander level." [Encl. 55]

454. (U) CCSG-8 Battle Orders state that "nothing in any doctrine or ROE relieves us of the obligation to take all appropriate actions to provide for HSTCSG defense. We shall act without delay to take timely and effective action to defend the forces by all means available, prudent, and necessary." [Encl. 55]

455. (U) Finally the CSG-8 Battle Orders delineate the expectation that CO's will "make prudent, sound decisions based on training, experience, and ***the best information available.***" [Encl. 55]

GET Battle Orders

456. (U) The principal guiding document for implementing fleet wide TTP into unit-level execution is the Commanding Officer's Battle Orders. GET CO signed the Battle Orders on 29 August 2024. GET Battle Orders are 196 pages long, including 7 enclosures. [Encl. 225]

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457. (U) GET Battle Orders state the "defense of GETTYSBURG and our crew depends on your ability to act decisively with tactical effectiveness… I expect you to be intimately familiar with these orders…" [Encl. 225]

458. (U) GET Battle Orders establishes Weapon Release Authority for TAOs however, further emphasizes that this "does NOT absolve [GET COs] responsibility to safely engage the AEGIS Weapon System." If the GET CO is present in CIC, the "TAO state the batteries release intention for my confirmation or negate unless prohibited by an extremely short timeline in self-defense of the ship." [Encl. 225]

459. (U) GET Battle Orders provides for system configuration and doctrine requirements stating that "TAOs will work closely with the Warfare Area Coordinators and the CSOOWs … optimize ALL Sensors to support Surveillance, Detection, Tracking, and identification in all warfare areas." [Encl. 225]

460. (U) GET Battle Orders establish a duty that all tactical watchstanders must read the Battle Orders monthly. [Encl. 225]

461. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted]" [Encl. 225]

462. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted]" [Encl. 225]

CWC Construct Duties and Responsibilities

Commander, Carrier Strike Group EIGHT / Commander Task Force FIFTY / Bravo

463. (U) RDML Bailey, assigned as Commander, Carrier Strike Group EIGHT (CCSG-8) and Commander, Task Force FIFTY (CTF 50) was the Officer in Tactical Control (OTC) and the senior officer present eligible to assume command and was responsible to the operational commander, Commander, U.S. FIFTH FLEET (C5F), for the tactical force deployment and action. CTF 50 was responsible for accomplishing operational tasking with task components executing five principle areas of warfare – Information Warfare (IW), Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), Surface Warfare (SUW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Strike Warfare (STW). As is often the case and in particular in this case, the CCSG-8, the OTC was the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC). The CWC wages combat operations to counter threats to the force and to maintain tactical sea control with assets assigned. [Ref. o]

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CCSG-8/CTF 50 Air and Missile Defense Commander (AMDC) / WHISKEY

464. (U) CO GET was assigned as the CCSG-8/CTF 50 AMDC and was the warfare commander responsible to the OTC/CWC for the defense of the force against integrated air and ballistic missile (IAMD) threats. The AMDC shapes the maritime IAMD battlespace and implements the IAMD plan by collecting, evaluating, disseminating information to the force, and managing the employment of IAMD resources. The AMDC is assigned responsibilities for Defensive Counter Air (DCA) and granted Tactical Control (TACON) authority to accomplish the assigned missions and tasks. [Ref. i]

465. (U) The AMDC develops and manages the approved air defense plan and aligns it with the area air defense plan and airspace control plan. The AMDC executes the OTC-approved air defense plan. The AMDC coordinates through the CWC/OTC to ensure seamless integration of maritime forces in the execution of the area air defense plan. [Ref. i]

466. (U) Additionally, the AMDC is responsible for myriad AMD functions in coordination with other warfare commanders. Two functions which require specific coordination with the STWC (CVW CDR) are establishing and promulgating the identification safety range and safety sectors for all friendly aircraft and any special areas or zones established for aircrafts safety and identification, or to prevent mutual interference as well as to establish joining control procedures for AAW aircraft and keeping air coordinator (AC) informed. [Ref. i]

647. (U) Pursuant to NTTP 1-10.3, (U) Navy Combat Identification, the relationship between Combat ID processes and the Air and Missile Defense (AMD) team is accomplished by the Air and Missile Defense Syndicate, their working groups and their products. Specifically, the AMD syndicate, under the leadership of the AMDC, is the Strike Group extended AMD team, which meets at regular intervals throughout the readiness cycle. Representative of all SG AMD assets, this group develops the OPTASK AMD Supplement, OPTASK ID Supplement, and the OPTASK CEC Supplement in which the CID process is vetted and formalized for the SG. The AMD syndicate is responsible for developing the AMDC's vision of mission requirements to primary AMD providers. This syndicate provides a forum in which CID subject matter experts review lessons learned, previous SG's best practices, and AOR-specific guidance, to include any joint AMD plan developed by the area air defense commander (AADC). These mission requirements include, but are not limited to the following: [Ref. p]

1. (U) Promulgating the intelligence/threat assessments applicable to air CID, the PPRs, data networks applicable to the force's mission and assets, OOB, degrees of readiness and weapon status with respect to CID.

2. (U) Developing the joint, missile, and fighter engagement one assignments and coordination procedures, tanker requirements (organic/nonorganic) and stationing assignments, RTF procedures, over-water MRR, self-defense zone designation and coordination procedures, contingency ROE requests, and aircraft joining procedures.

Interface Control Officer (ICO) / JICO

468. (U) HSTCSG Interface Control Officer (ICO) also referred to as the Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO) is the senior interface control officer in support of multi-tactical data link network (MTN) operations and supports the C5F ICO as the MTN coordinator for the joint data network (JDN) within the theater/Joint Operating Area (JOA). The MTN is the primary feed/data source to support generation of a common tactical picture (CTP). The CTP subsequently feeds the CCDR's theater common operational picture (COP). The HSTCSG ICO plans, monitors, and manages the architecture and technical integration of data and communications systems for the MTN. The MTN components are the TDLs such as LINK 11, LINK 11B, or LINK 16. The HSTCSG ICO controls and acts as the coordinating authority for the interface control cell and for any regional interface control officer (RICO)/sector interface control officer (SICO) for planning and executing tactical data link (TDL) functions that cross regional and/or sector air defense (AD) boundaries or impact the theater-wide MTN, specifically the MRICO. The ICO is responsible for the entire interface, including the determining interface units' communications and data exchange capabilities and limitations, and known interoperability problems using Service Level Capabilities and Limitations products such as the Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme Division Capabilities and limitations website which provides interoperability facts and potential mitigations. The ICO will develop multi-TDL architecture including leading multi-TDL network architecture planning meetings with the purpose of reviewing existing JNL for suitable networks that have the participants/capacity to meet the appropriate commander's IERs and if the existing JNL is inadequate, submit network design request to a Network Design Facility (NDF) and finally to review the LINK 16 network for accuracy and completeness. [Ref. q]

469. (U) The HSTCSG OPTASK CEC SUPP outlines several duties and responsibilities for the MRICO which is assigned as the Network Manager. The Network Manager is responsible for controlling ID doctrine by negation, managing and assigning data distribution system (DDS) Node ID assignments to ensure deconfliction, managing DDS activation, doctrine distribution and doctrine activation and deactivation, and reporting hourly situation reports to FTDC. The MRICO watch is managed by the HSTCSG JICO and stands watch on the CVN. [Encl. 235]

470. (U) Additionally, per the HSTCSG OPTASK CEC SUPP, GET is assigned as the Net Control Unit (NCU) who is the "Advocate" for integration of CEC into the air defense picture and will make recommendations to supported warfare commanders to maximize system effectiveness in the single integrated air picture. [Encl. 235]

471. (U) Finally, the HSTCSG OPTASK CEC SUPP "all CEC platforms within network range will establish and maintain an active CEC network…in the event of casualty/degradation to CEC, MRICO will change the TDL settings in order to mitigate impact to the CTP, and goes on to say MRICO will coordinate with Warfare Commanders in the event of a loss of connectivity." [Encl. 235]

Air Defense Units (ADUs)

472. (U) Navy Air Defense employment doctrine states maintaining an accurate air picture is necessary to prevent engaging friendly aircraft. Specifically, it states "Interceptors (DCA aircraft) proceeding to and from a DCA station and other friendly transiting aircraft should be carefully tracked and their movements reported to all friendly units." It goes on to say, "Friendly aircraft returning to the carrier can sometimes appear to be enemy aircraft or ASCMs attacking the main body. Continuous, positive tracking of friendly aircraft will maintain proper ID, avoiding their engagement by friendly AD systems. RTF procedures will help the force recognize returning strike aircraft." [Ref. r]

473. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Ref. r]

474. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Ref. r]

Commander, Carrier Air Wing as the Strike Warfare Commander (STWC) / Papa

475. (U) In the CWC concept, the STWC is the officer to whom the OTC has assigned detailed responsibilities for Strike Warfare (STW) and granted the TACON authority to accomplish strike missions and tasks such as to destroy or neutralize enemy targets ashore, including attacks against strategic or tactical targets, such as manufacturing facilities and operating bases, from which the enemy is capable of conducting or supporting air, surface, or subsurface operations against friendly forces. Additionally, the STWC plans, directs, monitors, and assesses CWC force airborne power projection ashore, plans and executes mine strikes, as supported by the MIWC and the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center minefield planners, and integrates or coordinates carrier air wing (CVW) resources with TLAM missions via the LAC and TSC, and naval surface fire support (NSFS) missions via the naval gunnery strike coordinator or naval fire support coordinator. [Ref. i]

Air Resources Coordinator (AREC)

476. (U) In the CWC concept, the AREC is the officer to whom the OTC has assigned detailed responsibilities for coordinating the employment of organic air assets other than those assigned to the HEC. The AREC allocates sea-based, fixed-wing air assets and CVN-based helicopters for the CWC, balancing CWC guidance, requests of warfare commanders and functional group commanders, aircraft/CVN helicopter availability, accessibility, maintenance readiness,

configuration, and weapons loadout. The AREC ensures that the CWC, warfare commanders, functional group commanders, and other supporting coordinators are kept fully informed of air operations, to include flight-deck and aircraft availability, aircraft assignment, and sortie mission results. The AREC generates the air plan, which reflects the requirements of the CWC, warfare commanders, functional group commanders, aircrew training, and maintenance. [Ref. o]

AMDC Warfare Commander Watchstander Duties and Responsibilities

477. (U) Force Tactical Action Officer (FTAO) lays out the duties of the FTAO, the duties include, but are not limited to being responsible for execution of the commander's daily operations plan and for building and maintaining a shared situational awareness among Strike Group decision makers. Specifically, the FTAO will Know the friendly-force composition including airborne assets as well as facilitate warfare commander interactions. [Ref. o]

478. (U) IAW GET Battle Orders, FTAO is responsible for providing the CSG commander all Air Warfare reports and defensive intentions. [Encl. 225]

479. (U) The FAAWC is responsible for SG AMD asset employment and directs and monitors overall AMD operations and makes tactical AMD decisions by monitoring the tactical picture provided by organic sensors, communications and tactical data links as well as monitoring the SG command net and is the voice of "WHISKEY" on the SG command net. [Ref. p]

480. (U) IAW GET Battle Orders, FAAWC is responsible for coordinating AW platforms, ordering force engagements, and employing forces. [Encl. 225]

481. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 56]

482. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 56; Ref. p]

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Air Defense Unit (ADU) Watchstander Duties and Responsibilities

483. (U) The CO is charged with the absolute responsibility for the safety, well-being, and efficiency of the ship and crew. and of particular importance is responsible to take all necessary and appropriate action in self-defense of the command. The CO shall also endeavor to increase the specialized and general professional knowledge of the personnel under his command by the frequent conduct of drills, classes and instruction. [Ref. s, t]

484. (U) Additionally, before going into battle or action the CO shall communicate to the officers of the command, if possible, his plans for battle or action and such other information as may be of operational value should any of them succeed to command. During action, station the executive officer where he can best aid the CO, and, if practicable, where he could probably escape the effects of a casualty disabling the CO, and yet be able to assume command promptly and efficiently. [Ref. t]

485. (U) Tactical Action Officer (TAO), is the CO's representative concerning the tactical employment and the defense of the unit. The TAO is responsible for the safe and effective operation of the combat systems of the unit and for any other duties prescribed by the commanding officer. The TAO is responsible for the smooth and efficient operation of the CIC including collection, display, and dissemination of tactical and other operationally significant data. Circumstances permitting, the TAO shall carry out promptly and precisely special orders and shall report any deviations to the CO. The TAO shall keep the commanding officer fully informed of the current tactical picture and immediately inform the commanding officer on any and all matters which pose a potential combat threat to the unit. The TAO, when authorized by the CO directs the employment of weapons and direct the OOD to maneuver, as required to fight or defend the unit. The TAO is required to be informed promptly of any combat system change that may affect the fighting capabilities of the unit. [Ref. s]

486. (U) IAW GET Battle Orders, TAO is responsible for tactical employment and defense of the ship. [Encl. 225]

487. (U) The TAO is delegated the authority to designate, engage, and release weapons against confirmed hostile targets posing an immediate threat to GET using any defensive weapons systems available, as per existing ROE and doctrine. [Encl. 100]

488. (U) The CSC is responsible for assisting the TAO in managing combat systems and ensuring combat systems are operating at the highest degree of availability and effectiveness possible. [Ref. s]

489. (U) The Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (AAWC) is the primary assistant to the TAO responsible for fighting the ship in the Air and Missile Defense (AMD) mission area while managing the RAP. The AAWC is responsible to the TAO to execute air defense PPR's and maintain an aggressive surveillance, detect, and track plan. The AAWC is the interface between the Air Intercept Controller (AIC) and the TAO for Defensive Counter Air (DCA) assets and is

the interface between the TAO and the Missile System Supervisor (MSS) and CIWS Remote Control Station (RCS). The AAWC also works for the FAAWC. [Encl. 225]

490. (U) The Electronic Warfare Supervisor (EWS) is responsible for managing the ship's EW systems and is the watchteam expert on threat intelligence and reports directly to the AAWC in coordination with the ID Supervisor for contact identification reporting directly to the TAO for detection of emergency threat emissions. [Encl. 225]

491. (U) The Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC) is responsible for managing data link operations and supervising the ID Supervisor and will normally be delegated the authority to manage ID doctrine statements. [Encl. 225]

492. (U) ID Supervisor (IDS) is responsible for properly identifying all contacts in C&D and will announce "new track" for any pop-up tracks within weapons range or any new, unidentified Pending, Unknown, Hostile or Suspect tracks. [Encl. 225]

493. (U) The Plans and Tactics Officer (PTO) is responsible to the CO to lead, direct, and synchronize warship plans; plan for the long-range employment of a task unit and the tactical training of all watchstanders; and serve as the lead tactical trainer for the unit. [Ref. s]

Strike Warfare Commander Watchstander Duties and Responsibilities

494. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [Ref. o]

495. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [Ref. o]

Aircraft Check-In/Check-Out Procedures

496. (U) CVW-1 TACTICAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES states that outbound aircraft shall check-in with STRIKE to ensure M2 and M5 are working properly. If aircraft are unable to obtain good checks with STRIKE, or after receiving good checks, they will check-in with REDCROWN to receive the same checks. For Return-to-Ship checks, "All aircraft shall check in with the same agencies as outbound in reverse order." [Encl. 236]

497. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 56]

a. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

(b)(1) [Encl. 56]

b. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 56]

c. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 56]

d. (U) Upon completion of each event launch, REDCROWN will annotate the status of the aircraft who checked in/out, M2/5 status, and secure UHF status for that event. Upon completion of the HST fixed-wing fly day, REDCROWN will tally all events, and the daily report will be sent every night two hours after the completion of HST fixed-wing flight operations. [Encl. 56]

498. (U) Pursuant to NTTP 3-01.12 MARTIME IAMD EXECUTION, the REDCROWN shall do the following: [Ref. c]

a. (U) Identify aircraft within the FADIZ (or as prescribed).

b. (U) Conduct IFF checks and voice check-in with friendly aircraft entering the FADIZ.

c. (~~C~~) (b)(1)

d. (U) Be a qualified air controller.

e. (U) Guard the REDCROWN/GREENCROWN net.

f. (U) Guard the tactical air control frequency (strike or Navy TACC) for force airspace deconfliction.

g. (U) Delouse aircraft returning to the force.

h. (~~C~~) (b)(1).

i. (~~C~~) (b)(1).

j. (~~C~~) (b)(1) [redacted]

k. (~~C~~) (b)(1) [redacted]

l. (~~C~~) (b)(1) [redacted]

m. (~~C~~) (b)(1) [redacted]

n. (~~C~~) (b)(1) [redacted]

o. (~~C~~) (b)(1) [redacted]

p. (~~C~~) (b)(1) [redacted]

Event Execution Analysis

Lack of Procedural Compliance

Evaluating Procedural Compliance with GET Battle Orders

499. (U) CIC watchstanders lacked familiarity with CO's Battle Orders. When interviewed, GET CO lacked knowledge of contents in his Battle Orders. [Encl. 21-22, 24, 69]

500. (U) IAW GET Battle Orders, prior to setting Combat Systems Green Deck, the TAO "shall solicit and obtain verbal verification by AAWC, ASUWC, and CSC that the SPY inhibit sector is clear of tactically significant tracks." [Encl. 225]

501. (U) When interviewed, all watchstanders, to include GET CO, failed to demonstrate knowledge of this requirement. [Encl. 21-22, 24, 69, 225]

502. (U) IAW GET Battle Orders, after engaging a threat, watchstander are instructed to "not roll FIS Red until Positive Kill Evaluation received." [Encl. 225]

503. (U) Immediately after engagement of GB121 and GB123, but prior to possessing knowledge that GB121 and GB123 were friendly Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112 respectfully, GET TAO rolled FIS red prior to kill assessment in violation of the Battle Orders. [Encl. 13, 21, 225]

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a. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 13]

504. (U) IAW GET Battle Orders, "Excessively deep Above Horizon Search Notches can create a high altitude clutter loading problem and not provide any improvement in Above Horizon Search track initiation ranges." [Encl. 225]

505. (U) During the strike event the Above Horizon Search (AHS) Notch was set at the lowest altitude possible, causing significant clutter. GET RSC1 made persistent recommendations to GET TAO via GET CSC that the AHS Notch should be raised. However, those recommendations were negated or not acted upon. [Encl. 24, 47, 71, 237]

506. (U) IAW GET Battle Orders, for a new air track, "if no valid PPLI reply and no M5 consider suspect A/C and continue to evaluate." [Encl. 225]

507. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) . [Encl. 21, 69]

508. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 225]

509. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 24, 225]

510. (U) Generally, the procedures and requirements for setting Combat Systems Green Deck is neither well understood nor routinely practiced onboard GET. Throughout interviews, multiple members of GET CIC watchteam indicated that TAO verbal solicitation for tactically significant tracks is not part of Combat Systems Green Deck procedures. Despite this requirement being established in his Battle Orders, even the GET CO lacked knowledge of this requirement when asked. [Encl. 18, 21-22, 225]

511. (U) Additionally, some watchstanders stated that since entering the Red Sea / 5th Fleet AOR, GET attempted to execute Combat Systems Green Deck more expeditiously and therefore did not conduct a verbal solicitation for tactically significant tracks. [Encl. 21-22]

512. (U) The written procedure for setting Combat Systems Green Deck as described in GET Battle Orders – specifically the verification of tactically significant tracks - is a sound technique for maintaining situational awareness. [Encl. 18, 21-22, 168, 225]

513. (U) Lack of level of knowledge and procedural compliance to this, led to GET watchstanders failing to solicit for tactically significant tracks and failing to maintain location and track on Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112. [Encl. 18, 22, 168, 225]

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Evaluating Procedural Compliance with BMA/FADIZ Requirements

514. (U) The following was the status of GET's compliance with FADIZ requirements on 21 December 2024:

a. (U) SPY-1D: Secured aft (GET was Northbound, SPY-1D secured South toward the threat axis and major ingress route for friendly aircraft) for Green Deck, communicated at 2321Z. [Encl. 13, 194]

b. (U) IFF Interrogator: Noted as "a bit finicky" by GET RC1 during turnover at 2300Z. [Encl. 41]

c. (U) Voice Communications were operational. [Encl. 195]

d. (U) GET RC1 did not meet the requirements to stand REDCROWN watch, relieved by qualified watchstander at approximately 2310Z. [Encl. 41]

e. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 13-14, 29]

515. (U) The REDCROWN procedures established by GET in the FADIZ SOP did not specifically define what would be required for an RTF procedure, and the lack of a geographic flight path does not satisfy the requirements of an RTF procedure. [Encl. 56]

516. ~~(S).~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 41, 56, 238]

517. (U) According to the Master Flight Log for 21 – 22 December 2024, managed by the CATCC, there were 47 total fixed-wing launches, and 47 overall fixed-wing landings. However, this does not include the 3 sorties flown in Aircraft 107 by the pilot and WSO. This information was purposefully removed immediately following the friendly fire engagement but remains annotated in aircrew logbooks IAW the CATCC mishap documentation policies. For 21 – 22 December 2024, the total number of launches was 50 and the total number of landings was 49. [Encl. 173, 179-181]

518. (U) The REDCROWN report that was generated for 21 – 22 December 2024 incorrectly lists all aircraft (only totaling 43) has having valid M2 and M5 checks. This is incorrect because there was a REDCROWN waiver requested and approved for Aircraft 304 that was not accounted for in the report. It is notable, that although this waiver was requested and approved –

over voice Aircraft 304 informs REDCROWN that they were Sweet / Sweet with STRIKE and that REDCROWN should check their system. [Encl. 166, 178, 195, 239]

519. (U) GET RC1 assumed the duties of the REDCROWN watch at 1800Z on 21 December 2024, and did not remember any sour aircraft launch. [Encl. 41]

520. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [Encl. 41, 128]

521. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) [Encl. 12-13, 41, 51]

522. (U) During his watch, GET RC1 was reminded by GET TAO "to make sure I was ID'ing the inbound package" as the strike package was returning to force. [Encl. 41]

523. (U) GET RC1 relayed the ID of the strike package to XW FAAWC, informing him of Sweet / Sweet, however this was not on Net 15 so no other watchstanders within GET heard these reports. [Encl. 41]

524. (U) Helicopters are only required to check-in with REDCROWN if operating outside a 25NM radius of HST. From a review of the REDCROWN audio, there are multiple helicopters that checked-in with REDCROWN, but none of them were logged in the REDCROWN report contrary to the FADIZ SOP. [Encl. 56, 239]

525. (U) The REDCROWN report GET generated does not differentiate between outbound or inbound checks nor the time of check in, and only notes if an aircraft checked in at least once throughout the flight. [Encl. 239]

526. (U) Aircraft 107 flew in Event 3A1, and was recorded in the REDCROWN report as Sweet / Sweet. The Aircraft 107 pilot and WSO flew a total of three sorties, starting with the scheduled Event 5A4. Aircraft 107 did not conduct a Check-in with REDCROWN for any Event 5A4, but was logged as Sweet / Sweet without a positive check-in. Aircraft 107 was also noted as having a PPLI. The two following sorties Aircraft 107 flew with the pilot and WSO were not logged. This is shown in Figure 35. [Encl. 176, 181, 195, 239]

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REDCROWN MII / V STATUS DATE:									
REDCROWN RATE/NAME/UNIT:									
		MODE II		MODE V					
MSN	SIDE #	SWEET	SOUR	SWEET	SOUR	CHECK IN	GREEN	HQ	PPLI(Y/N)/REMARKS
STK	100	☑	☐	☑	☐	☐	☐	☐	Y
STK	113	☑	☐	☑	☐	☑	☑	☐	Y
DCA	102	☑	☐	☑	☐	☐	☐	☐	Y
PTNK	107	☑	☐	☑	☐	☐	☐	☐	Y

Figure 35: REDCROWN M2 and M5 Report

527. (U) Aircraft 112 flew in Event 4A1 and the alert launch Event 6AA, where Sweet / Sweet was noted, Aircraft 112 had a valid PPLI, and the check-in was conducted. Aircraft 112 only conducted checks when departing during Event 6AA, and did not conduct inbound checks with REDCROWN. [Encl. 173, 181, 195, 239-240]

528. (U) During Event 4A1, when Aircraft 112 checked-in with REDCROWN during RTB checks, REDCROWN told Aircraft 112 that they were "in the midst of an IFF reboot, switch to "Strike" for checks," but no annotations were logged for the inability to execute RTB checks in the Sour Summary. "Strike" in this instance is a communications network used for aircraft inside 10NM of the CVN to "check in" with the CVN to verify the status of their IFF M2 and M5. [Encl. 195, 239]

529. (U) Aircraft 211 flew in Event 2B1, and the alert launch Event 6BA, where Sweet / Sweet was noted, Aircraft 211 had a valid PPLI, and the check-in was conducted. Aircraft 211 conducted checks both inbound and outbound during Event 6BA. The engagement of Aircraft 107 occurred less than 90 seconds after Aircraft 211's check-in with REDCROWN. [Encl. 13, 173, 181, 195, 239, 241]

530. (U) Throughout the day, multiple aircraft try to check-in with REDCROWN and are unable to verify their M2 and M5 due to GET IFF troubleshooting, as indicated in the REDCROWN audio files. [Encl. 195]

531. (U) Of the 43 logged entries in the 21 December 2024 REDCROWN report, 13 aircraft did not check in at any point, but M2, M5, and PPLI were still verified. There were only 2 entries that did not have a valid LINK 16 PPLI or it was not logged at all, which were Aircraft 411 (no PPLI), and Aircraft 213 (no PPLI entry in the report). [Encl. 239]

532. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 150, 141]

533. (~~S~~) [redacted] [Encl. 128]

534. (U) Aircraft 107 or Aircraft 112 did not comply with the established procedure to check in with REDCROWN. However, the RTB contingency for sour aircraft that was established in planning but not briefed could not be complied with because it was unknown by aircrew of Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112. [Encl. 128, 141, 157, 195]

Evaluating Tanker Ops

535. (U) HST was recovering aircraft using Case III approaches. [Encl. M]

536. (U) CVW-1 Tactical Standard Operating Procedures state that during Case III recoveries with 3 or 4 tankable aircraft to recover, airborne tanker requirements are two tankers equipped with operable ARS pods with 2,500lbs of fuel to give each. [Encl. 242]

537. (U) 107 WSO and XP were concerned about airborne fuel available. At 2246Z, 107 WSO told XP, "Papa, 107, recommend launch another tanker in 30 mikes." At 2306Z, XP informed Aircraft 103, "[…] we intend to launch you, 103." [Encl. 182]

538. (U) Aircraft 107 had given away all available fuel to Aircraft 112 and Aircraft 211. XP directed this at 2311Z on J Voice A by saying, "[…] give gas to the low state aircraft, we'll recover you. We're launching 103." After Aircraft 107 gave away their fuel, there were four tankable aircraft airborne. Aircraft 103 was in a tanker configuration. Even if Aircraft 103 was launched, airborne fuel requirements would not have been met as only one F/A-18 with fuel available would have been airborne. [Encl. 143, 173, 179-182, 242]

539. (U) CCSG-8 and DCAG were looking at the fuel requirements to keep the aircraft airborne for DCA. DCAG stated, "We were not in accordance with *NATOPS*. We did not have enough tankers airborne." DCAG further stated, "I told [XP] to launch another tanker." But was then asked "why we were going to do that" by CCSG-8. DCAG stated that "we needed gas airborne. We had three fighters airborne with no additional gas airborne." However, CCSG-8, having made the decision to bring all of the aircraft back, did not want to continue to launch more aircraft. [Encl. 123]

Adequacy of GET Deck Log, GET CIC Log, GET CS Night Orders, and TFCC BWC Log

540. (U) The deck log of 21 December 2024 only lists one engagement. [Encl. 192]

541. (U) The deck log and CIC log do not contain entries for personnel in the water after friendly fire incident. [Encl. 192]

542. (U) The deck log and CIC log do not contain information about helicopter launch and recovery status. [Encl. 192]

543. (U) CICWO turnover log only lists GB122 engagement at 0229L and loss of Illuminator #2 at 0228L. [Encl. 243]

544. (U) Watch Section 3 of the CICWO turnover log is predominantly a cut and paste of significant chat entries. [Encl. 243]

545. (U) The Combat Systems Night Orders for 21 December 24 listed "NSTR" in the "Summary of Potential Threats" section although CSMM wrote to "Standby to execute tasking on short order" which was emphasized in blue ink by GET CO. WEPS also noted that GET was "on the hook for tasking and when executed there will be retaliation." [Encl. 58]

546. (U) On 19 December 2024 WEPS wrote in the Combat System Night Orders "The time for asking how to execute tactics is over. We are in the WEZ!" Additionally, WEPS wrote "All focus should be on ID and PPRs to keep the force safe." GET CO emphasized "in the WEZ!" and "ID and PPRs" in blue ink CO. [Encl. 58]

547. (U) On 20 December 2024 WEPS wrote that GET was "heading south towards the MTA, be ready with proper ID and execution." GET CO underlined "proper ID" and "execution" in blue ink. [Encl. 58]

548. (U) The Combat Systems Night Orders watchstander review table for each night is incomplete and not signed by all watchstanders. [Encl. 58]

549. (U) A review of GET Deck Log, GET CIC log, and GET Combat Systems Night Orders were found to be inadequate, poorly used, and below standards. [Encl. 58, PI, PD]

550. (U) The CSG-8 TFCC BWC log of 21 December 2024 only has a single entry under the 1730-2330 watch, annotating XB BWC assuming the watch. The next entry occurs at 0339L on 22 December 2024, where the next BWC assumed the watch. There is no entry regarding the deliberate strike or follow on friendly fire incident. [Encl. 244]

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Lack of Forceful Backup

Evaluating Who knew/should have known there were of Friendly Aircraft

551. (U) Both Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112 were evaluated by the GET watchteam as "Unknown" despite multiple data points the watchteam had, or should have had, indicating both tracks were friendly aircraft. [Encl. 21, 69, 168, 177]

552. (U) All three aircraft, Aircraft 107, Aircraft 112, and Aircraft 211, were quick tagged and labeled as RR07, RR12, and TM11 on GET AAWC scope starting approximately one hour before the engagement. At 2320Z the hooked track and additional friendly track fade when the SPY-1 radar is secured. The GET AAWC did not recall this occurring. The GET AAWC did not make a "track FADED" report, either internally to the GET TAO2 or externally to XW. [Encl. 21, 69, 168, 177]

553. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 168]

554. (~~S~~) (b)(1) (b)(1) [Encl. 211]

555. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 211]

556. (U) The HSTCSG C5F OPTASK AMD SUPP directs use of a "Track FADE" report which would include track number and last known location from a geographic reference. The purpose of this report is to alert other watchstanders that there is was a track that is no longer being held on a sensor. [Encl. 185]

557. (U) During turnover at the end of his watch, GET RC1 informed GET RC2 that IFF was "a bit finicky, might have to have CSC reload the SPQ-15 because the video may become stale," as well as there being two DCA aircraft and one E-2 airborne at that time and "pointed them out to him on the scope." [Encl. 41]

558. (U) However, when interviewed GET RC2 stated that there was no turnover about IFF and it seemed to be working, and that he "wasn't tracking any aircraft that were up under control," but was aware of "the helos and two fighters to the South." [Encl. 23]

559. (U) GET RC2 stated that REDCROWN is normally up net 15 and net 12, "Net 12 is for comms we pass directly towards AAWC if we don't want to clutter net 15." He further stated that CSC, AAWC, IDS, ASUWC, TIC, and GWS are up net 12. [Encl. 23]

560. (U) When interviewed, GET RC2 stated, "Once I took the seat, I had eyes on the two contacts. The one to the North, we ran through the PPRs, I believe they were at the last step of getting ready to engage it. That was like 10 minutes after I got in the seat. So we end up engaging the first one, then we start working through the process on the second one." When asked if GET RC2 knew who in the CSG was controlling aircraft at the time of the friendly fire engagements, GET RC2 stated, "To my knowledge, no one. As far as I knew it was just the strike package that had gone down to Yemen and come back, but I wasn't tracking any aircraft that were up under control." When asked if GET RC2 knew if anyone in CIC was aware of tracks South of GET, GET RC2 stated, "to my knowledge, no." [Encl. 23]

561. (U) When asked if REDCROWN let the rest of CIC know that Aircraft 211 checked in, GET AAWC said, "No, …They are not trained to bring REDCROWN into CHECKPRINTs or contribute to the internal air picture…." [Encl. 69]

562. (U) At 2323:30Z, REDCROWN's console (AIC2) shows correlated M5 video on GB121, and remains correlated throughout the engagement sequence of Aircraft 107, shown in Figure 36. [Encl. 29]



Figure 36: (b)(1)

563. (U) At 2325:10Z, REDCROWN's console (AIC2) shows correlated M5 video on GB123, and remains correlated throughout the engagement sequence of Aircraft 112, shown in Figure 37. [Encl. 29]



Figure 37: (b)(1)

564. (U) While REDCROWN is not trained to take part in internal CHECKPRINT procedures or contribute to the internal RAP, GET RC2 could have intervened. GET RC2 stated that he was up net 12 and 15, he did not report M5 indications during the CHECKPRINT procedures after GET IDS reported no modes, no codes. [Encl. 69]

565. (U) GET IDS assumed his watch at 2230Z. "They weren't on the screen when I came up watch, so I figured they were further away out there." GET IDS further states, "There was not a brief for [this] event." Despite GET IDS statement that the aircraft were not on his screen when he assumed watch, Aircraft 411 recovered onboard HST at 2305Z, and was the final fixed-wing aircraft recovery prior to the friendly fire engagements of Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112. [Encl. 15, 173]

566. (U) When asked what aircraft recovering from the strike would look like, GET IDS responded, "I'm not really well versed. I just knew they would be going toward the Truman." [Encl. 15]

567. (U) When asked of any impacts that would affect him when GET set combat system green deck, GET IDS responded, "[I'm] not aware, didn't really notice too much of anything." [Encl. 15]

568. (U) During the CHECKPRINT, GET IDS reported no "modes or codes," and the contact was on a low-slow flier profile. GET IDS stated he was displaying IFF video on his TACSIT. Although a replay of IDS scope is not available, the replay of two other consoles in GET CIC, AIC1 (AAWC UI) and AIC2 (REDCROWN), that were both also displaying IFF M5 video, indicate that there was IFF M5 video in the vicinity of the track. Relying only on the CRO indication for IFF Mode 5, IDS reported to AAWC, "No modes and codes, recommend low-slow flier." [Encl. 13, 15, 29]

569. (U) When TAO2 was asked if aircraft were effectively checking into REDCROWN, he stated that he didn't hear any discrepancies, but REDCROWN was not his priority while he was in CIC during the strike. [Encl. 21]

570. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 13, 73-74, 206]

571. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 13, 73-74, 206]

572. (~~S~~) (b)(1) . [Encl. 245]

573. (U) Onboard GET, SSES does not routinely participate in the CHECKPRINT of tracks. [Encl. 15, 17, 26-27, 43, 47, 107, 246]

574. (U) When evaluating whether to engage tracks GB121 (Aircraft 107) and GB123 (Aircraft 112), GET CO, GET TAO2, GET AAWC, XW FAAWC and XW FTAO were unaware GET was experiencing an IFF system degrade (IFF MOP Overload), which had been observed by GET IDS and reported to GET CSC, only. [Encl. 19, 22, 25, 69]

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Evaluating Who knew/should have known Friendly Aircraft were RTB

575. (U) Despite this loss of situational awareness, when interviewed GET TAO2 stated that he was "not trying to be boastful," but he had been doing this for a long time. Both as an OSC and as the ADO. He further stated "I feel confident in my ability to sanitize the airspace, it's like a hobby." [Encl. 21]

576. (U) When interviewed, GET TAO2 stated that he was not aware of an ADU controlling aircraft at the time of the friendly fire engagement. He believed that the E-2 was controlling the last DCA that were located down to the Southeast. However, this belief was not accurate as the E-2 reported its radar was down and Hotel took control on CR 6/7 at 2303Z, almost 20 minutes prior to the friendly fire engagement. [Encl. 21, 166]

577. (U) GET TAO1 was concerned with the ID of the strike package as they returned to the CSG and this concern was communicated to GET RC1. However, after the REDCROWN and TAO watchstander turnover, GET TAO2 was not aware of any REDCROWN discrepancies with regard to aircraft modes and codes, and noted that aircraft check in was not his priority while he was in CIC during the strike. [Encl. 47, 21]

578. (U) From approximately 22 minutes prior to the engagement to 7 minutes prior, there are several reports from different stations over different mediums regarding the positioning and status of the DCA that were still airborne. [Encl. 60, 166, 178, 182, 184, 199]

a. (U) At 2303Z, HST established control over airborne CR 6/7 performing DCA, and passed via ADC Chat that C/R 6/7 are standing by for tasking. [Encl. 166]

b. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 166]

c. (U) At 2306Z, XW reported to XB via CTF-50 CMD chat that they are setting CR to VL 16C. [Encl. 178]

d. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted] [Encl. 166]

e. (U) At 2311Z via J Voice A, XP passes to all for "everyone to start making your way back to mom for recovery." This order is acknowledged by CR 6, Texaco, and H. When interviewed. CCSG-8 stated that he called XW via VOSIP and informs XW that "I intend recover all fixed-wing aircraft since the E-2 radar did not come up following tanking." The specific time of this phone call cannot be confirmed. [Encl. 60, 182]

f. (U) At 2314Z, on J Voice A CR 6 reported to H that they have been advised by XP to "retrograde" to mom. This report is acknowledged by H. [Encl. 182]

g. (U) At 2314Z, on HSTCSG_ADC Chat, Aircraft 603 states "U is RTB per instruction." This transmission is immediately acknowledged and followed by a question from XW FTAO stating "U de XW, r were you directed to recover?" [Encl. 166]

h. (U) At 2316Z, HST communicated the RTB of Aircraft 112 and Aircraft 211 to XW via ADC Chat. This is not acknowledged by XW. [Encl. 166]

i. (U) At 2317Z, H again passes via ADC Chat to XW that "CR 6/7 RTB, still under H control, standing by for follow-on plan from XW/XP." This is again not acknowledged by XW. [Encl. 166]

j. (U) At 2318Z, XW passes to XB their intention to recover all aircraft and set the alerts once SUL and JDM have existed Operating Area HEMLOCK. This report is passed over both voice and chat and is acknowledged by XB. This plan is in direct conflict with the RTB order issued by XB approximately seven minutes earlier. [Encl. 199]

k. (U) At 2318Z, Aircraft 107 checked in with the Marshal controller and was passed radar vectors, as well as approach instructions. [Encl. 184]

l. (U) At 2321Z, Aircraft 112 checked in with the Marshal controller and was passed radar vectors, as well as approach instructions. Aircraft 112 states that they will manage their spacing off of Aircraft 107. [Encl. 184]

Evaluating Who knew/should have known GET's Systems were not Reliable

579. (U) Combat Systems Night Orders were written for 19, 20, and 21 December 2024. Each iteration was signed by GET CO. [Encl. 58]

580. (U) Combat Systems Night Orders listed IFF M5 degradation as a result of timing issue and that COMPID was not correlating tracks. [Encl. 58]

581. (U) CEC was listed as "UP" on 19, 20, and 21 December 2024. This was not accurate as GET CEC had been secured. [Encl. 58]

582. (U) When asked which supervisory personnel were aware of the ongoing issues with IFF, GET CSOOW3 stated, "on the CSOOW side, all the way up through CSMM and STO was definitely tracking. On the CE side, up through EMO, and the CO was definitely tracking" [Encl. 46]

583. (U) When asked which supervisory personnel were aware of the ongoing issues with IFF, GET CE LCPO stated, "I don't know how far it went up. I know I informed my chain of command. I informed [GET CSMM]. EMO knew about the situation, because he asked me some questions, but I don't know how much detail he knew." [Encl. 33]

584. (U) When asked which supervisory personnel were aware of the ongoing issues with IFF, GET CSOOW4 stated, "At least up to EMO. EMO was acting DH – it was at least up to his level. We had email back and forth from the Mid0Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center (MARMC). We specifically had an email asking if we could see intermittent M5 based on the timing issue, and the tech said absolutely. EMO is on that email, so he is definitely tracking. We also call away loss of IFF over the 1MC, so everyone up to the CO is tracking. Maybe not the specifics of it, but at least that it is happening." [Encl. 44]

585. (U) When interviewed, TIC stated that "I was trying to look at IFF video itself. It was difficult because there were a lot of M5's – a Lot. You couldn't tell what matched up to a track and what didn't." [Encl. 27]

Evaluating Data Link Management

586. (U) The LINK 16 network active at the time was USFO0026C (JNL 719/NETWORK 219) for USN Ships / Helos, and USFO0026A (JNL 686/NET 186) for all P-8A / All USAF / Allied Fixed-wing Aircraft. Specific parameters for the network were promulgated in the CSG-8 LINK 16 Cut Sheet, as well as in the JICO SITSUM. [Encl. 172, 247-248; Ref. u, v]

587. (U) USFO0026A/C did not have sufficient Surveillance Timeslots to run a Track Initiator (TI) AMIIP configuration as designed. Per the NWOT Air and Missile Defense, TI is the preferred tracking scheme, and the AMDC shall implement tracking schemes for the force. Because the network was unable to support TI tracking scheme, HSTCSG was using a Primary Track Producer (PTP) scheme, with JDM as the PTP. [Encl. 249-251; Ref. u, v]

588. (CUI) Per the Carrier Airborne Early Warning Weapons School (CAEWWS) Manual, detailed in VX-20's Discrepancy Report (DR) 0825, J0.7 TSR negotiation messages were not received by E-2D DSSC-3.1 MIDS JTRS CMN-4 terminal during developmental testing. This leads to a contention access transmission while in a TSR pool, resulting in inconsistent transmission and reception of E-2D surveillance tracks by other JUs. Since all E-2s now use the MIDS JTRS CMN-4 terminal, TSR pools should not be used by any E-2 for any NPG 7 operation. [Encl. 252]

589. (~~S~~) b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(1)
[Encl. 27, 62, 253]

590. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 22, 62, 254]

591. (U) MRICO/FTDC was charged with setting the ID policy per C5F OPTASK. MRICO, in this instance refers to the CSG-8 MRICO. FTDC was delegated, per the CTF 50 SITSUM and LINK SITREP, to GET on 21 December 2024. [Encl. 235, 247, 253, 255-258]

592. (U) The authority for management of ID Policy across CSG-8 was unclear. Both the CSG-8 JICO and the CO GET assumed the other retained authority and was the controlling official, via their respective watches, for the ID Policy. [Encl. 22, 62]

593. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 164, 259-261]

594. (~~S~~) (b)(1)
(b)(1) . [Encl. 64]

595. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 22, 173, 262]

596. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 262]

597. (~~S~~) (b)(1)

(b)(1)
[Encl. 27]

598. (~~S~~) (b)(1)
[Encl. 174]

599. (~~S~~) (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
. [Encl. 174]

600. (~~S~~) (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
[Encl. 12, 174, 264]

Critical Watch Station Turnover Contributing to Loss of SA

601. (U) The GET TAO turned over at 2300Z (0200L), approximately 25 minutes prior to the friendly fire engagement. The turnover did not follow a turnover checklist, which was reported as typical, and did not include a discussion about ongoing issues with any Combat Systems equipment. (Encl. ME)26c. (U) At 2200Z (0100 L), XW FAAWC assumed the watch. XW FAAWC had stood the GET AAWC watch from 1800-2100Z (2100-0000 L) before shadowing the preceding XW FAAWC watchstander (GET EMO) for approximately one hour before taking the XW FAAWC watch. [Encl. 16, 25]

602. (U) The REDCROWN turned over approximately 2315Z (0215L), approximately 10 minutes prior to the friendly fire engagement. GET RC1 turned over to GET RC2 that there was two DCA aircraft and one E-2 Hawkeye still up and those aircraft were pointed out on the scope during the turnover. [Encl. 41]

603. (U) When interviewed, GET RC2 stated that there was no turnover from GET RC1 about IFF and it seemed to be working, and that he "wasn't tracking any aircraft that were up under control," but was aware of "the helos and two fighters to the South." [Encl. 23]

604. (U) While GET RC1 was not qualified, he demonstrated a higher level of knowledge of the requirements of the position (when compared to other GET RC Watchstanders), and had high SA of the air picture at the time he turned over. Unfortunately, his detailed turnover was to a less competent, (although PQS qualified), watchstander (GET RC2), who failed to maintain the situational awareness that was turned over regarding the location of the friendly aircraft to the south of GET RC2 was additionally disadvantaged by materiel issues which degraded situational awareness. He was aware of previous IFF issues, but didn't believe they were affecting his watch, because when he relieved GET RC1, IFF was working. [Encl. 23, 41]

Physiological Readiness to Assume the Watch (GET CIC)

605. (U) Investigations into the 2017 mishaps involving USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald identified Sailor overwork and fatigue, as well as training deficiencies, as contributing factors to the collisions. In response, the Surface Navy developed a Comprehensive Fatigue and Endurance Management Policy in 2017 that was subsequently updated and renamed Comprehensive Crew Endurance Management Policy in 2020. In 2021, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report with eight recommendations to the Department of the Navy to manage fatigue, reduce crew shortfalls, and implement training to address readiness in the Navy. A 2023 follow-up report by GAO indicated the fatigue-related recommendations were partially implemented and noted progress of two programs – Command Readiness, Endurance and Watchstanding (CREW) and Optimized Watchbill & Logistics (OWL) – that are being developed in partnership with Commander, Naval Surface Forces to collect objective sleep data using wearable technology and use this data to provide operational commanders near-real time sleep and fatigue data to inform underway decision making. On 30 September 2024, Secretary of the Navy directed Bureau of Medicine and Surgery to (1) assess CREW and OWL and coordinate with OPNAV N9 to fund the programs if they are assessed as successful and effective; and (2) coordinate with OPNAV N9 and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition to provide a plan to accelerate development and fielding a system for individualized fatigue management in the surface fleet. [Encl. 264-266; Ref. w]

606. (U) The Navy does not currently have a program to collect objective sleep data in the underway environment to assess and inform individual and group level risk associated with insufficient sleep and fatigue. [Encl. 266; Ref. w]

607. (U) The COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT Comprehensive Crew Endurance Management Policy states that Sailors must be given the opportunity to obtain a minimum of 7.5-hours of sleep per 24-hour day; either by one uninterrupted 7.5-hour period or an uninterrupted 6-hour period with an uninterrupted 1.5-hour restorative nap. [Ref. w]

608. (U) The COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT Comprehensive Crew Endurance Management Policy recommends the use of a circadian-based watch rotation and additional protective sleep measures as "best practices" for optimized crew endurance. [Ref. w]

609. (U) GET did not provide individual risk management (IRM) assessments for the CIC watchteam on the night of 21 December 2024. [Encl. 158]

610. (U) The GET watchbill was written in accordance with Crew Endurance Policy. [Encl. 101; Ref. w]

611. (U) GET Standing Orders (Standing Order 17 Crew Endurance and Fatigue Management) includes many of the recommended "best practices" for optimizing crew endurance. [Encl. 267; Ref. w]

612. (b) (5) [redacted]

613. (b) (5) [redacted]

614. (b) (5) [redacted]

615. (b) (5) [redacted]

616. (b) (5) [redacted]

617. (U) GET CO reported to the CIC at approximately 1730Z / 2030L on 21 December 2024 and remained in the CIC throughout the strike mission and friendly fire engagements with Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112 at 0225-0226L on 22 December 2024. [Encl. 22]

618. (U) GET CO indicated he was physically and mentally ready to execute his duties but was unsure whether he obtained 7.5 hours of sleep in the 24 hours prior to the friendly fire incidents. [Encl. 22]

619. (b) (5) [redacted]

620. (U) GET TAO arrived in the CIC at approximately 1800Z / 2100L on 21 December 2024. GET TAO provided backup to XW FTAO and support in his role as Interface Control Officer during the strike mission. He took a break at 0045L, leaving the CIC, and returned to begin standing watch at 2300Z/ 0200L and did not feel tired at the time of assuming the GET TAO watch. [Encl. 21]

621. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

622. (U) XW FAAWC slept for approximately 5.5 hours in the 24 hours prior to the friendly fire incidents. [Encl. 25]

623. (U) GET RSC1 indicated he was sometimes able to obtain 7.5 hours of sleep in a 24-hour period broken into approximately 2, 4-hour blocks of sleep. He assessed he was "super caffeinated" and ready to stand his watch that night from 0000-0400L. He indicated obtaining one night of uninterrupted sleep can keep him going for a few days. [Encl. 70]

624. (U) GET RSC2 indicated he slept approximately 7.5 hours in the evening before taking the watch from 0000-0400L. [Encl. 71]

625. (U) XW FTAO indicated he slept for approximately 6 total hours (~5-5.5 hours in the morning, ~1-hour nap at ~2200L) in the 24 hours prior to the friendly fire engagements. [Encl. 19]

626. (U) XW FTAO reported that he arrived to the CIC a couple hours prior to his scheduled time to stand watch (0000-0600L) because he wanted to be in the CIC at Time on Target and to be "an extra set of hands." XW FTAO described HSTCSG air operations in the hours preceding the engagement as "it was like the wild west out there." [Encl. 19]

627. (U) GET Tactical Interface Coordinator (TIC) obtained approximately 9 hours of sleep in the 24 hours prior to the friendly fire incidents and felt ready to stand the TDC/TIC watch. [Encl. 27]

628. (U) GET TIC2 began standing watch at approximately 2233Z / 0133L. [Encl. 27, 101]

629. (U) GET EMO stood the XW FAAWC watch until approximately 2200Z / 0100L. He had been scheduled to stand that watch from 1800-0000L but stayed for an additional hour because "there was a lot going." [Encl. 16]

630. (U) EMO stated he had the opportunity to obtain 7.5 hours of sleep in the 24 hours prior to his watch ending approximately 1.5 hours prior to friendly fire incidents, and he felt physically and mentally ready to stand the XW FAAWC watch. [Encl. 16]

631. (U) GET EWS assumed the watch at ~0130L (55 minutes prior to friendly fire incidents) and stated, "You could feel the energy when you got in there…There was like a lot of excitement. Not noise, but each watchteam is talking about "their part of the mission" you know…." [Encl. 73]

632. (U) GET WEPS, a qualified TAO, indicated the Port and Starboard watch rotation technically provides the opportunity for 7.5 hours of sleep in a 24-hour period; however, that sleep opportunity time includes the time required to do other work and life things. [Encl. 20]

633. (U) GET WEPS described physical and mental readiness during TAO watch as "…fine for the first 3-4 hours and the remainder of watch as a drag." [Encl. 20]

634. (U) GET Systems Test Officer (STO), a qualified CSC, indicated the CSC watch rotation provides the opportunity for 7.5 hours of sleep / 24-hour period. [Encl. 18]

635. (U) GET AAWC indicated he obtained close to 7.5 hours of sleep in the 24-hours prior to the friendly fire incident. [Encl. 69]

636. (U) GET AAWC indicated he felt physically and mentally ready to stand watch during which the friendly fire incident occurred. [Encl. 69]

637. (U) GET CSC indicated, on average, that she obtains approximately 6 hours of sleep in a 24-hour period due to being a Division Chief. [Encl. 24]

638. (U) GET CSC indicated she felt physically and mentally ready to stand the watch during which the friendly fire incidents occurred. [Encl. 24]

639. (U) GET RC2 indicated his watchbill rotation provides opportunity to obtain 7.5 hours of sleep / 24-hour period and he felt physically and mentally ready to stand watch. [Encl. 23]

640. (U) REDCROWN turnover [from GET RC1 to GET RC2] occurred at approximately 0215L, approximately 10 minutes prior to the friendly fire incidents. [Encl. 23]

641. (U) GET RC1 indicated his watchbill rotation provides opportunity to obtain 7.5 hours of sleep / 24-hour period and he felt physically and mentally ready to stand watch. [Encl. 41]

642. (U) GET CSC watch turnover occurred at 0000L, approximately 2.5 hours prior to the friendly fire incidents. [Encl. 24]

643. (U) GET EWS indicated the watchbill rotation provides opportunity to obtain 7.5 hours of sleep / 24-hour period and he felt physically and mentally ready to do some operations. [Encl. 73]

644. (U) GET EWS assumed watch at 0130L, approximately 55 minutes prior to the friendly fire incident. [Encl. 73]

645. (U) GET TSS indicated the watchbill rotation provides opportunity to obtain 7.5 hours of sleep / 24-hour period and he felt physically and mentally ready to do some operations. [Encl. 74]

646. (U) On 19 December 2024, GET implemented modification to Condition III Watchbill for TAO watchstanders in an effort to permit more sleep opportunity to address fatigue concerns. [Encl. 20, 47, 111]

647. (U) Sleep restriction to 3-7 hours / night is known to cause sleepiness and reduce cognitive performance after just 1-2 days. [Encl. 268-269]

648. (b) (5) [redacted]

649. (b) (5) [redacted]

650. (b) (5) [redacted]

651. (b) (5) [redacted]

652. (b) (5) [redacted]

653. (U) XW FTAO and XW FAAWC, and GET TAO2 and CSC reported having obtained 4-6 hours of sleep in the 24 hours prior to assuming watch; and GET TAO2 and CSC indicated that amount of sleep restriction is routine for them. [Encl. 19, 21, 25]

654. (U) Sustained cognitive loading is known to induce mental fatigue. [Ref. w]

Human Machine Teaming

655. (U) Misuse of automation refers to excessive trust formed by operators that led them to rely uncritically on automation without recognizing its limitations or fail to monitor the automation's behavior. [Encl. 270]

656. (U) Trust in human-machine teams is developed through reliable and predictable performance of the automation / machine and can be enhanced if the operator has authority over the system. [Encl. 270]

657. (U) Automation bias represents a case of inappropriate decision making linked to overreliance on automation. [Encl. 270]

658. (U) Overreliance on automation represents an aspect of misuse that can result from several forms of human error, including decision biases and failures of monitoring. [Encl. 270]

659. (U) Automated systems that provide decision support may reinforce the human tendency to use heuristics and the susceptibility to automation bias. [Encl. 270]

660. (U) Commission errors occur when operators follow an automated directive that is inappropriate. [Encl. 270]

661. (U) Reliance on the decisions of automation can make humans less attentive to contradictory sources of evidence. [Encl. 270]

662. (U) Authority over system functioning increases operator trust in the system. [Encl. 270]

663. (~~S~~) (b)(1) [Encl. 19, 271]

664. (~~S~~) (b)(1) – (b)(1) (b)(1) [Encl. 19]

665. (U) Despite known issues with the IFF system, GET watchstanders had high confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the IFF system and continued to rely on it. [Encl. 16-17, 23, 25, 42]

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

Opinions

1. (~~S~~) (b)(1); (b)(5) [redacted] .

2. (~~C~~) (b)(1); (b)(5) [redacted]

3. (~~S~~) (b)(1); (b)(5) [redacted] .

4. (b) (5) [redacted]

5. (b) (5) [redacted]

6. (U) In addition to GET CO, individuals across the HSTCSG and within GET contributed to the friendly fire engagement.

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

1. (~~S~~) [redacted]

Watchstanding Principles Violated:

Level of Knowledge: X	Forceful Backup: X	Questioning Attitude: X
Procedural Compliance:	Formality: X	Integrity:
Ownership:	Self-Sufficiency:	

a. (~~S~~) [redacted] [FF 3-7, 10-11]

(1) (~~S~~) [redacted] [FF 13, 314-316, 347-358, 361]

(2) (~~S~~) [redacted]. [FF 2, 7-10, 12-13, 17-18, 20, 315]

(3) (~~S~~) [redacted] [FF 9, 13-15, 314-316]

b. (~~S~~) [redacted]. [FF 8]

c. (~~S~~) [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted]. [FF 21-27].

d. (S) (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 267-268]

(1) (S) (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 286-287, 347-358, 260-269]

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2. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [FF 36-37, 39-40, 96-139, 302, 310, 312-313, 317-325, 336-337, 342, 456, 461, 499-506, 508-510, 515, 541, 551-553, 559-582, 607-639, 641, 643, 645-653, 655-665]

Watchstanding Principles Violated:

Level of Knowledge: X	Forceful Backup: X	Questioning Attitude: X
Procedural Compliance: X	Formality: X	Integrity: X
Ownership:	Self-Sufficiency:	

a. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [FF 310, 313, 317, 319-325, 552-553, 560-573]

(1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) 's [FF 111-118, 321-322, 324, 551-553, 560, 562-568]

(2) (U) Despite the completion of the PQS program and training during OFRP, those qualified as IDS, TSS, and MSS lacked the level of knowledge, tactical proficiency, and confidence in their abilities to effectively manage their supporting systems and make valid recommendations to their supervisory watch stations. [FF 101, 124-127, 321-322, 324, 342]

b. (b) (5)

(1) (U) Lack of formalization of GET's qualification process for supervisory watchstations marginalized the level of knowledge for qualification and led to watchstanders ineffectively standing the watch. [FF 96-100, 105-106, 505]

(2) (U) GET's ineffective training program and lack of new qualifications for supervisory watchstations contributed to fatigue in supervisory positions. [FF 96-98, 100, 616, 621, 632, 633, 646]

(3) (U) GET did not conduct sufficient training scenarios to maintain watchstander proficiency. Lack of tracking watchstander currency on training scenarios led to uneven training and inability to assess watchstander proficiency. [FF 109-115, 120, 123-124]

(4) (U) Key GET watchstanders, including TAO, AAWC, IDS, REDCROWN, EW Operator, and EWS, demonstrated an insufficient level of knowledge for their watchstations as evidenced by their actions leading up to the engagement. [FF 123, 505-506, 302, 515, 559-582]

(5) (U) GET watchstanders lacked knowledge of GET Battle Orders and failed to comply with requirements. [FF 456, 461, 499-506, 508-510, 541]

(6) (U) GET CO lacked knowledge of requirements in his own Battle Orders and failed to ensure procedural compliance by his watchteams. [FF 499, 510]

c. (b) (5) [redacted]

d. (b) (5) [redacted]

(1) (b) (5) [redacted]

(a) (U) GET's modification to its watchbill in an attempt to alleviate recognized TAO watchstander fatigue did not have sufficient time to take effect, and therefore watchstanders may have been operating at a reduced capacity on the night of 21 December 2024. [FF 607-615, 623-624, 627, 630, 632-635, 639, 641, 643, 645-646, 650]

(b) (b) (5) [redacted]

(c) (b) (5) [redacted]. [FF 617, 620-621, 625-626, 629, 631]

(2) (U) GET CO's decisions to engage GB121 (Aircraft 107) and GB123 (Aircraft 112) were, in part, due to an overreliance on the AWS auto-engagement order and trust in the degraded IFF and LINK 16 systems. This overreliance led to complacency, reduced situational awareness, and inattention to contradictory sources of information available, leading watchstanders to ignore information that disconfirmed automation. [FF 36-37, 310, 655-665]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

(a) (~~S~~) (b)(1) [redacted] 's [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted]. [FF 310, 312-313, 336-337, 663-664]

(b) (U) The GET IDS and the GET CSC's failure to communicate the IFF system degradations to GET CIC watchstanders degraded the watchteam's situational awareness and failed to mitigate misplaced trust in the systems. [FF 39-40, 317, 321, 557-558, 582, 665]

(c) (~~C~~) (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 39-40, 317, 321, 574, 582]

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3. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [FF 13-19, 21-26, 28-38, 42-44, 45-47, 51-53, 55-72, 74-79, 81-82, 88-89, 107-108, 117-118, 135, 138, 147-152, 153-161-162, 165-178, 180-210, 212-213, 223, 231-235, 237-249, 252-254, 257, 260-271, 274, 276, 279-284, 286-288, 290, 298-313, 351, 355-356, 481-482, 498, 500-501, 510-516, 518-523, 530, 532-533, 557-563, 562-563, 569, 576-577, 586-588, 590-604, 616, 640]

Watchstanding Principles Violated:

Level of Knowledge: X	Forceful Backup: X	Questioning Attitude: X
Procedural Compliance: X	Formality: X	Integrity:
Ownership: X	Self-Sufficiency: X	

a. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5) (b)(1); (b)(5) (b)(1); (b)(5) (b)(1); (b)(5) (b)(1); (b)(5)

(1) ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [FF 21, 34-44, 317]

(2) ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) 's (b)(1) (b)(1) [FF 28-36, 45-50, 54-55, 59, 60-71, 77, 579-584]

(3) ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [FF 26, 58-60, 64, 71-72, 74-76, 616]

(4) (U) GET experienced a significant normalization of deviation. Watchstanders and technicians accepted the degraded equipment status and associated impacts to their watch due to a belief that "that was how the system operates." Factors contributing to this include a strike group wide lack of understanding of system degradations; lack of routine discussion and understanding of critical CID systems status across the force which limited forceful backup, and lack of oversight from the CSG, GET CSO off-ship acting as LNO, and an acting CSO with limited experience and level of knowledge. [FF 78-79, 29-31, 590, 592-593]

(5) ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [FF 21-26, 28, 30-32, 34-36, 51, 60-70, 77-78]

(6) ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) . [FF 13-19, 36-37, 66, 70]

b. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [FF 135, 138, 601-604, 640]

(1) (U) Watch turnover checklists available to multiple watches in CIC were not in used during turnover prior to the friendly fire incident, contributing to the loss of situational awareness of the three friendly aircraft on recovery. [FF 558, 601-602]

c. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [FF 180-210]

(1) (U) The air defense plan focused on DCA aircraft stationing and employment with little discussion or formalization of an integrated plan for ADUs or MRR procedures. The lack of planned integration between surface and aviation forces contributed to confusion and affected XW's ability to conduct CID and maintain a recognized air picture. [FF 180-198, 200, 204]

(2) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [FF 177-178, 203-210]

(3) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [FF 172-178, 199, 206-210]

(4) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [FF 161, 238-244]

(5) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [FF 192-198, 200, 207]

(6) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [FF 180-185]

(7) (b) (5)

d. (U) The transition between the deliberate strike mission and the follow-on force egress air defense mission was not effectively managed between XP and XW, contributing to the loss of situational awareness in the AMDC's watch floor. [FF 237, 242-243, 245-259]

e. (U) GET CO's failure as the AMDC Warfare Commander to transfer REDCROWN on 21-22 December 2024 to another ADU contributed to the overall loss of situational awareness relative to the friendly air picture. [FF 107-108, 207-210, 481-482, 514, 516, 518-523, 530, 557-563, 602-603]

(1) (U) GET did not meet the minimum requirement of qualified watchstanders to perform the FADIZ function. [FF 107-108, 207-210, 481-482, 514, 518-521, 530]

(2) (U) GET did not meet minimum required equipment functionality to perform the FADIZ function. [FF 107-108, 481-482, 514-515, 519-523, 557-560, 562-563, 602-603]

(3) (U) GET TAO2's overconfidence in his ability to maintain a sanitized airspace led to complacency and a lack of situational awareness, leading to the friendly fire incident. [FF 569, 576-577]

(4) (U) The lack of a defined geographic flight path in the MRR contributed to a decrease in SA of ADUs when experiencing M5 and LINK 16 degradations. [FF 177, 204-205, 498]

(5) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1); (b)(5) [redacted]

f. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 261, 282, 285-288, 299-301, 510]

(1) (U) XW FTAO's request to collect administrative information for storyboard development was a distraction from the immediate tactical mission and likely contributed to XW's degraded situational awareness. [FF 260-269, 282, 285, 287]

(2) (U) GET's recovery of Helo 706 was a distraction that greatly degraded GET's situational awareness and influenced the decision to engage Aircraft 107. [FF 298-299, 301-306, 500-501, 510-511]

g. (b) (5) [redacted]

(1) (U) GET's combination of not accounting for tactically significant tracks and securing SPY aft, directly down the assessed threat axis, significantly degraded their situational awareness of the air picture. The loss of situational awareness negatively impacted GET's ability to execute their duties and maintain control of the friendly air picture, which contributed to the watchteam's surprise at Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112's appearance and the decision to engage. [FF 299, 301, 500, 510, 512-513]

h. (U) Data link architecture, maintenance, and management were insufficient to support ongoing operations, and improper setup directly contributed to degraded situational awareness and decision to engage. [FF 183, 212, 586-588, 595-600]

(1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 586-588, 593-600]

(2) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 183, 212, 593, 598-600]

(3) (U) C2 of HSTCSG datalink architecture, to include changes to the network configuration, setting and management of filters, and reporting of changes for individual units, was ineffective to the extent that it contributed to the loss of situational awareness across the force. [FF 595-598]

(b) (U) CSG-8 JICO's failure to provide adequate supervision of the MRICO watch and network architecture led the MRICO watch to subsume his authority and execute network architecture changes outside of compliance with CSG OPTASKS, fighting instructions, and commander's guidance, which was not briefed to the commander. [FF 595-598]

i. ~~(C)~~ [redacted] [FF 33, 35, 213, 270, 590-591, 593-594]

(1) ~~(C)~~ [redacted] [FF 33, 35, 213, 590, 593-594]

(2) ~~(C)~~ [redacted] [FF 33, 35, 213, 270, 593-594]

(3) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] [FF 33, 35, 213, 270, 591, 593-594]

(4) (U) GET watchstanders (TIC, CSC, TAO) secured CEC without effectively relaying that information to the CSG staff or to GET CO. Although not in compliance with OPTASK CEC requirements, neither the GET TAOs or GET CO took appropriate action to clarify or resolve the issue. [FF 33, 35, 213, 223, 591-594]

j. (U) Lack of formality and adherence to communications protocols and CWC standards resulted in an active recovery of DCA assets without the controlling warfare commander (XW) involvement and knowledge, significantly degraded XW situational awareness, and influenced eventual engagement decision. [FF 245-248, 252, 257, 281]

(1) (U) XW's command and control of the DCA assets was insufficient and contributed to the loss of situational awareness of airborne threats and DCA assets. [FF 223, 231-235, 276, 280, 284, 288]

(2) (U) TFCC action to lasso returning strikers for DCA without XW involvement contributed to the loss of situational awareness onboard GET and was not in accordance with CWC construct. [FF 223, 231-235, 276, 280, 284, 288]

(3) (U) XB initial negation of XW's direction to recover all aircraft short-circuited control over DCA airborne assets and contributed to XW's loss of situational awareness during the event. [FF 253-254, 262, 266, 270-271, 274, 276, 283, 286-287, 351, 355-356]

(4) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 281, 264-265, 271, 274, 279-280, 283-284, 288, 290, 586]

k. (CUI) METOC conditions did not negatively influence HSTCSG's ability to conduct proper combat identification in the battlespace. [FF 147-152, 165-171]

(1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 117-118, 147-152, 165-171]

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4. (U) Despite the significant contributing factors in opinions 1-3, the engagement of Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112 was preventable, and the information either inside of GET CIC or resident within the AMDC team, HST, and ADUs across the force was sufficient to prevent the engagement had it been recognized. [FF 19, 38-41, 101, 110-114, 117-119, 124-126, 175, 192, 199-210, 218-222, 244, 267-269, 285-287, 289, 295, 297, 301-303, 306-307, 309, 317, 319, 321-322, 327, 330, 334, 341-343, 350-354, 360-364-369, 371, 374-384, 390-410, 492, 498, 500, 506, 510-511, 514, 526-534, 552-556, 562-563, 565-567, 570-574]

Watchstanding Principles Violated:

Level of Knowledge: X	Forceful Backup: X	Questioning Attitude: X
Procedural Compliance: X	Formality: X	Integrity:
Ownership:	Self-Sufficiency:	

a. (U) GET's engagement of Aircraft 107 and Aircraft 112 was preventable, and CIC's information was sufficient to prevent the decision to engage. Several actions inside of GET CIC during the event could have either prevented the loss of situational awareness which led to improper combat identification, or could have interrupted the errors in the decision to engage. [FF 38-41, 222, 289, 301-302, 306, 309, 321, 342-343, 365-369, 498, 500, 510-511, 552-553, 556-563, 572]

(1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1), (b)(5) [redacted]

(2) (U) GET AAWC failure to make a "FADED" report, to either the TAO or externally to the XW FAAWC, prevented the watchteam from looking in the last tracked position and prevented external stations from assisting in providing combat ID on the last tracked position, of Aircraft 107 and 112. [FF 302-303, 556]

b. (U) IDS shortfalls in the CHECKPRINT process failed to prevent the engagement. [FF 321]

(1) ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 101, 110-113, 117, 126, 317, 321, 565-567]

(2) ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

[redacted]. [FF 39-41, 317, 321, 562, 563]

(3) (~~S~~) [redacted] [FF 111-114, 117-119, 124, 321, 492, 506]

(4) (~~C~~) [redacted] [FF 319, 321, 562-563]

(5) (~~C~~) [redacted]'s [redacted] [FF 39-40, 321, 350-351, 353-354]

(c) (U) EWS/TSS shortfalls in the CHECKPRINT process failed to prevent the engagement. [FF 322, 319, 570-571, 175, 352]

(1) (~~S~~) [redacted]'s [redacted] [FF 322, 570-571, 175, 352]

(2) (~~S~~) [redacted]

d. [redacted]

e. (~~S~~) [redacted] [FF 267-269, 285-287, 552]

f. (U) Several single actions outside of GET CIC during the event could have prevented the loss of situational awareness and friendly fire engagement. [FF 19, 207-208, 210, 514, 530]

(1) (~~S~~) [redacted]

(2) (U) Only one of three aircraft checked-in with REDCROWN. If the other two aircraft had checked in with REDCROWN, this may have prevented the friendly fire engagements and may have led to recognition of LINK 16 PPLI and M5 causalities onboard GET. [FF 526-531, 534]

(3) (~~S~~) (b)(1) [FF 192, 200-201, 203-206, 210, 532-533]

(4) (~~S~~) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) [FF 218-220, 303, 307, 554-555]

(5) (~~S~~) (b)(1), (b)(5)

(6) (U) After GET reported engagement of GB121 on ADC C&R, HST ADWC2 attempted intervention based on friendly aircraft indications on his displays, but did so with an informal, unanchored communication format. Had ADWC2 communicated with the standardized format of, "XW this is H, GB121 shows Friendly PPLI, over," it would have alerted XW of the errors in PFID at the time of the first engagement and prior to follow-on engagement. [FF 360-364]

g. (b) (5)

(1) (b) (5)

(2) (U) GET lack of an external CHECKPRINT did not give other strike group assets timely notice of the pending engagement or solicit their input to evaluate the engagement. PFID

indications were resident at several locations across the CSG, however, without adequate time to evaluate the engagement, other strike group assets were unable to intervene. [FF 330, 334, 327, 351-352, 354]

h. (U) The ejection decision made by the aircrew of Aircraft 107 was justified, and if the aircrew of Aircraft 112 had also decided to eject, this too, would have been justified under the circumstances. [FF 391-403, 405-410]

(1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 244, 297, 391-401]

(2) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 341, 402-404]

(3) (CUI) Had the Aircraft 107 pilot not commanded ejection of Aircraft 107, the SM-2 (b)(1) would have most likely maintained a valid guidance mode and fuzed on Aircraft 107. [FF 399-404]

(4) (U) Had the Aircraft 112 pilot executed the appropriate SACT maneuvers, there is a high chance it would have resulted in controlled flight into the Red Sea and the loss of both aviators, due to aggressive maneuvering at night. [FF 396-397, 405-408]

(5) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] [FF 295, 407-410]

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[22] ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

5. (U) Under a totality of the circumstances reviewed, based upon major opinions 1-4, all findings of fact, and understanding that he was the single accountable officer responsible for engagement decisions and weapons release, CO GET's decision to engage was neither reasonable nor prudent. [FF 19-22, 28-29, 32-33, 35-36, 52-56, 59-60, 76-78, 80, 90-91, 96-97, 99-100, 106, 108, 122, 124-127, 134-146, 162-163, 180-181, 187, 194, 207-210, 212-213, 223, 236-237, 248, 259-260, 275-276, 278, 291-294, 298-303, 308, 312, 314, 316, 321-322, 326, 328, 331, 333, 338, 344, 347-349, 352-353, 354, 356, 357, 359-365, 370, 438-443, 445-454, 457-460, 462, 464-647, 472-474, 483-484, 499-514, 540-544, 552, 566, 565, 567, 572, 573, 579-585, 601, 603]

Watchstanding Principles Violated:

Level of Knowledge: X	Forceful Backup: X	Questioning Attitude:
Procedural Compliance:	Formality:	Integrity: X
Ownership: X	Self-Sufficiency:	

a. (U) The GET CO's decision to engage GB121 and GB123, which he had assessed to be inbound threats to GET and the force, was conducted in accordance with ROE and a commander's inherent right and obligation of self-defense. However, under the totality of the circumstances, based on the deficient materiel condition of GET (IFF and CEC issues), and deficient unit and force watchstander proficiency, the decision to engage was neither reasonable nor prudent. [FF 19-22, 28-29, 32-33, 35-36, 52-56, 59-60, 76-78, 90-91, 99-100, 106, 108, 122, 124-126, 140-146, 162-163, 180-181, 187, 194, 207-210, 212-213, 223, 236-237, 248, 259-260, 275-276, 300, 302, 314, 316, 321-322, 326, 328, 331, 338, 344, 347-349, 352-353, 354, 357, 359-365, 370, 438-443, 445-454, 462, 464-647, 483-484, 514, 579-585]

b. (b) (5) [redacted]

c. (U) The GET CO, in his role as ADU CO, failed to ensure his watchteam was adequately qualified, trained, proficient in the execution of TTPs, and that the materiel condition of his ship met minimum requirements for performance of air defense duties. [76, 80, 96-97, 124-127, 134-139, 321-322, 357, 457-460, 472-474, 499-511, 514, 540-544, 566, 565, 572, 573, 579-585, 601, 603]

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

6. (U) In addition to GET CO, individuals across the HSTCSG and within GET contributed to the friendly fire engagement.

a. (U) The CSG-8 JICO failed to ensure an adequate LINK architecture, CEC compliance, compliance with ID Policy A. [FF 211-213, 468-470, 586-598]

b. (U) The XB BWC failed to supervise TFCC's acknowledgement of the GET engagement report without adequate forceful backup, by issuing a "roger out" on a track report they had no information on, TFCC missed an opportunity to exercise command by negation. [FF 371 – 390]

c. (U) The GET TAO2 failed to properly supervise subordinate watchstations in GET CIC and violated GET Battle Orders. His overconfidence in his ability to maintain a sanitized airspace led to complacency and a lack of situational awareness leading to the friendly fire incident. [FF 351, 485-487, 569, 575-576]

d. (U) The GET AAWC failed to maintain a RAP, failed to make a faded report when the friendly track he had hooked that was associated with Aircraft 107 was dropped, and maintained no situational awareness to the expected DCA RTB flight path. [FF 259, 272, 296, 302-303, 325, 349-350, 489, 552-553, 556]

e. (U) The GET IDS failed to properly identify M5 on scope and incorrectly reporting no modes, no codes in the CHECKPRINT procedure. [FF 492, 565-567]

f. (U) The GET CSC failed to inform GET TAO of the tactical significance of MOP overload reported to her by GET IDS 15 minutes prior to the CHECKPRINT, and violated GET Battle Orders in the setting of combat systems green deck, and reauthorizing the AFT VLS while Helo 706 was over deck. [FF 39, 62, 488]

g. (U) The GET EWS failed to properly report the friendly aircraft radar signature down the line of bearing during the CHECKPRINT procedure. [FF 322, 490]

h. (U) The GET MSS failed to recognize that the intercept point for GB123 (Aircraft 112) had moved away from ownship prior to a fire authorization. [FF 365, 342-343]

i. (U) The XW FTAO / XW FAAWC / REDCROWN failed to maintain situational awareness of the location of the friendly aircraft as they RTB. [FF 305, 354-356, 477-482, 497-498, 514-531, 557-560, 563]

j. (U) The GET PTO failed to ensure the adequate tactical training across all watchstanders. [FF 109-117, 124-126]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

k. (U) The GET EMO (acting Combat Systems Department Head) failed to adequately inform leadership of the equipment casualties associated with IFF and LINK 16. [FF 582-584]

l. (U) The GET SWO failed to identify and prevent unauthorized watchbill modifications within CIC. [FF 128-139]

m. (U) The GET CSMM and GET OI LCPO made unauthorized watchbill modifications and allowed non-qualified individuals to stand watch. [FF 128-139]

n. (U) The GET AMDC Syndicate and CVW-1 mission planners failed to effectively integrate and develop a comprehensive air defense plan in support of combat operations on 21 December 2024 and failed to ensure that the air defense plan was adequately communicated to all ADUs. [FF 180-210, 647]

o. (U) The AMDC LNO failed to adequately represent the interest of the GET CO and the GET AMDC planning team onboard HST and failing to communicate effectively the interest of CVW-1 planners to GET. [FF 163-164, 181-187, 194-195, 203-204, 206-207]

p. (b) (5) [redacted]

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Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

Recommendations

The following recommendations are focused on Categories of Doctrine and Organization, Training, Materiel, and Leadership/Education and Personnel. Facilities (DOTMLPF). DOTMLPF categories have been consolidated to: Doctrine and Organization, Training, Materiel, and Leadership/Education and Personnel. Facilities recommendations were not applicable.

Doctrine and Organization

1. (U) Provide this report to Fleet Commanders for consideration of IFF and CEC systems in their specific combat readiness requirements instructions.

2. (U) Provide this report to Surface TYCOMs for consideration of standardized class specific Battle Orders to include an addendum on System limitations and tactical mitigations.

3. (U) Provide this report to USFFC to inform updates to the Navy Wide OPTASK ID, including clarity in assignments for OPTASK duties and responsibilities, and consideration of separation of MRICO and FTDC (MRICO/FTDC) responsibilities, boundaries, and reporting requirements.

4. (U) Provide this report to SMWDC to inform updates to command and control of CSG assets in NTTP, more specifically, as it relates to C2 of Air Defense assets in Maritime Air and Missile Defense Employment (NTTP 3-01.12).

5. (U) Provide this report to SMWDC / NAWDC to review for lessons learned and then update TM 3-22.1-17 Combat Flight Quarters, and include Combat Flight Quarters into AW Basic Phase events.

6. (U) Provide this report to NETC to review for lessons learned concerning watch initialization, turnover, and minimum currency and proficiency requirements across the force.

7. (U) Provide this report to USFFC for consideration of developing JICO-specific training requirements and directives to formalize and improve the training, qualification, and assignment of CSG / ARG JICOs during the OFRP.

8. (U) Provide this report to Surface TYCOMs for consideration in establishing and accelerating implementation of minimum currency and proficiency requirements for tactical watch standers across the surface force.

9. ~~(C)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

10. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

11. (U) Provide this report to CSG-8 to inform an update to OPGEN SUPP, clarifying command organization and command by negation guidance.

Training

12. (U) Provide this report to Surface TYCOMs to review with all stakeholders for lessons learned and their application to Air Warfare across the continuum of training provided in the OFRP.

13. (U) Provide this report to Surface TYCOMs to review for lessons learned and application during Basic Phase trainings on procedural compliance, level of knowledge, and the tactical impact of off-nominal conditions, with attention on fratricide prevention.

14. (U) Provide this report to Surface Combat Systems Training Command (SCSTC) / ATG/ NIWDC/ SMWDC for consideration in publishing a recommended TACSIT and Console operations settings as tactical guidance.

15. (U) Provide this report to USFFC for consideration in updating the Navy-Wide OPTASK AMD to include external, multi-unit compilation of data to inform track ID in defined CHECKPRINT procedures.

16. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(1)
(b)(1)

17. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

18. (U) Provide this report to cognizant training organizations to incorporate the lessons learned into the review and rehearsal of Combat Flight Quarters (CFQ) considerations throughout the OFRP.

19. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted]

20. (U) Provide this report to AMDC training continuum (FADO, IADC, AD Seminar) to incorporate the lessons learned into ID policies and implementation, and training events with attendance by key CSG staff elements.

21. (U) Provide this report to NETC to review for lessons learned and their application to IAMDC curriculum and staff training, specifically considering CVN/CVW aircraft approaches, alert posture considerations, and CATCC operations.

22. (U) Provide this report to CSG-4 / CSG-15 / TTGP / TTGL to inform updates to the "Strike Group Warrior's Guide" and recommend inclusion of the Warrior's Guide in Warfare Commander BST and/or as a focused aspect of the CSG OFRP schedule to highlight specific aspects of combat leadership and friction points between warfare commanders.

23. (U) Provide this report to CSG-4 / CSG-15 / NWDC for consideration of formalizing their Warrior's Guide as a Navy Tactical Reference Publication (NTRP).

24. (U) Provide this report to CSG-4 / CSG-15 to inform the development of training scenarios that mirror the complexity of this operation (deliberate strikes with mixed air threat picture or similar) including training to off-nominal contingencies such as RTF/MRR (ID turns) and other ways to effectively ID a complex multi-threat air picture.

25. (U) Provide this report to CSG-4 / CSG-15 to review for lessons learned and underscore the importance of formal assessment of Surface Ship ALR in CSG mission planning and CONOP development during OFRP events, specifically warfare commander conferences hosted by TTGP / TTGL and through assessment at GRUSAIL and C2X.

26. (U) Provide this report to CSG-4 / CSG-15 for consideration of including a minimum number of Large-Force Flex-Deck CVN/CVW operations during GRUSAIL and C2X scenarios to ensure greater exposure of the Air Defense Commander planning staff and their integration into the CVN (Romeo) and CVW Strike (Papa) planning processes.

Materiel

Accounting for known combat systems degradations

27. (U) Provide this report to NAVSEA PEO IWS to develop a report to fleet commanders compiling an aggregated list of risk within each AEGIS ship's combat systems as it applies to readiness for warfighting against the most challenging, plausible threats in a combined, joint environment.

28. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

29. (U) Provide this report to USFFC to inform a review of ship baseline certification process across all stakeholders, and how residual risk from the technical community should be characterized and communicated to the fleet and operational commanders.

30. (U) Provide this report to NSWC Dahlgren Division to inform a review of CPDD that includes additional details in reported discrepancies such as frequency of occurrence (measureable), symptoms and indications, and mitigations. Mitigations should be reviewed for tactical feasibility.

31. (U) Provide this report to NSWC Dahlgren Division to inform a review of combat systems documentation and tech library requirements for each baseline, and then promulgate a comprehensive list of effective publications to support technical documentation for all elements of the combat system.

32. (U) Provide this report to ATG to incorporate lessons learned in the Air Warfare administrative review process, to include a validation of combat systems documentation onboard.

33. (U) Provide this report to NSWC PHD to inform a review of interoperability C&L generation process to include notification of ship, squadron, and strike group stakeholders of inherent IOP deficiencies identified.

34. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

35. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

36. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO HSTCSG FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

37. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) [redacted].

Data Extraction / Materiel Readiness

38. (CUI) Provide this report to NAVSEA PEO IWS for consideration in accelerating their effort to field data recording, extraction, and analysis capability to allow replay (operator scope) capability of shipboard ES systems.

Leadership & Education, Personnel

39. (U) Provide this report to OPS LDO Community Leadership to inform a more robust screening process for assignment as a CSG JICO.

40. (U) Provide this report to BUMED, OPNAV N9, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and Acquisition to inform their 2024 SECNAV-directed development and fielding of a system for collecting objective sleep and fatigue data for individualized fatigue management and support to operational commanders' decision-making.

41. (U) Provide this report to Surface TYCOMs/NAVSEA/NSWCs for consideration of including Human Systems Integration and Human Factors Engineering into the development and design process for critical systems.

Accountability

42. (b) (5) [redacted]

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